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Summary
The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that the way groups or individuals
tackle resource access and control problems does not always reflect identifiable
institutional processes. This was tested through a case study of livelihoods and
resource access problems of a Kenyan coastal community dependent on small scale
fisheries. The structure of the study was based on the need to understand the context
in which people live in order to interpret their behaviour. Each chapter sought to
examine aspects of people's social and biophysical setting, paying particular attention
to changes and causes of change. This involved a reconstruction of the community's
historical relations with other groups in their area; socio-economic analysis of the
livelihoods of different groups within the community; and social network analysis of
people's actions in response to resource access and control problems.
All groups within the community depended on a range of activities to provide food
and income, but the role of fishing was dominant. Changes in local natural
environments were shown to have led to a decrease in household productivity over the
last five decades. This was attributed to colonialism, international development and
cultural changes. This also led to increased effort in the sea, leading to overfishing.
The overall socio-economic situation of the community was revealed as poor.
Social network analysis showed that administrative and political actors were found to
be more important than actors with a legal mandate to solve resource related
problems. It was shown that formal institutions relating to natural resources stifled
the process of problem resolution. Local people were found to use alternative
processes, based on communication networks, to solve problems, thus supporting the
hypothesis.
The findings stress the importance of understanding local people's socio-economic
and socio-political situation before developing resource management strategies.
Resource managers could make use of social network analysis to identify and
understand the roles of key people, groups and organisations.
xiv
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Approaches to human-environment interactions
The ongoing epistemological debate in the natural and social sciences reflects a shift
in Western attitudes towards the natural environment and development. The heritage
of Western rationalism, grounded in attitudes developed during the European
Enlightenment era of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is no longer accepted
without argument (Habermas, 1984; Wallace et al., 1996). The attitudes of Western
society have shifted away from naive modernism, the tenets of which were cultural
Eurocentrism, scientism and a belief in indefinite and continuous progress (Sokal and
Bricmont, 1998). This is evidenced by, among other things, an increasing acceptance
in the West that many societies in the world do not share these beliefs and that other
societies are fundamentally different. Experiences outside the West often find that,
for example, cultural factors are of greater or equal importance as economic factors
and that community pressures can be greater than state sanctions in influencing social
behaviour (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Ghai, 1999). Despite (or possibly due to) some
radical concepts I developing from this shift in attitude, the positive spin-offs have
been felt in international development and concerns about human-environment
relations. In particular there has been an increasing shift towards multidisciplinarity
as cultural, social and political dimensions of human-environment relations are
considered in conjunction with natural sciences when tackling the dilemmas derived
from man's use and abuse of the environment.
The marriage of natural and social sciences is as essential as it is inevitable if an
understanding of the relationship between humans and the natural environment is
being sought. This alliance is strengthened further by the fact that the relationship
between humans and the environment is closely tied to the relationship between
humans and humans. There are complex social rules and patterned expectations of
behaviour that govern how groups and individuals gain access to, harvest, use and
I Post-modernism and related concepts of constructivism (radical and social), post-structuralism, and
deconstructivism can be characterized by a non-belief in the objective world and attempts at meta
narrative explanations (e.g. the universal theories/explanations generated by science). These concepts
view reality as purely a function of social and, by definition, linguistic construction (Mathews, 1999).
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distribute natural resources. These rules and patterns of behaviour are manifested as
formal and informal institutions 2 . These structural characteristics are considered to
determine what can happen in societies (Giddens, 1984). Thus, historical,
sociological, ideological and political factors that influence the evolution of social
rules must be considered in conjunction with natural factors when considering human-
environment interaction. It is from this perspective that the following study is carried
out. The interaction between humans and humans and how they shape human-
environment relations is a central theme.
The question of how people gain access to and control over natural resources, the
focus of this study, illustrates well the duality of social and natural factors. The
institutions that govern resource access and control are rooted in social histories and
biophysical processes. An important characteristic is that they are inherently flexible.
This is because of the need to adapt to both changing social and biophysical
conditions and because natural resource exploitation is characterised by uncertainty
and irreversibility (Dasgupta, 1982; Berry, 1989; Pido et al., 1997). However, it is
possible that the pace of social or biophysical change may be too great for social rules
(institutions) to adapt, and as a result environmental and social problems may occur
(Watson, 1989). The recent history of global wealth and food distribution suggests
that this is the case for much of the world. In the 1990s, 80% of the world's gross
product was owned by 20% of the world's population (Robertson and Speier, 1998).
By the end of the 20th century, real per capita income in the one hundred poorest
countries had not increased for over a decade and a half, leaving 2.3 billion people
living on less than two US dollars a day (de Rivero, 1999). Furthermore, an estimated
800 million people in the world are considered chronically undernourished (Ricupero,
1999) and in sub-Saharan Africa people are worse off nutritionally today than thirty
years ago (Reid, 1998).
The issue is not simply one of aggregate resource or food availability, global food
balance sheets are positive (Ricupero, 1999). As Sen explains, "scarcity is the
2 Institutions are formed when rules or guidelines become embedded in social settings through regular
use (Thomas-Slayter, 1994; Mearns, 1995). They are understood to be the rules by which people gain
access to and control over resources — ie. rights (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Mearns, 1995), but they also
embody responsibilities (Pinkerton, 1997).
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characteristic of people not having enough; it is not the characteristic of there not
being enough. While the latter may be the cause of the former, it is one of many
causes" (1981: 1). One of the major causes is the loss of command over resources
(Sen, 1981), due for example, to changing institutions relating to resource access. A
principle cause of this change is widely considered to be the superimposition of
modern ideology3 over other societies through processes such as European
colonialism4 and the market economy (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Robertson and
Speier, 1998). The problem of population pressure is acknowledged as a contributory
factor, but the long held belief that it is the sole cause of resource scarcity problems is
simplistic.
The change in Western attitudes, referred to from the outset, is partly 5 in response to
this situation. There has been a realisation that thirty years of technocratic, top down
forms of development have not worked and that local communities do not maliciously
or ignorantly harm the environment (Baker, 1984; Kanbur, 1992). The
complementary fields of natural resource management and international development
have become increasingly aware that the crux of the problem is ideological. This is
demonstrated by the increasing inclusion of understanding site-specific social
conditions (culture, politics and socio-economics) in development programmes. This
is true of both the developed and the developing world and is best illustrated by the
growing use of local level participation in development and natural resource
management as the improvements become apparent (Doulman, 1993; Hviding and
Baines, 1994; White et al., 1994; Chambers, 1995; Bavinck, 1996; Horrill, 1998;
McGlade, 2000)6 . Central to this breakthrough, and permitted by the ideological shift,
has been the growing understanding of the role of local level institutions governing
human-environment relations (Berkes, 1985; McCay and Acheson, 1987; Berkes,
1989; Ostrom, 1990).
3 The characterising feature of modern society's relationship with nature is one of domination and
mastery (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1993 quoted in Wallace et al..., 1996).
" Colonial rule fundamentally changed the political and administrative make up of societies. Scientific
and administrative techniques adopted in the nineteenth century significantly enhanced the state's
ability to control human-environment interaction within its jurisdiction (Bryant and Bailey, 1997)
5 There are also changing attitudes towards natural resources and the environment in the West, away
from a focus on commodity production to the inclusion of aesthetic values, wildlife habitats etc.
6 Some other illustrations include: McGlade's (1999) observation that hollowing out of the state is
occurring; the ecosystem management approach discussed by Wallace et al. (1996); Robertson and
Speier's (1998) evidence of self organising networks and collaboration paradigm.
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However, analysis of these recent approaches to resource management and
sustainable development acknowledge that despite a shift in attitude the results have
not always met expectations (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Leach et aL, 1997; Forsyth et
al., 1998). In practice access to resources is a dynamic political process (Berry, 1989)
characterised by unequal power relations between groups and individuals (Kanbur,
1992; Bryant and Bailey, 1997). National and international development policies are
subject to this process, which partly explains why the last thirty years of development
has tended to favour the better off and politically powerful sections of society, whilst
poorer indigenous people are the last to benefit (Boukhari, 1999). Clearly the top
down reality has changed little as it still has its uses and because it maintains people
in positions of power (Chambers, 1995). Participation of local people infers
empowering them and this is often viewed as a threat to the establishment (Chambers,
1994; Eyben and Ladbury, 1995). In addition, Giddens (1999) alludes to the fact that
the effect of rapidly changing ideology has meant that formal institutions have
become inadequate to the tasks they are now called upon to perform.
Identifying established institutions and creating new institutions that govern how
people gain access to resources has become a preoccupation of resource management
and development policies that give a central role to local people (Ostrom, 1990; Ghai
D. and Vivian J. 1992; Berkes 1995; Means, 1995; Baland and Platteau 1996; Leach
et al., 1997). The problem of constantly changing conditions is recognised as a
significant complication (Gibbs and Bromely, 1989; Watson, 1989; Ostrom, 1990;
Kooiman, 1999). In addition there has been great difficulty in coping with the fact
that human communities are differentiated and therefore institutions affect individuals
and groups differently (Leach et al., 1997). Similarly variations in local ecosystems,
changes in culture and local power relations all influence institutional make-up and
functioning and are difficult to formalise for application in policy. The response has
been to develop an increasingly comprehensive understanding of the institutions that
are in place with respect to specific human-environment situations (Leach et al., 1997;
Pido et al., 1997; Lamb, 1998) and then to patch the rules into a specific policy
framework. But, as Nuitjen (1999) points out, such an approach does not consider the
problem that in many cases people are reluctant to participate, preferring to work in
4
loose personal networks instead of collective projects. Or why we find local people
working in continuously changing constellations instead of in more enduring groups.
The suggestion in this study is that an alternative approach to this institutional
problem can be taken. Rather than taking the contemporary approach that involves
identifying the institutions (rules) that govern resource access and control in a given
place, the aim is to analyse how groups and individuals actually tackle resource access
and control problems. The former approach assumes the identifiable formal (e.g. state
laws) and informal (e.g. local customs) institutions that are in place have some
efficacy in solving resource access problems, the latter does not. In reality people's
actions in response to resource access problems may not always reflect identifiable
institutional processes that can be 'harnessed' for policy. In fact, people organise
activities in their daily life in many ways. For most of these activities no
organisations or predetermined patterns are set up but networks are mobilised which
provide crucial information, financial support, and practical help (Nuij ten, 1999). In
many instances therefore, local groups and individuals may actually act
extemporaneously and create ad hoc processes to find solutions to the sorts of
problems resource management policies also seek to encompass. Thus, the focus of
resource management and development policies on untangling the institutional
reality7 may represent a misunderstanding of the actual processes involved.
Admittedly, some of these ad hoc processes may in time become new institutions
through repeated use, as de Soto (1989) identified for informal economic sectors in
developing countries, but they may just as likely not be used again.
This hypothesis does not negate the important role of institutions in governing
resource access and control, it simply suggests that embedded social guidelines may
not determine all social actions. Understanding these other processes may be
beneficial for natural resource management and development strategies.
7 Such as environmental entitlements (which identifies institutions to particular resource situations, cf.
section 5.4) (Leach et al., 1997) and Rapid Appraisal of Fisheries Management Systems (which
identifies which informal institutions should be included) (Pido eta!., 1997).	 5
1.2 The case study
This study focuses on the activities of a community living on the south coast of Kenya
(Figure 1.1). Management of natural resources in coastal areas is especially complex
because of the diversity of marine and terrestrial environments and the complex
patterns of human activity they support (Burbridge, 1995). Consequently, the
principles of multidisciplinarity and the participation of local stakeholders have
become embodied in contemporary management approaches. Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM) and community-based or co-management are now standard
terminology.
This case, of a developing country community living adjacent to a coral reef
ecosystem, illustrates further challenges to resource management. Fish for food is
extremely important in developing countries, providing 40% or more of the annual
protein intake for over 60% of the population (Price et al., 1993). Coral reefs in
particular supply about 20-25% of the fish catch of developing countries (IUCN,
1993). In coastal East Africa, where this study was carried out, fish is estimated to
provide 90% of the total annual animal protein intake by coastal people, 70% of the
catch coming from coral reef related ecosystems (Ngoile and Horrill, 1993). In
developing countries it is often the poorest sections of the population who depend on
the marine environment for their livelihoods, this is particularly the case in coral reef
areas (Tvedten and Hersoug, 1992; Eakin et al., 1996). Yet these areas are also
characterised by rapid human population growth and migration to the coast and, as a
result, competition for limited marine and terrestrial resources has become a
problematic feature (Price et al., 1993; Jameson et al., 1995). Lack or failure of
management policies in these regions can have catastrophic effects for millions of the
world's most disadvantaged people.
The fieldwork for this study took place in two phases, five months in 1996 and a year
from February 1997 to February 1998. The study focused on the livelihoods of a
fishing community and three situations in which the fishing community had to deal
with issues of access to and control over resources. One issue involved the attempted
implementation by the State of a marine protected area that incorporated the
community's fishing grounds. Another issue involved a conflict between the
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indigenous fishers and a group of well established migrant fishers from Tanzania. A
third issue involved the illegal subdivision and sale of seafront state land used by the
community to access the sea and to carry out fish trade and other fishing related
activities.
Figure 1.1 The Kenya coast, showing the location of the study site.
Adapted from Mclanahan and Obura, 1995
1.3 Objectives and outline
The aim is to test the hypothesis that the way groups or individuals tackle resource
access and control problems does not reflect identifiable institutional processes. The
structure of the study is based on the need to understand the context in which people
live in order to interpret their behaviour. Each chapter seeks to examine aspects of
people's social and biophysical setting, paying particular attention to changes and
causes of change.
Chapter 2 develops the institutional theme introduced in this chapter, and reviews the
way resource management has developed in recent years. Some of the constraints to
resource management success are also discussed. The alternative approach to the
institutional problem is expanded upon, and social network analysis is presented as a
methodological approach suited to the analysis of problem solving processes at the
local level.
Chapters 3 and 4 present the historical reasons why resource access problems have
arisen at the chosen study site, in terms of both human activity and the natural
environment. In chapter 5 the mix of formal and informal institutions in the study site
are analysed in their historical context, and their impact on resource use in the study
area is examined. Although this study focuses on a single community, other social
groups exist in the area. The aim of chapter 6 is to link the main activities that occur
in the study area to the issue of resource availability for members of the studied
community. These chapters provide the background to the socio-economic analysis
of livelihoods in the study site (chapter 7).
The penultimate chapter (chapter 8) analyses the actions taken by members of the
community to tackle resource access and control problems. The approach taken is
based on the inference that the institutions involved can be deduced from the people
or groups (actors) involved and the importance of the actors in solving the problems.
The final chapter (chapter 9) considers the extent to which institutions did determine
the actions of local people and concludes by discussing the implications of the study
findings for natural resource management.
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2 MITIGATING HUMAN-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONS
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter introduced the idea that people's patterns of behaviour with
respect to the use of natural resources, are conditioned by their physical environment
and rules or guidelines. The notion that these rules evolve or change over time and
are therefore inherently flexible was also introduced. Interest in these rules or
guidelines, which are broadly defined as institutions (the definition is considered
below), has grown in recent years because of their role in mitigating human-
environment relations. As outlined in the introduction, the shift in resource
management approaches to include groups and individuals previously excluded from
the management process has elevated the role of a wide range of institutions. When
the results have not always met expectations (Leach et al., 1997), the general response
has been to widen the scope of institutions included, for example, by placing greater
importance on traditions. Writers such as Rasmussen (1989) and Nuijten (1999) point
out that this has meant that other processes that mitigate human-environment relations
have been neglected. This study considers the possibility that individuals or groups
may well act without the guidance of institutions.
Before describing the nature of small-scale fisheries in section 2.3 (the sector in which
this study was carried out), our understanding of an institution and the associated
ambiguities is reviewed in section 2.2. The role of institutions in the livelihood
strategies of people dependent on locally available resources are also considered in
this section, particularly in relation to risk. As indicated in the previous chapter, it has
been suggested that the way resource management has been approached is partly
responsible for the poor results, especially in fisheries. Some of the well-discussed
criticisms are reiterated below, particularly in relation to the oversimplification of
theories. However, the intention is not to criticise the theories, but to show that taking
a particular view (modernist) of human-environment relations has placed limitations
on resource management success (section 2.4). This has been tackled at two related
levels: the theoretical biases behind the science of management (part 2.4.1), and the
cultural prejudices that have had an over-riding influence on human-environment
9
relations globally (part 2.4.2). The legacy of this modernist view is argued in section
2.5 to exacerbate the problems of poor people, such as small-scale fishers, in
developing countries.
The major shift in approaches to resource management is acknowledged, but it is
argued that understanding different processes, other than institutional, could improve
resource management further (section 2.6). The fact that it may not be possible to co-
opt these processes into management strategies stresses the need to understand the
conditions that predicate people's actions that bring about similar results sought by
resource managers. Thus, the socio-political environment in which management takes
place is considered to be of importance.
The final part of this chapter (section 2.7) introduces a method of analysis that allows
people's actions to be analysed in relation to resource access and control problems.
The case study in the following chapters seeks to verify the arguments presented in
this chapter.
2.2 The meaning and role of institutions
Recent analysis of problems relating to human-environment relations stress the
important role of institutions (Gibbs and Bromely, 1989; Watson, 1989; Ostrom,
1990; Thomas-Slayter, 1994; Mearns, 1995; Leach et al., 1997; Pido et al., 1997;
Forsyth et al., 1998; Jentoft et al., 1998). However, there is some ambiguity in the
definition of an institution and an organisation, particularly in the context of natural
resource management and development. In general, institutions are distinguished by
their normative aspects, whereas organisations have structural aspects (Nuijten, 1999).
Thus, institutions constitute complexes of norms of behaviour structuring human
interaction (Giddens, 1984; Uphoff, 1986; North, 1990), with formal (rules, laws) and
informal (norms of behaviour, conventions) constraints. In relation to common
property resources (of particular interest in this study), Ostrom (1990) and Leach et
al. (1997) take such a structured definition, defining institutions as the working rules,
meaning those actually used, to organise repetitive activities. Associated with this
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definition is the understanding that they become identifiable institutions when the
rules become embedded in social settings through regular use (Meams, 1995). Jentoft
et al. (1998) stress however, that institutions should not be simply regarded as North's
(1990) 'rules of the game', because they also consist of "cognitive, normative, and
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social
behaviour" (Scott, 1995:33 in Jentoft et al., 1998: 427).
In contrast, organisations are considered to be structures of recognised and accepted
roles (Uphoff, 1986) where groups of individuals are bound together by some
common purpose to achieve particular objectives (North, 1990). Their existence is
dependent on people's interactions. Institutions therefore, are the underlying beliefs,
rules and social and political elements that govern the activities of organisations as
they seek to realise particular goals (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; North, 1990; Scott,
1995). Uphoff (1986) argues that an organisation can become 'institutionalised' if it
satisfies people's needs by meeting their normative expectations over time. Similarly,
the bureaucratic nature of organisations can lead to institutionalisation when people
within them are simply role-playing. For example, the United Nations (UN) may
have acquired this status (although it doesn't say much about people's normative
expectations of certain technical organisations within the UN, see section 2.5). This
aspect is important from the point of view of current 'participatory' approaches to
resource management, because it infers that the organising practices of local people or
community organisations can become institutions over time (Thomas-Slayter, 1994).
In the context of human-environment relations, the role of institutions has been to
confer rights and responsibilities and provide livelihood opportunities by authorising
and legitimising actions (Pinkerton, 1997; Jentoft et al., 1998). There has been much
attention given to understanding that the, often quite complex, composites of rules
that involve multiple and overlapping user rights to resources are associated with the
pursuit of collective goals (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Bryant and Bailey, 1997;
Nuijten, 1999). This role has been given precedence in resource management since
institutions have been viewed as having to deal with the exclusion problem and the
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subtractability problem 8 in common property resource situations (Berkes and Folke,
1997 in Nuijten, 1999). But Nuijten (1999) warns against the notion of collective
goals because resource managers may perceive the collective goal (e.g., sustainable
resource management) and not the stakeholders. This is because individuals involved
in collective actions may all have different goals, and may participate in a variety of
institutions to gain greater or lesser advantages (Crowley and Appendini, 1999).
By participating in institutions, which involves establishing relationships, individuals
and groups gain an important form of social capital. Crowley and Appendini (1999)
suggest that greater social security or 'stronger safety nets' appear to be associated
with access to wider ranges of institutions. Thus, participation in institutions does not
only affect access to resources, but the contrary is also true: access to resources
affects participation in institutions.
Participation in institutions is one way individuals and groups seek to manage risk.
The livelihoods of small-scale rural people have been characterised by Chambers
(1997) as being complex, diverse and risk-prone. The features of complexity and
diversity, in relation to livelihood strategies, are intended to minimise risk. This is
discussed below. Institutions fall into the complexity/diversity strategies that seek to
reduce environmental, economic and social risk.
Swift and Baas (1999) summarise definitions made in Beck (1992) and Adams
(1995), that risk is the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a
stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge. This is in contrast to
detriment, which is defined as a numerical measure of the expected harm or loss
associated with an adverse event. Two aspects of risk have been identified: objective
risk, which is the past and likely future occurrence of risk measured by experts; and
perceived risk, which is the way lay people anticipate future events or view past ones.
Table 2.1 expresses the relationships.
Berkes and Folke (1997: 7,8 quoted in Nuijten, 1999), argue that "institutions have to deal with the
two fundamental management problems that arise from the two basic characteristics of all such
resources: how to control access to the resource (the exclusion problem), and how to institute rules
among users to solve the potential divergence between individual and collective rationality (the
subtractability problem)"	 12
Table 2.1 Risk matrix. (Source Swift and Baas, 1999)
Risk Detriment
Objective
(measured as)
statistical probability economic cost
Perceived
(measured as)
perceptions of likelihood
of different events by
different actors
economic cost
non-economic cost (including eg
self-esteem, community solidarity,
future livelihood vulnerability)
People are not unwary of risk; they experience it and prepare for it in ways that
depend on their prior experience, their expectations of the behaviour of others, and
their resources and their objectives. Their behaviour is guided by institutions that
have also been built on prior experience and the interactions with their environment
and other people. Thus risk is culturally constructed (Adams, 1995 in Swift and Baas,
1999), and individual attitudes to risk differ, for reasons such as wealth, which in turn
will influence their behaviour (Milner-Gulland and Mace, 1998). But this is set
within certain institutional constraints (customs, land tenure systems, law...).
2.3 The nature of small scale-fisheries
Small-scale fisheries, alternatively referred to as traditional or artisanal fisheries,
represents one of the most important livelihood sectors in the world. These fisheries
are characterised by locally made boats (dug out canoes for example) and gear
(woven fish traps, spears, relatively small nets), and locally available natural
resources. Small-scale fisheries are labour intensive, employing approximately 95%
of the world's 28.5 million fishers and supplying 50% of the 70 million tonne annual
catch for direct human consumption (FAO, 1993, 1995b; O'Riordan, 1994; Le Sann,
1998). This takes place predominantly in the developing world where the sector
supports over 140 million9 people in traditional processing (such as curing and
drying) and marketing, providing food and income for many of the world's poorest
and most vulnerable people. In coastal East Africa, where this study was carried out,
it is estimated that fish accounts for 90% of total annual intake of animal protein and
9 Based on 1998 fertility estimate for developing countries of 3.3 children per woman (National
Geographic, 1998). O'Riordan (1994) estimated at least 100 million people, Weber (1993) estimates
200 million including associated activities.	 13
is the primary source of income for many people (Ngoile and Horn!!, 1993). This
sector of fisheries is the focus of this study.
Like 'third' agriculture l °, livelihoods based on small-scale fisheries are complex,
diverse and risk-prone (Chambers, 1997). Being risk-prone is a characteristic of
livelihoods dependent on natural resources and the biophysical environment
(Dasgupta, 1982; Chambers, 1997); complexity and diversity are strategies people use
to reduce this risk (Tvedten and Hersoug, 1992; Chambers, 1997). Thus, a common
feature of small-scale fisheries is that they are often combined with other sources of
food and income activities. Different household members may carry out different
activities. Usually the additional sources of livelihood are agricultural, but they also
include activities such as trade and casual labouring (Tvedten and Hersoug, 1992). In
addition, for many people, fishing has become a diversifying tactic from other forms
of livelihood, and as such it represents a livelihood of last resort (Russ, 1991) and a
source of low cost protein (O'Riordan, 1994).
Apart from small-scale fishing often being part of complex and diverse livelihood
strategies, the fisheries themselves tend to be complex and diverse. Tropical
nearshore marine fisheries, which are characteristic of many developing countries,
involve many species, complex and diverse habitats, and many fishers and gear types
(Johannes, 1998). Furthermore, the resource users themselves form complex and
diverse groups, often being highly differentiated according to age, gender and
ethnicity for resource access and production roles (Tvedten and Hersoug, 1992;
Chambers, 1997). Not surprisingly the institutions that determine access to these
resources are also complex and diverse (Ruddle, 1988; Bryant and Bailey, 1997;
Leach et al., 1997; Forsyth et al., 1998). This is particularly so because so many
small-scale fisheries are common property resources (McCay and Acheson, 1987;
Ostrom, 1990).
1 ° Chambers (1997) identifies three types of agricultural activity: industrial agriculture found in the
North (developed world) and plantations of the South (developing world), which is standardised and
simple and supports 1.2 billion people; green revolution agriculture found in the South which is also
relatively uniform and simple and supports 2.6 billion people; and third agriculture of the South which
is complex, diverse and risk-prone, and supports 2.2 billion people. 	 14
The institutional arrangements that people develop in a common property situation
form what are known as common property regimes. These regimes typically involve
two things: well-defined resources and resource users; and strict controls on access
and use (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Generally these situations are not 'open access' in
small-scale fisheries (Berkes, 1985, 1989; Ostrom, 1990). Limits to access in
fisheries have for example been based on territorial user rights in fisheries (TURFs)
(Lutchman and Hoggarth, 1999). As Bromley argues, "common property represents
private property for the group of co-owners (since all others are excluded from use
and decision-making)" (1991: 25 quoted in Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 161). These
regimes are also inherently flexible because of the element of local control and
decision-making. Individuals are able to communicate in these localised settings, and
to establish institutional arrangements based on their shared norms and patterns of
reciprocity (Ruddle and Johannes, 1985; Ostrom, 1990). Thus, resource use practices
can be adjusted, in other words the rules changed, in response to changing social and
environmental conditions (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). In fact, a state of constant
change is normal for common property regimes. People have to constantly respond to
shifting property relations, environmental circumstances, and social conflicts amongst
themselves both inside and outside a common property regime (Ecologist, 1993).
It is therefore not surprising that analysis of institutional arrangements in relation to
small-scale common property resource situations has revealed that people have many
solutions to cope with many different problems (Ostrom, 1990; Leach et al., 1997).
Clearly complexity and diversity are not only characteristic, but are necessary,
features of the livelihoods of people depending on small-scale fisheries. Threats to
this complexity and diversity would therefore be expected to weaken the livelihood
security of these people by increasing effort in fewer activities and ultimately
reducing resources. As many writers suggest (O'Riordan, 1994; Bryant and Bailey,
1997; Chambers, 1997; Jentoft et al., 1998; Johannes, 1998), this has been the case
for small-scale common property systems due to Western scientific and development
theories.
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2.4 Contextual limits to management success
"Most of us are not naïve enough to believe the old myth that scientists are paragons
of unprejudiced objectivity, equally open to all possibilities, and reaching conclusions
only by the weight of evidence and logic of argument. We understand that biases and
preferences, social values, and psychological attitudes all play a strong role in the
process of discovery...Science as actually practised, is a complex dialogue between
data and preconceptions." (Gould, 1991: 244)
The declining state of many coastal marine environments and the overexploitation of
many of the world's fisheries have been widely reported (FAO, 1995b; Economist,
1998). The latter situation has been caused principally by overfishing, destructive
fishing methods and pollution (Weber, 1994). There are a number of important
theories informing natural resource management. One of the principle theoretical
areas, where people are concerned, relates to how people make decisions about the
harvesting of resources (Milner-Gulland and Mace, 1998). The perceived failure of
natural resource management, as reflected by, but not exclusively, the state of the
world's fisheries, has encouraged critical analysis of its theoretical basis. This
criticism, the "lifeblood of science" (McGlade, 1997), is part of the ongoing process
informing and revising natural resource management approaches. In the context of
common property systems, there has been a perceptible shift away from top-down,
bureaucratic, and to some extent, science based approaches to management (Jentoft
and McCay, 1995; Pomeroy, 1995; Holland, 1996; Christie, 1997; Jentoft et al.,
1998). The growing use of community-based management or co-management, and
the incorporation of traditional or local knowledge in marine resource management
illustrates this".
Critical analysis of natural resource management has occurred at two related levels:
the applicability of the theories to reality, and at a higher level, the cultural prejudices
that have influenced the approach taken by science and 'development'.
11 For examples see: Doulman (1993); Hviding and Baines (1994); White eta!. (1994); Pomeroy et al,
1996; Sen and Nielsen (1996); Jorge (1997). 	 16
2.4.1 Theories and reality
The main criticism of harvesting and decision-making theories has been the
oversimplification of the models derived from the theories (Berkes, 1985; Ostrom,
1990; Ludwig et al., 1993; Kooiman, 1999). For example, the decision-making
theory, Game theory, a mathematical tool for analysis of strategic interaction, has
been widely applied to fisheries (Sumaila, 1999 reviews different game-theoretic
models of fishing). Its application has been related to how individuals make decisions
in relation to risks. The Prisoner's Dilemma 'game', for example, has been used to
explore the obstacles to the development of trust and co-operation between
individuals exploiting natural resources I2 (original applications were by Axelrod,
1984 and in relation to the role of the state, Johnston, 1989). However, as Ostrom
(1990: 183-184) points out, this model depends on extreme assumptions that do not
reflect many real situations. Similarly, Hardin's (1968) famous 'tragedy of the
commons' model is equally constrained (Berkes, 1985; McCay and Acheson, 1987;
Ostrom, 1990) because of its basic assumptions. Such models, however, have been
extremely influential in resource management because they have been closely tied to
justifying the principal role of the state° (Bryant and Bailey, 1997).
Aspects of harvesting theory, such as the influential concept of maximum sustainable
yield (MSY), have been criticised because of the level of uncertainty in the models
(Ludwig et al., 1993). Ludwig et al. (1993), and later, Healey and Hennessey (1998)
argued that social, political and economic factors make fisheries management regimes
based on such stock recruitment models unworkable. I4 Yet, these models have long
been used to determine centralised fisheries management policies, even in small-scale
situations that are infinitely more complex than single species industrial fisheries.
Such critical analysis, in the light of resource management performance, has spawned
the range of alternative practices we now see, none of which focus on a neo-
Hobbesian Leviathan (see Jentoft et al., 1998). Many stress greater participation of
12 For an explanation see Milner-Gulland and Mace, 1998: 91-96.
13 The need for the state as argued by Hobbes in 1651, that individual action in the absence of a state
can only lead to anarchy, has remained largely unchanged. This argument has been used in relation to
natural resource exploitation, particularly by Ophuls (1977), quoted in Bryant and Bailey (1997: 51).
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previously excluded actors, for example in community-based management and co-
management regimes.
2.4.2 Cultural prejudice
The higher level of critical analysis relates to the modernist approach taken towards
human-environment relations. For example Ghai (1999) and Wallace et al. (1996)
point out that individualism is a characteristic of modernism and therefore of most
Western societies, however it is not characteristic of all societies. Yet, it has been an
assumption of resource management theories applied, through the West's power and
influence (aid and 'development'), globally. Similarly Western scientific method,
with its tendency to reduce the complex and varied to the simple and standard, has
been questioned (Ludwig et al., 1993; Wallace et al., 1996; Chambers, 1997;
Johannes, 1998). As Chambers explains, reductionism has been "very successful in
physical sciences, but not in human sciences and the other more complex intersections
of the ecological and biological sciences with people and their needs. In diverse,
dynamic and uncontrollable conditions with continuous variance and multiple
linkages, reductionist methods can be both costly and misleading" (1997: 42). In this
policy environment, with its reliance on expert opinion, democratic processes have
been largely ignored in favour of scientific decision-making. Consequently, resource
users and other stakeholders have had little room to participate meaningfiffly in
decisions about resource use and management (Wallace et al., 1996). This situation is
changing in many instances, as reflected in new resource management approaches,
but the legacy of modernism remains for a number of reasons. Some of these reasons
are outlined in section 2.5.
As with earlier resource management concepts, the continuous process of critical
analysis has highlighted some weaknesses of the more recent approaches to human-
environment relations and resource management. For example, co-management or
community based management place more emphasis on the participation of resource
14 Consider the socio-political environment in which management of industrialised fisheries must
operate, where fishing fleets are paid between US$21-54 billion in subsidies, worth 75% of global
catch (Weber, 1993; Milazzo, 1998). It gives little hope for sustainable resource use. 	 18
users and other stakeholders in an attempt to redress the oversimplification of earlier
models (Ostrom, 1990; McGlade, 1995; Leach et al., 1997; Kooiman, 1999). This
explains why detailed knowledge of local institutional arrangements has been
considered a priority. However, analysis of human-environment relations have
revealed a level of complexity that are not acknowledged in many cases where
community-based resource management has been applied, and this may explain why
many cases have not met expectations (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Leach et al., 1997;
Forsyth et al., 1998). Leach et al. (1997) show that there has been a weakness in the
main assumptions in community-based approaches because they have been based on
assumptions of homogenous, consensual communities, the existence of stable
universally valued environments, and the potentially harmonious relationship between
the two. At the local level however, communities are very differentiated. Factors
such as class, gender and wealth can determine local power relations that greatly
influence people's access to resources (Chambers, 1997; Leach eta!., 1997).
Acknowledging and incorporating local complexity adds numerous challenges for
resource management. A look at the institutional aspect provides many examples.
Often institutional arrangements are not always as adaptable or as flexible as may be
desired for holistic management policies due to internal and external factors relating
to the local people concerned (Ostrom, 1990). Gender, wealth, age and ethnic
differentiation within communities can result in communication difficulties between
groups for many reasons. People with power or status within a community who stand
to gain from the existing situation can block efforts by less powerful individuals to
change the rules. Similarly, external authorities may prevent institutional change
because they risk losing power (Nelson and Wright, 1995). This is further
complicated by the fact that institutions themselves reproduce and shape relations of
unequal power and influence that exist in societies (Kanbur, 1992). Thus institutions
which might appear to be acting for the collective good may actually deprive certain
groups of access to resources (Rocheleau and Slocum, 1995; Leach et al., 1997).
Such subtleties may only become apparent with hindsight. Another problem for
management may be that the rate of change external to the local situation may be too
fast for internal structures to respond (Ostrom, 1990; Eyben and Ladbury, 1995).
Local institutions have a tendency to breakdown due to the problems of poverty and
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inequality that can result from external economic or political influences (Forsyth et
a!., 1998). This explains why traditional TURFs appear to be vulnerable to exposure
to external values, economic pressures and technologies, and decreasing authority of
the community (Lutchman and Hoggarth, 1999).
Another question that has been raised about community-based approaches relates to
the importance placed on consensus. Consensus processes are considered extremely
powerful tools because agreements can be accomplished where ordinary political
processes would fail. There is a tendency to believe that consensus can be reached
within communities. But, because they are highly differentiated, consensus may be
an unattainable goal. Nelson and Wright, (1995) argue that strategies that reconcile
living with difference may be a more realistic objective. Consensus processes can
also be used to artificially manufacture the appearance of consent and legitimise
actions that would otherwise be impossible to accomplish. This can happen when
certain groups or individuals are excluded from consensus processes because more
powerful actors organise the process (Britell, 1997a, b). Conflicts between local
people and large-scale commercial interests could suffer from this problem where
national policies tend to support the commercial interests. Moreover, if it is change
that is being sought, the role of consensus itself may be questionable. As Marx noted,
"it is the dialectical struggle between actors and groups and the contradictions of
social structures that govern historical change more than cooperation, harmony and
common general interests." He observed that this was because "actors and social
groups cannot be regarded as having equal opportunities and resources. This is the
foundation of relations of power. But there is always some degree of autonomy and
dependence on both sides of any power relations" (quoted in Rasmussen, 1989: 10).
So even weaker actors have an ability to resist stronger actors, since it is rare that one
actor has overwhelming power over all other actors (Bryant and Bailey, 1997).
The examples above, of theoretical biases and prejudices and the limitations to
resource management, represent conventional wisdom in the wealthier and more
powerful developed nations. Where the scientific process of critical analysis and shift
in Western attitudes (cf. chapter 1) refines and changes the theories, the organisations
and institutional processes that apply the concepts have been slow to change. Part of
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the problem can be attributed to the bureaucratic nature of the organisations that seek
to influence or carry out resource management. Merton demonstrated that individuals
within organisations tend to adhere to rules in a ritualistic way and elevate these
above the goals they were designed to realise (1957, in Abercrombie et al., 1988).
This becomes inefficient if changing circumstances such as described above, have
made the rules out of date. But the reluctance to change can also be attributed to
prejudices derived from being in a position of power. As Rowe observed, "In the
final analysis, power is the right to have your definition of reality prevail over other
people's definition of reality" (1989: 16, quoted in Chambers, 1997: 76). Since the
powerful individuals within organisations and states determine their actions, power
can become an impediment for change. The legacies of powerful global actors are
discussed below because it has consequences for the livelihood strategies of small-
scale fishers.
2.5 The legacy of modernism
It is ironic that scientific method and reason, as forces of change in Europe during the
Enlightenment 15 , should be identified as contributing to the current dichotomy
between the world's developed and less-developed nations and the state of the
environment. The argument appears in political ecology and development literature,
for example, Wallace et al. (1996), Bryant and Bailey (1997) and Chambers (1997).
The industrial model of development and free markets in the developed world grew
out of the ideals of enlightenment (Wallace et al., 1996), and has created modern
societies based on materialism with very high levels of consumption of natural
resources. The USA, for example, with 5% of the world's population consumes 40%
of the world's non-renewable resources (O'Riordan, 1994).
The influence of the European economic order, which has dominated much of the
world since the colonial era of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 16 continues
15 As science and its challenge to societal beliefs in various natural phenomena evolved during the
Enlightenment so did the critique of the social order. The ills of society were seen to be a function of
the distribution of wealth, power, and prestige, suggesting that egalitarianism was implicit in the
thinking of the scholars of the Enlightenment (Mathews, 1999).
16 Colonialism was precipitated five hundred years ago by Europe's attempts to outflank their eastern
Islamic barrier, via sea routes, to the wealth of the 'East'. Famously Colombus's arrival in America2it
to influence the livelihoods of people dependent on locally available natural
resources, such as small-scale fishers. The dominant economic order that developed
in the nineteenth century was the provision of raw materials from colonies established
in Africa, Asia and Latin America for consumption and manufacturing in Europe and
North America. This involved annexing vast areas of land for the provision of raw
materials, either as mono-crops or for exploiting natural resources such as timber, and
imposing open access regimes over marine resources. Consequently, those colonies
became, and their more recent incarnations remain, economically dependent on
natural resource exploitation. From the perspective of many indigenous people,
locally available resources became scarce due to a tragedy of enclosure (Ecologist,
1993). Property became a system of authority established by colonial governments.
For individuals within these regimes, the assignment of property rights affected their
bargaining powers and changed the distribution of income and wealth (Dasgupta,
1982) (for this case study, cf. chapter 4).
Institutions established during colonial regimes were created to co-ordinate
exploitation of natural resources and only late in the day did the need to 'manage' the
exploitation be recognised (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Obvious problems arose, not
excepting the theoretical weaknesses identified above, because the 'science' of
management relied on expert opinion and technology (Hays, 1959), which colonial
regimes could afford but independent developing countries can not. Yet, the same
organisations and institutional structures have remained and continue to be
responsible for natural resource use and management. Another consequence of
keeping the same institutional structures from the colonial past has been the
marginalisation of whole sectors of society dependent on resources deemed of little
worth during the colonial era (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). In Kenya for example the
colonial regime decided that it was not feasible to develop industrial fisheries in East
African coastal waters (Crutchfield, 1958), and did not place importance in a marine
fisheries department. Consequently, the current department and small-scale fishers
remain under-supported despite the more recent realisation that many tens of
thousands of people depend on marine resources in Kenya (pers. obs.).
1492, and Vasco da Gama's voyage to India around the Cape of Good Hope in 1497-99 (Hall, 1996;
Bryant and Bailey, 1997).
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The problems of bureaucracy identified by Merton (1957) contribute to the
entrenchment of outmoded ideas in many developing country organisations. But this
is also the case in Western dominated organisations that have influence over
developing country organisations. For example, the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organisation's (FAO) work programme for 2000-1 is spending US$
847,000 field testing participatory methodologies for the acquisition of information in
small-scale fisheries (FAO, 2000) 17 . Yet these methods have been applied and have
had a proven record for over a decade in small-scale agriculture (Chambers, 1997).
What is striking about the FAO since 1945 is how little the institution's core ideas
have changed (modernisation, promote export cash crops, enhance productivity and
'efficiency') (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). The consequence of which has been to
maintain the international status quo. As in colonial times, 'progress' for the FAO
was defined in terms of increased production for the market, and modernisation was
thus a process whereby Western science and technology were applied to the task of
enhancing yields (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). The quest to apply Western knowledge
in aid of 'development' persists, despite the basic concepts, such as technology
transfer, being acknowledged as "one of the most expensive and tragic hoaxes of all
time" (Smillie, 1991, quoted in O'Riorden, 1994: 1).
The international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International
Monetary (IMF) fund have been similarly criticised. Structural Adjustment Policies
have deepened the political and economic dependency of many developing countries
on the developed world. The export-led growth model on which structural adjustment
policies have been based is "a purely extractive one involving more the 'mining' than
the management - much less the conservation - of resources" (George, 1992: 2-3
quoted in Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 92). The conditions of loan agreements with the
IMF and the World Bank require developing countries to pursue western development
ideals with some obscure consequences. In Kenya for example, the increased
17 FAO 2000 sub-programme 234A4: Promotion of Fisheries Management in Coastal Fisheries
281. Objective: Fisher communities achieve a balanced equilibrium between the need to engage in
capture fisheries and the need to preserve aquatic resources.
282. Outputs: Review of policies, planning procedures and management strategies of potential use in
Africa and South Asia. Field tests of participatory methodologies. Guidelines for community-level
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problem of land grabbing (a problem analysed in the case study) by politicians has
been identified as a result of international pressure for political liberalisation which
has increased the cost of political patronage (Klopp, 1998). In addition the
IMF/World Bank agenda of privatisation and commitment to individual property
rights has placed public or community lands under great pressure.
In a similar vein, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), established after the Uruguay
round of negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is
viewed as promoting the interests of developed nations over other nations (Walker,
1995). The procedural elements of the WTO, particularly in the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, are based on consensus.
Consensus however, is defined in the WTO as the absence of formal objection by any
Member present at the meeting. Thus, those countries that cannot afford to have a
permanent representative in Geneva, or to send delegates to every meeting, lose their
influence (Walker, 1995). This feature of the WTO, present in both decision-making
and dispute procedures, favours the developed nations. In addition, the legal status of
the WTO, which requires Member countries to amend their domestic laws to conform
to the obligations under the Uruguay round, is concerned with gaining access to
markets. This favours global business, namely Transnational Corporations (TNCs),
which are almost exclusively from developed nations. Milner-Gulland and Mace
(1998) observe that the higher legal status of the WTO may also have weakened some
established international treaties by reducing the enforcement option of trade
sanctions.
The examples above illustrate the globalisation of a particular system in which the
individual has primacy over the community (Ophuls, 1977). But, as Shiva reminds
us, 'global' does not denote a universal human interest, but rather signifies "a
particular local and parochial interest which has been globalised through the scope of
its reach" (1993: 150 in Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 81). Habermas (1987: 155-197)
discusses this change in societies, showing that 'tribal' societies, such as those in this
case study, become less self-maintaining as they become modernised. For rural
fish stock assessment and determination of fishing capacities. Report on national/regional policy
frameworks conducive to local management of fishing effort. 	 24
communities, the effect has been the loss of community control over local resources,
and thus it is at the local level that these effects have been most acutely felt, with the
overall result being intensified social poverty and environmental degradation. Many
of the risk management strategies of local people have been lost, both through the
limits placed on livelihood options and the ability of local institutions to function
under over-riding external influences. Common property regimes that were once
diverse and complex have been eroded to mono-faceted regimes. In the case of small-
scale fisheries, the limitations placed on livelihoods due the imposition of
individualistic philosophy have possibly had a greater effect than mismanagement. In
Kenya, for example, there is no state management (or mismanagement, therefore)
actively carried out in small-scale coastal fisheries (C. Oduol pers. comm.). Yet, as
the case study shows, the effects of past (colonial) and present international
(development policies, tourism) influence and government policy have significantly
reduced the livelihood options for local people.
The appearance of 'participatory' resource management is in recognition of the limits
to these regimes. But, as was argued above, these more recent approaches to resource
management still face certain limitations due to the same conceptual constraints. If
human-environment relations continue to be perceived as bounded by rules and the
processes having specific directions, it will be difficult to recognise other processes
that are important in mediating human-environment problems (Rasmussen, 1989).
2.6 Less structure, more action
Two factors suggest that individuals and groups act outside the realm of institutions in
relation to resource access and control. Firstly, there is evidence that they do so in a
variety of circumstances but it is simply not acknowledged in resource management.
Secondly, the complexity and diversity of livelihoods in small-scale common property
resource situations would be reduced if actions were limited to institutional
constraints.
The evidence for individual or group actions that are not guided by institutions, yet
involve significant levels of organisation, or derive collective outcomes, is found in a
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range of situations. Nuijten (1999) discusses experiences in development projects that
often find people preferring to work in loose personal networks instead of collective
projects. This is because there can be disadvantages and dangers involved in
collective organising. For example, in some situations formalised collective actions
may imply political dangers and risks. Therefore, other more individual and less
identifiable forms of organising are used to avoid outside control. This is especially
the case when the state has the reputation of being unpredictable, dangerous, and
sometimes violent. Although not necessarily sinister, Gupta notes that what is most
striking "is the degree to which the state has become implicated in the minute texture
of everyday life" (Gupta 1995: 375 in Nuijten 1999). Gupta described the situation in
India, but it was equally evident in this case study in Kenya (pers. obs.). Such socio-
political contexts can be a strong disincentive for people to become involved in
'community based' organisations, or to follow established formal or informal
institutions.
Complex and diverse livelihoods include a wide range of activities. But these
activities also depend on the life cycle of the household, on who is fit or sick, who can
do what, on what has already been done, on competing demands for resources
available, on past experiences, social conventions and much else. Even within the
same village, different social groups can have completely different strategies (e.g.
many livelihood activities over the year) (Chambers, 1997). Each actor has a
different perspective on what is a problem and how to improve the situation (Pretty
and Scoones, 1995). Such livelihoods are dependent on ingenuity and opportunism
with minimal constraints. Institutions serve to allow people to cope in many ways
with their local, complex, diverse, dynamic and unpredictable conditions, facilitating
diverse behaviour of individuals. But the actions themselves are ultimately
unpredictable (Chambers, 1997), being influenced by a multitude of factors that are
more transient than institutions.
2.7 Analysing the process of problem solving at the local level
"The structural designers of organisations, those who mandate reporting
relationships or memo distribution lists or access to databases, are much like
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architects who try to predict where the pedestrian traffic will be or should flow on a
university campus. They lay their cement, install fences and other obstacles, but
inevitably the flows of people and classes carve bare spots in the grass where the
sidewalks need to be." (Salancik, 1995: 347)
The thread of the argument presented above is that a reductionist and over structured
approach to human-environment relations has placed limitations on resource
management and on the livelihoods of people in common property situations.
2.7.1 A network approach
In other management disciplines, with a greater attention to the relations between
people, such as business management, it has long been recognised that rigid
approaches fail to elicit an accurate understanding of situations (see Peters, 1989;
Handy, 1990). With reference to the application of systems theories to problem
solving approaches in business, Checkland notes that 'hard' methodologies such as
systems engineering fail when applied "to the messy, changing, ill-defined problem
situation with which managers have to cope in their day-to-day professional lives"
(1989: 288). Similarly, early (1970s) criticisms of technical Operational Research
(OR) 18, stressed that models could be optimised, but not reality, and "that OR should
aim to manage complex messes rather than solve problems" (Mingers, 1992: 95).19
One response to these criticisms, which has relevance to problem solving and
organising practices in the context of this study, has been the application of a social
network approach to organisational settings (proposed by Tichy et al., 1979). These
authors argued that a social network perspective enabled both the static and dynamic
aspects of organisations to be captured, because of the focus on the linkages between
the social objects (actors - individuals, groups, organisations...) (ibid). The social
network approach Tichy et al. (1979) advocated has conceptual origins in sociology,
anthropology and role theory that had already been widely applied since the 1950s in
18 OR was developed in the 1950s and 1960s to improve decision making and problem solving in
organisations.
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other studies of the behavioural and social sciences (see Tichy et al., 1979: 508
Origins and Perspective; Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 5-6). The uniqueness of the
social network approach is that emphasis is placed on the actors and the relationships
between them (in contrast to the actors and their attributes), and the notion that the
characteristics of the relationships as a whole may be used to interpret the behaviour
of the actors. Any regularities and patterns in these relationships are seen to give rise
to structures, and the actors are seen as being embedded in these structures of
connections (for comprehensive reviews see Scott, 1991; Wasserman and Faust, 1994;
Hanneman, 1997). Thus, the focus is on the network of relations, and the network is
generally defined as a set of relations linking a defined set of persons, objects or
events (Everett, unpub.). Social networks can be developed from four basic flows:
exchange of goods; exchange of information and ideas; affect or liking; and the
attempt to influence (Tichy et al., 1979). Many of the concepts in social network
analysis are founded in graph theory, enabling mathematical operations to be used to
quantify structural properties of networks (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Models of
social systems based on graph theory are therefore social networks, and graph
theoretic terminology is applied, where nodes are actors and lines connecting nodes
are ties between actors. One of the main applications of graph theory in social
network analysis has been for the identification of the most important actors in a
social network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Identifying important actors in networks formed when people tackle resource access
and control problems in common property resource situations, it is argued (part 2.7.3),
provides an insight into the question of the role of institutions. In such cases,
networks are formed through the exchange of information, forming communication
ties between actors. The different sources of actor importance are discussed in part
2.7.2.
In the context of social interactions, power is seen to play a key role in determining
social behaviour (for a review of theories of power see Mingers, 1992). In sociology
power is a description of a relation, not a 'thing' that people 'have' (Mingers, 1992;
19 Similar kinds of constraints have led to the use of network approaches in biological sciences. For
example in relation to the dynamics of whole ecosystems (see Baird eta!., 1991; Ulanowicz, 1999). 28
Nelson and Wright, 1995). From a network perspective, an actor's power within a
network is therefore derived from their relations with others, whereas an actor's
personal attributes and strategies have more influence on how power may be acquired
(Brass, 1984). This relational importance is illustrated by Berry's observation that
small-scale "farmers' ability to gain or retain access to land for purposes of
cultivation depend as much on their relationships with other people as on the specific
terms under which they claimed the land rights" (1992: 347). Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978) also stress that power is a strong predictor of resource allocation under
conditions of uncertainty, a condition characteristic of livelihoods dependent on
locally available natural resources. Power is also a property of the overall network,
depending on the variations in the patterns among actors. Power, for example may be
concentrated in a few actors, and this would be reflected by the overall structure of the
network.
Taking a social network approach to questions such as how do actors tackle issues of
resource access and control, enables power to be taken into account as well as how
action and decision making are embedded in social networks (Schweizer and White,
1998). Furthermore, this approach is actor oriented, which is necessary because, as
Seed (1990) argues, working with any individual or group, in any setting, only makes
good sense if it incorporates an understanding of the individual's or group's world
from the individual's or group's point of view.
In relation to resource access and control, Leach et al. (1997: 7-12) describe an actor
oriented approach (environmental entitlements analysis) that seeks to understand how
different actors' practices are embedded in, and help to shape, formal and informal
institutions. They develop the notion of entitlements, first described by Sen (1981),
emphasising social and environmental differentiation and the command different
people have over environmental resources. They argue that by being actor oriented it
takes an analysis of difference and an appreciation of power relations seriously, and
by focusing on institutions (illustrative of current approaches) it avoids the
Malthusian type of analysis that links people directly with resources. However, they
neglect to show how power derived from relations between actors influences social
behaviour, and therefore fail to appreciate more flexible processes can also determine
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the outcome of a given situation. (Although they do provide a good method of
identifying the range of institutions influencing a given social situation, and it is used
in chapter 5 to illustrate institutional links to livelihoods.) Eliciting an understanding
of the more transient or flexible processes through social network analysis would
complement the environmental entitlements analysis, providing a significantly more
holistic reflection of social behaviour related to resource access and control.
2.7.2 Sources of actor importance
From a network perspective, actors have constraints or opportunities according to the
way they are embedded in a network. Actors with few constraints and more
opportunities are in favourable structural positions (Hanneman, 1997). These
favourable positions, which are essentially the extent to which actors are connected to
other actors (alters), have been considered to put actors in positions of power over
other actors in the network. These positions are referred to as central positions. Thus,
an actor's centrality in a network can be considered to reflect the actor's power in the
network. But the centrality-power relation is not monotonic. As Freeman (1979)
showed, centrality is a multidimensional concept, and different kinds of power can be
derived from different positions. He identified three types of centrality, degree,
betweeness and closeness, each of which are based on graph theoretic concepts. The
definitions are widely summarised (Scott, 1991; Wasserman and Faust, 1994;
Hanneman, 1997; Mizruchi and Potts, 1998). Degree centrality is defined as the
number of other actors (alters) to whom an actor is directly tied. Thus, power
(importance) is derived from the ability to communicate directly with others.
Betweeness centrality is defined as the extent to which alters must pass through a
focal actor in order to communicate with other actors. Power in this case stems from
the ability to restrict the communication of others. Closeness centrality is defined as
the extent to which an actor can reach a large number of other actors in a small
number of steps. So the ability to reach large numbers of alters whilst being able to
rely on a minimum number of intermediaries places an actor in an advantageous
position.
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Other questions have been raised about the centrality-power relation. In certain
exchange networks, for example, power and centrality are related in a non-monotonic
way. Power and centrality are also considered to be analytically and empirically
distinct, since in some cases an actor's power may be influenced by the power of its
alters, and this may not be reflected by Freeman's centrality measures. Each of
Freeman's measures have been developed upon in an attempt to account for this. For
a review of these issues see Mizruchi and Potts (1998). The issue of exchange
networks does not affect this study, since it concerns communication networks,
however the notion that an alter's power influences the power of an actor is taken into
account. The measures applied in this study are described in chapter 8.
2.7.3 The use of social network analysis in this study
The application of a network approach in this study enables networks based on
communication ties to be identified for specific circumstances. Through social
network analysis (chapter 8), the importance of individual actors (derived from
different graph theoretic concepts) within each network can be determined. The
assertion is that, as long as the relationships can be identified (through interviews,
discussions, documentation...), this approach reflects people's actual social behaviour.
There may seem to be a contradiction in taking this approach, which asserts that
social structures play a significant role in social action, when looking for transient or
flexible processes. However, the suggestion here is that the actors in the network will
reflect institutions that guide social behaviour, and the actor's importance in the
network will reflect the importance of the institution. Or, as is asserted in the
hypothesis, the contrary is the case, that it may be that institutions are not
determinants of a network's structure or the behaviour of the actors. A focus on actors
and their actions (communcative, in this case), is also an attempt to avoid the circular
reasoning of the argument that institutions guide people's behaviour, yet at the same
time people's repetitive behaviour form institutions. There must be a point at which
people's effective behaviour is neither repetitive nor guided by rules.
Social network analysis has been widely applied in relation to many of the problems
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discussed in this chapter. Some recent examples are given below. As with the
argument presented in this study, Ortegon (1998) showed that communication
networks (in her study, 'gossip' networks) were necessary social assets used to express
multiple interests where no institutional arrangements existed. She argued that these
networks were essential for institution building and every day conflict resolution.
With reference to the limitations of too restricted an institutional view, Helbling
(1998) showed that in the context of tribal societies, New Institutional Economics
(based on North's rules of the game) failed to give sufficient attention to political
phenomena. This was mainly because too much attention is given to institutions
influencing transaction costs, particularly property rights. Similarly, Lang (1998)
used a network approach to show how different actors influenced the process of
communal land privatisation in Namibia in the early to mid 1800s. Aunger (1998)
found that in the changing socio-economic environment of the Democratic republic of
Congo, new kinds of social organisation resulted from the use of belief systems for
social ends. Social network analysis has also been applied to demonstrate that the
overlaying of colonial social orders on other societies resulted in the redefinition of
old social orders and the invention of new strategies (Goelich, 1998). White et al.
(1998) explain why Tlaxcalan villages in Mexico have been able to maintain cultural
autonomy through spatially concentric social network organisations, despite Spanish
colonial settlement since the turn of the 16 th century.
In this study the communication relationships between different actors involved in a
series of resource access and control issues were identified and are analysed in
chapter 8. The issues examined were the attempted implementation of a marine
protected area, a conflict between two fishing groups and a case of land grabbing.
Each chapter prior to the social network analysis provides a detailed examination of
the environmental, socio-political and socio-economic situation of the studied
community. This is necessary for an informed interpretation of people's behaviour in
relation to the resource access problems they face.
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3 THE BIOPHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE KENYAN COAST AND
THE STUDY SITE - LOCALLY AVAILABLE RESOURCES
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to describe the main biophysical features in the region and
study area that are relevant to the activities of the studied fishing community. The
availability of resources to coastal human populations of the type in this study
depends on the natural characteristics of the areas they inhabit. The productivity of
local environments reflects both large-scale phenomena such as climate as well as
localised features such as soil type, habitats or the type of ecosystem. Variability and
long-term changes in the biophysical environment can change livelihood
opportunities. Climatic seasonality for example can dominate livelihood
opportunities by determining agricultural growing seasons or limiting access to
remote coral reefs. Climatic seasonality also determines the nature of local
ecosystems themselves. Similarly, long term changes in local environments can be
due to natural events as well as human activities. For example the el Nino event of
1997 resulted in widespread coral bleaching in the Indian Ocean in early 1998
(Wilkinson et al., 1999). The potential consequences of such an event, coupled with
continued exploitation of the reefs, could be the loss of coral and a change to
different marine habitats. This in turn would alter the kinds of resources available to
human populations.
The first part of this chapter considers the large-scale processes that occur on a
regional scale and consequently influence the environment of the study area. The
second part describes the environment of the study area in more detail. Focus is
given to the marine environment and terrestrial environment, introducing the links
between biophysical characteristics and human activities, in order to explain the
current state of the environment.
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3.2 Environmental characteristics of the region and the Kenyan coast
The wider East African coastal region includes the Indian Ocean coasts of Somalia,
Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique and the island States of Comoros, Madagascar,
Mauritius and Seychelles (Figure 3.1). It is a region that falls within one of the
United Nations Environment Programme's (UNEP) Regional Seas Programmes and
the more recent Ecoregions of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). From an
ecosystem perspective, the region includes the Somali current and Agulhas current
large marine ecosystems (LME) (Sherman et al., 1998), the Kenyan coast falls within
the Somali current LME (Alexander, 1998). This study is focused on the livelihoods
of people depending on the inshore marine and coastal terrestrial environments of the
southern coast of Kenya (Figure 1.1).
Figure 3.1 The wider East African region.
Different tropical marine and wetland habitats occur within the region including
coral reefs, sea grass beds, mangroves and salt marshes, all of which are found along
the coast of Kenya (UNEP, 1985; Wells and Sheppard, 1988; ECC, 1992). In terms
of shorefish fauna the Kenyan coast falls within the Indo-Pacific zoogeographical
region. This is the largest zoogeographical region with an estimated 4,000 shorefish
species, 3,000 of which inhabit coral reefs (Lieske and Myers, 1994). Coral diversity
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is also high in the region, 112 species of hard corals have been identified in Kenya
and Tanzania (Sheppard, 1999) and a further 28 species of soft corals in Kenya
(Samoilys, 1988).
Terrestrial environments along the Kenyan coast are now dominated by agricultural
production predominantly in the form of smallholdings, but there are some
plantations of coconut and sisal. This, however is a relatively recent development
resulting from coastward human migration and population growth over the last two
hundred years. Prior to that, much of the coastal region was covered in dense
tropical lowland woodland and bush (Spear, 1978; Sayer eta!., 1992).
3.2.1 Climatic seasonality
The most influential physical process in the East Africut coastal rcgion is fiyt
climate. There are two distinct seasons, the Northeast monsoon (kaskazi) and the
Southeast monsoon (kuzi) (Figure 3.2). This seasonality is due to the annual north-
south migration of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ). The ITCZ moves
further north than in most tropical areas during the Southeast monsoon because of the
low-pressure belt on the Asian continent during the Northern Hemisphere summer.
Consequently, there are two rainy seasons in coastal Kenya, the long rains (masika)
from March to June and the short rains (mvuli) from October to December (Figure
3.3). Mean annual rainfall in the south coastal region of Kenya is 1,397 mm and in
the north coastal region of Kenya is 889 mm. Mean annual temperature is 26.7°C
(80°F) with small seasonal fluctuations according to the monsoons (Ominde, 1984).
Wind speeds tend to be highest during the cool dry period (kipupwe) from June to
August during the Southeast monsoon creating rough seas. The winds drop in
strength from August to October (demani) prior to the hot dry and calm period
(musimi) from December to March.
Climatic seasonality has a significant impact on the activities of coastal communities,
influencing both fishing and agriculture. High agricultural activity is linked closely
to the rainy periods, when land has to be cleared and crops planted. Fishing is
predominantly influenced by winds and the corresponding sea-state which make
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working conditions physically demanding and limit access to exposed outer reef
areas. Fish catches reflect this seasonality, being lower in the Southeast monsoon
and higher during the Northeast monsoon (McClanahan, 1988).
Figure 3.2 Prevailing wind (dashed lines) and current (solid lines) patterns in the SE
(a) and NE (b) monsoon in the East African region.
Figure 3.3 Mean Monthly Rainfall at Mombasa, 1985 - 1994 (Source: Kenya Met.
Office Mombasa).
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3.2.2 Oceanographic seasonality
There is distinct oceanographic seasonality in East Africa's coastal waters which is
directly related to the climate. Climatic changes affect physical, chemical and
biological oceanographic parameters due to factors such as wind driven currents,
freshwater runoff and sedimentation. Offshore, the East African Coastal current (the
EACC is the continuation of the Southern Equatorial Current) flows northwards from
Tanzania to northern Somalia during the Southeast monsoon. The changing winds of
the Northeast monsoon slow the current's northerly flow and eventually reverse the
flow, forming the Somali Counter Current which can reach between 3°S and 4°S
(Johnson et al., 1982; Ngoile and Horrill, 1993) (Figure 3.2 and 3.4). The effects of
the EACC are largely felt offshore, whereas tidal currents tend to influence nearshore
waters. Spring tidal range is approximately four metres along the Kenyan coast.
These tides strongly influence the strength of linkages between the different marine
and wetland habitats, dispersing sediments, nutrients, organic matter and living
organisms (Ngoile and Horn!!, 1993). There is a major downwelling area and
associated low nutrient water along the Tanzanian coast and the southern Kenyan
coast. Downwelling occurs throughout the year but is strongest during the Southeast
monsoon (McClanahan, 1988).
3.2.3 Coastal habitats
Much of the coast is bordered by fringing and patch coral reefs (Figure 1.1) (Wells
and Sheppard, 1988). The whole of the southern coast of Kenya is bordered by a
fringing reef 0.5 km to 1 km from the shore. These reefs create protected inshore
lagoons that are characterised by patches of coral, sea grass beds and sand. The coral
reefs and associated seagrass beds are the basis for a multispecies small-scale fishery
along the entire length of the coast. This near-shore fishery is estimated to occupy
8,000 fishers producing up to 16,000 tonnes of fish in 1990 (McClanahan and Obura,
1995), and is the only significant fishery along the Kenyan coast. Sufficient
productivity for large-scale fisheries may be limited because of the narrow
continental (Bakun et al., 1998).
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Figure 3.4 Mean monthly sea surface temperature (SST) images, July - June (1987 -
1997), illustrating oceanographic seasonality in the East African region. (Source:
produced by Dr Tim Smyth, CCMS, Plymouth.)
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Mangroves are important wetland habitats that also support small-scale fisheries,
either directly or as juvenile habitats for many food fish. There are twelve patches of
mangrove forests along the Kenya coast, making up about 530 km 2 in total.
Mangroves have been exploited in Kenya for thousands of years and exported to the
Arabian peninsular for building material. Local consumption now dominates for
building material, charcoal production and firewood and large areas have been lost
along with the associated flora and fauna (Kennedy, 1990).
On land the Kenyan coast is characterised geologically by a coastal plain largely
underlain by Pleistocene deposits of corals and sands less than 30m above sea level
and 5-10 km wide (Ominde, 1984). The southern Kenyan coast is characterised by
Pleistocene-Recent raised coral reefs of a constant 15m above sea level (Kent, 1982).
Behind the coastal plain is a foot plateau with a varied altitude of 60-135m made up
of marine shales, mudstones and limestone of Jurassic age. A feature of the south
coast of Kenya is a coastal range west of the foot plateau with altitudes of 150-420m.
Further to the west lies the Nyika plain forming the arid Taru desert, a natural barrier
between the coast and the densely populated highland areas further inland (Ominde,
1984; DCO, 1993).
The East African coast, particularly in the area of southern Kenya and northern
Tanzania, has been an area of stable climate over millennia, including periods of
climatic change such as the global ice ages (Kingdon, 1997). A mosaic of tropical
lowland woodland and dense bush is the natural terrestrial habitat along the coast.
Small patches of woodland remain, either as State protected areas, sacred sites
(Kayas) or under private ownership. Apart from their ecological value, the few areas
of woodland and bush continue to be valued by coastal communities as a source of
raw materials for fishing equipment, building material, food, medicines and spiritual
needs (Glaesel, 1997; pers. obs).
Agricultural cultivation is now the dominant habitat. There are two forms of
cultivation: plantations and subsistence agriculture. The main form of land use is
subsistence agriculture and limited cash cropping by coastal communities. A variety
of crops are cultivated, such as cassava, millet, maize, beans, sesame, rice and a
variety of citrus, mango and coconut trees. Plantation cultivation was historically
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associated with coastal towns and was therefore geographically restricted, but during
the British colonial era plantations of sisal, coconut and sugar were developed in a
number of more remote sites along the coast. Some of these estates have since
collapsed and squatter farmers now cultivate the land.
3.3 Biophysical environment of the Study Site
The study site was located on the south coast of Kenya, approximately 40 km south
of Mombasa, at approximately 4°20'S (Figure 1.1). The study site covered four
kilometres of shoreline, the adjacent coral reef lagoon and stretched inland three
kilometres to include the community of Biga (Figure 3.5). The shore and inshore
area is characteristic of much of the southern Kenyan coast, with some low
Pleistocene-Recent coral cliffs, a wide sandy beach and a fringing reef approximately
one kilometre offshore. Within the reef is a lagoon with coral heads, sandy patches
and seagrass beds. The sea front has been steadily developed by expatriate residents
and non local Kenyans over the last thirty years. Behind the strip of development the
land is either owned by expatriates, but undeveloped, and used by the fishing
community or migrant farmers from further inland or owned by members of the
fishing community.
3.3.1 Marine environment
A survey of the lagoon substrate and main habitats adjacent to one of the fish landing
sites was carried out with the assistance of a marine biologist20. This enabled the
local marine environment on which the community of Biga depended to be described
in detail.
20 Dr David Obura.
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Figure 3.5 The study site.
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3.3.1.1 Methods
Fourteen sites were visited at which four visual observations were made. Sites were
chosen near the shore, midway between the shore and the fringing reef and near the
reef. Each site was accessed by boat on the flood tide. Four observations were made
approximately ten metres from the boat at four different points, most often
northwest, northeast, east and south of the boat. At each sample site, observations of
the primary, secondary and tertiary substrates were made, and the percentage cover
of the main habitat types was recorded within a sampled area of approximately 10m2.
The substrate types were coral rock, rubble and sand. If the coral rock was very
eroded, particularly by urchins, it was also noted. The main habitat types were coral,
macro algae, algal turf, sand and sea grass. The predominant seagrass and algae
species were noted as well as maximum and minimum water depth.
3.3.1.2 Results
The results are presented in Appendix I and summarised in Figure 3.6 and Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Mean % cover of the different habitats over the surveyed area. (Source: this
study)
Habitat Mean % cover
Coral 8.43% ± 5.64
Macro algae 8.36% ± 4.81
Filamentous algal turf 30.5% ± 23.24
Sand 27.97%± 24.86
Seagrass 69.15% ± 29.16
Sand was the primary substrate or framework for 82% of the survey points.
Secondary substrate was also predominantly sand, but also coral rubble (36%) and
eroded coral rock (20%).
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The dominant species of seagrass were Thalassodendron, Thalassia, Halodule and
Syringodium.
3.3.1.3 Discussion
The results show that seagrass is the dominant habitat in the lagoon, and bare sand
and filamentous algal turf are other important habitats. Factors such as water depth,
salinity, and water motion play a role in limiting seagrass growth (Phillips, 1978;
Cappo et al., 1998), and may explain why there are large areas of algal turf and sand.
The areas of algal turf are predominantly in shallows exposed at low spring tides, or
where the secondary substrate is coral rock under shallow sand. The sandy areas are
found in the deeper channels where tidal currents are strongest or where there is
wave action, making the sandy substrate unstable.
Seagrasses are acknowledged as being highly productive compared to other habitats
(Table 3.2). This is linked to their role in fixing carbon and supporting grazing and
detrital food chains. Growth and productivity of seagrasses is greatly influenced by
water movement needed to replenish nutrients and gases and remove metabo)ites
(Phillips, 1978; Cappo et al., 1998). Thus, the food chains that rely on seagrasses for
shelter and food also rely on seagrass connections to adjacent coastal waters and
sediment movements.
Table 3.2 Estimated economic productivity of three different habitats. (Source: Dr. E.
Green, Global Seagrass Initiative, WCMC.)
Habitat Total value per hectare
($/ha/yr)
Total Global Flow value
($/year 3109)
Seagrass beds 19004 3801
Coral reefs 6075 375
Tropical rainforests 2007 3813
Food chains dependent on seagrass habitats are mainly based on the grazing by
benthic epifauna of epiphytes or periphyton lying on leaf blades and surface
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sediments. 21 In turn a variety of predators feed on these benthic grazers and may
themselves feed, to a considerable extent, on the same foods. Most grazers prefer to
eat algae rather than detritus or living plant tissue, and it is estimated that on average,
only a small fraction (about 10%) of living seagrass tissue is consumed directly
(Cappo et al., 1998).
The trophic connectivity of seagrass beds to adjacent habitats is considered
particularly important. For example, a study of the Gazi Bay ecosystem, just south
of this study site (Figure 3.5), showed a broad interdependence among seagrass beds,
marshes, mangroves and adjacent coral reefs (Hemminga et al., 1994; Kitheka,
1996). Gazi Bay is a semi-enclosed shallow bay 10 km 2 in area. An additional 5 km2
of mangrove forests line the bay. Stable isotope analyses indicate that mangrove-
derived particulate organic matter is exported to the adjacent subtidal seabed. The
signature of this material decreases rapidly with distance from the shore, indicating
that the seagrass beds most proximate to the mangroves receive the most material.
Moreover, changes in the isotope composition of seagrass parallel the inputs of
mangrove material suggesting that the mangrove carbon is assimilated by the
seagrass.
In the case of the study site, there are no adjacent mangroves or marshes, but the high
flushing rate of the lagoon (max. tidal range of 4m across a relatively narrow lagoon)
may supply sufficient nutrients. The amount of nutrients supplied by the fringing
reef is unknown, but Cappo et al. (1998) review other studies which find that the
organic connection between coral reefs and adjacent coastal ecosystems tend to be
localised and that coral reefs are principally sinks of nutrients. A survey of the
fringing reef in the same area as this study by The University of York in 1993 found
that macroalgae and soft corals tended to cover the outer reef slope (TMRU, 1994).
Personal observations found a high cover of free-standing macroalgae on the upper
reef slope. This suggests that the base of the food chain on the reef may not be a
coral-zooxanthellea relationship, and that nutrient transfer between the lagoon and
21 Epifaunal amphipods, shrimps, gastropods, isopods, nematodes, and copepods readily graze down
complexes of periphyton consisting of diatoms, chlorophytes, encrusting algae, fungi, protozoa,
bacteria and sedimentary material lying on leaf blades and colonising understorey surfaces and surface
sediments.
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the reef slope may be higher than in the case of reefs dominated by branching and
massive hard corals. An additional importance of the fringing reef in this case may
be principally because it dampens water motion, creating an environment suitable for
the colonisation of seagrass beds.
With respect to the health of the ecosystem, studies by McClanahan and others
within the same lagoon at different sites found similar conditions to this study site
(McClanahan and Muthiga, 1988; McClanahan and Shafir, 1990; McClanahan et al.,
1996a; 1996b). Very high levels of the sea urchin Echinometra mathaei were
observed and this related to the lack of urchin predators, particularly keystone
species such as the orangestriped triggerfish (Balistapus undulatus) and the tripletail
wrasse (Chelinius trilobatus) (McClanahan, 1995a), which was attributed to high
levels of fishing activity. Between 1970 and 1985 numbers of E. mathaei had
increased from 5.3/m2 to 15/m2 (Khamala, 1971; McClanahan and Muthiga, 1988).
Compared to marine protected areas in Kenya, where sea urchin abundance were
between 20 to 375 kg/ha (wet weight), within this lagoon abundances of around
5,000 kg/ha (wet weights) were found (McClanahan et al., 1996b). The high
numbers of E. mathaei resulted in a subsequent decrease in coral cover ('10% of the
area), increased bioerosion estimated to be 3.8kg/m 2/yr, and a loss of topographic
complexity (McClanahan and Muthiga, 1988; McClanahan and Shafir, 1990;
McClanahan et al. 1996b).
The low fisheries yields (discussed in more detail in chapter 6) in this lagoon have
been attributed to both high levels of fishing activity and indirect effects of high sea
urchin abundance (McClanahan, 1994; McClanahan et al., 1996a). Sea urchins have
become the dominant herbivores in the lagoon competing with fish and encouraging
the spread of filamentous algal turf, which McClanahan et al. (1996b) found to be
the dominant substrate in the overall lagoon (64% ± 14.6%). This substrate is not
suited to coral recruitment. The low coral cover in the lagoon has also been
attributed to human activity such as trampling, disturbance from beach seines and
coral collection for the tourist trade. Surveys taken over a period between 1985 and
1996 at one survey site indicated that the hard substrate ecosystem was being
replaced by seagrass and sand (McClanahan et al., 1996b).
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In conjunction with the habitat and sea urchin surveys, McClanahan and others
carried out a census of coral reef fish species in eight families 22 and found the
number of species to be less than 20/500m2. Similar studies in Kenyan protected
areas found twice that number (McClanahan and Obura, 1995; McClanahan et al.,
1996b). Fish wet weights for eleven families 23 were found to be about 75 kg/ha in
the same lagoon as the study area whereas in Kenyan marine protected areas wet
weights for the same families were between 800 and 1500 kg/ha (McClanahan and
Obura, 1995; McClanahan eta!., 1996b).
In relation to traditional conservation and the possible use of religious sites as
conservation areas, the studies by McClanahan in the vicinity of this study site found
that there was no difference in corals or fish at marine sacred sites (Mizimu)
(McClanahan eta!., 1996b).
These results show that the lagoon and reef in the study area and its vicinity is in
poor condition relative to other reefs in Kenya. The indications are that the
ecosystem is changing to algal turf, seagrass and sand. This is a change to less
complex topographic habitats and consequently fewer fish species. It does not
necessarily mean that the fishery will be less productive, since seagrass beds are
acknowledged as being highly productive in terms of fisheries (Phillips, 1978; Cappo
et al., 1998), but the opportunities to fish a wide range of species using a range of
methods may be diminished.
3.3.2 Terrestrial environment
The Pleistocene-Recent raised coral reefs are exposed at the surface forming a strip
about one kilometre wide parallel to the sea front. The result is a coral rag zone
characterised predominantly by exposed coral rock and pockets of very shallow soil.
Inland from the coral rag zone is a zone of sandy loam stretching inland to form the
22 Acanthuridae Balistidae Chaetodontidae Diodontidae Labridae Pomacanthidae Pomacentridae Scaridae
23 Acanthuridae Balistidae Chaetodontidae Diodontidae Labridae Mullidae Lutjanidae Pomacanthidae Pomacentridae Scaridae
Siganidae Others
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coastal plain (GOK, 1991a). Despite the lack of soil, the coral rag zone maintains a
natural habitat of tropical lowland woodland and dense bush. This is partly due to
the levels and reliability of the precipitation and also the fresh water table being
relatively close to the surface (as indicated by the number of wells within a few
hundred metres of the sea front, pers. obs.) The sandy loam zone also maintains a
habitat of tropical lowland woodland for the same reasons. However these natural
habitats are now very limited. Since the coastal strip has been settled by human
populations land use patterns have brought about changes in the prevailing habitats.
Most of the area is now devoid of primary woodland except for some small stands in
sacred areas known as kaya. Other areas of woodland remain on land that has been
held under private expatriate ownership since British colonial times. Most of the
land however has been cleared in the last three of four decades for agricukure,
charcoal production and development.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the changes in terrestrial habitats over the last three or four
decades in the study area. The sea front is now dominated by private development in
the form of hotels or private expatriate residences. This zone of development
stretches up to a kilometre inland in some places. Behind this strip of development
lies the community of Biga, most of the houses are approximately two kilometres
from the sea front. Much of the land not owned or occupied by the indigenous
community is in the coral rag zone and much has yet to be developed. Migrant
farmers from further inland have occupied these areas and cleared the land to grow
cash crops on a seasonal basis such as tomatoes, capsicum and aubergine. In many
cases seasonal farmers are encouraged by absentee landlords to maintain a presence
on the land and to keep it cleared in preparation for possible development. The
sandy loam zone occupied by the indigenous Biga community is characterised by
household plots of seasonal crops such as maize, cassava and beans, and stands of
coconut, mango and citrus trees. Any land that is not under cultivation quickly
becomes overgrown with dense scrub. The presence and implications of other
resource users in the study area will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
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The loss of woodland and access to the coral rag zone for the community has had an
impact on both fishing and agricultural practices. The lack of large trees with which
to build dugout canoes has become a major cost and constraint. Now the only trees
large enough for canoes are mango trees planted by earlier generations, and these are
becoming increasingly scarce within a practical distance to transport to the sea. Other
material needed for traditional fishing methods such as traps have also become harder
to come by. This has contributed to the increasing use of other methods such as spear
guns. Agricultural activities have also changed due to the lack of access to the coral
rag zone. The traditional shifting agriculture of the indigenous people took advantage
of the more fertile soil on the coral rag zone (Spear, 1978; this study). Although the
sandy loam zone is easier to work, the heavily forested areas on the coral rag
produced more fertile soil due to the presence of the dense forest, and this was
exploited using shifting agriculture. These issues and the land use patterns in the
study area are described in later chapters.
3.4 Conclusion
The local environment of the study site, on which the local people depend, is clearly
diverse and complex. Climatic seasonality provides opportunities and constraints
both on land and in the sea, affecting agricultural and fishing practices. These
practices and the effects of seasonality are considered in detail in chapter 7.
Variations in the marine environment have been attributed to the topography of the
nearshore environment, where the fringing reef forms a protected lagoon, and to
human activities such as fishing, which has increased urchin abundance and algal turf
coverage. These habitats and the changes that occur to them determine the species
available for human exploitation. For example, increased competition between high
numbers of urchins and herbivorous fish has been observed to cause these fish to
move to deeper waters (Hay, 1991), which in the case of this site may be inaccessible
to fishing for much of the year. The dominant marine habitat is seagrass in the area
adjacent to the studied community, and the fringing reef slope is predominated by
macro algae and soft corals. From a fisheries perspective, the seagrass beds are
important because the outer reef slope can only be fished from December to March
during the calm Northeast monsoon. Clearly, the urchin situation within the lagoon
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suggests that the productivity of the marine environment is sub-optimal from a
fisheries perspective. The socio-economic factors that have led to the current state of
the fishery are discussed in later chapters, and an analysis of the fishery is given in
chapter 7.
Similarly, the terrestrial environment has undergone changes due to human activity.
Most of the natural habitats have been lost due to human settlement in the area. These
patterns of settlement and the factors that precipitated the changes are discussed in the
next chapter. From the perspective of the local community, the effects include the
loss of important raw materials for traditional fishing practices and the inability to
carry out traditional shifting cultivation. This in turn may have led to an increasing
reliance on the marine environment and changing fishing practices.
From the fishing community's perspective, their local environment provides
livelihood opportunities based on agriculture and fishing. The settlement of other
groups in the area and the development of tourism should ostensibly have increased
the livelihood options for the local community. But, as later chapters show, the
reverse has been the case. The changes that have occurred to the local environment
have inhibited their traditional livelihood strategies, which have not been
compensated by surrounding development.
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4 THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE: INFLUENCES
ON RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND USE IN THE STUDY AREA
4.1 Introduction
A major influence on the processes and structures determining access to and control
over resources has been identified in earlier chapters as the cultural and political
situations of local communities. These aspects determine to a large extent the social
differentiation within social groups and this in turn affects an individual's access to
resources. The aim of this chapter is to present the cultural and political history of the
community of Biga so that the present situation, in terms of the both the natural
environment and socio-economics, can be understood. Significant historical events or
periods in the past often determine the current availability of resources, such as
wholesale annexing of resources by more powerful groups or the imposition of
different political regimes. Other historical factors include how embedded local
traditions relating to resource use are. These kinds of traditions can be considered de
facto resource management strategies, but their persistence in changing conditions
will depend on how embedded they are and how applicable they can be to
contemporary situations.
The first part of this chapter outlines the origins of the people who make up the
studied community. The resource use patterns of the people of Biga relate as much to
the environments they originated from and other groups they have been in contact
with as to their current situation. East Africa has been a melting pot of cultures for
many millennia and this aspect has influenced resource use patterns in the study area
to the present day. The opportunities available to the people of Biga and their
forebears will be shown to tied to the activities of different peoples who have been in
the area at certain times in the past.
In the context of resource use patterns over time, the second part considers the origins
of fishing as a livelihood activity in Biga. The evidence presented in the first part
suggests that fishing is a relatively recent activity. There is a possibility therefore,
that customs relating to the marine environment are not sufficiently embedded to
resist strong external influences. The third part examines the principal cultural
52
influences on resource use and access in the area, Islam and traditional spirit-based
beliefs.
The final part of the chapter is concerned with politics and power. In communities
where livelihoods are based on the exploitation of natural resources, politics and
power play an important role in determining resource allocation. Changes in the
balance of power relate to cultural influences as well as political regimes. The
historical influence of traditional beliefs, Islam and the British colonial regime on
power and politics are examined in the context of resource access in the study area.
This leads on to the contemporary situation where the influences of the past are
clearly evident. This chapter is in essence a historical description of key influences
on resource availability to local people in the study area. Without an understanding of
the past it would not be possible to understand the present situation, including
livelihood activities and the capacity to which people can determine their situation.
4.2 The origins of the people of Biga
The geographical position of Biga, given in the previous chapter, accounts to a great
extent for key cultural and political moments in their history. Although the people of
the Biga community will be shown to be relative newcomers to the coast, the major
cultural influences owe much to the regional importance, particularly commercial, of
the East African coast over many millennia.
The East African coast has had a long association with many of the cultures in the
Indian Ocean basin, Asia and the Mediterranean. Surviving documents of the trading
opportunities along the East African coast date to the "Periplus of the Erythraen Sea",
written in the middle of the first century AD as a traders' manual for Egypt-based
Greek merchants. The document lists the available exports and imports in demand at
each port along the East African coast (Allen, 1993). Later Ptolemy's "Geography"
also described a number of ports along the East African coast (Allen, 1993). Other
texts referring to trade with East Africa include Procopius's "Persian Wars" written in
the sixth century AD, and Chinese texts from about AD 860 describing the East
African coast (Throckmorton, 1987). Chinese coins dating from the seventh century
AD have been found in such numbers along the East African coast that they must
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have been used for trade, and large quantities of tenth century Chinese ceramics have
also been found. Prior to this the area was also known to belong to the lands of the
ancient civilisations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, Arabia, the Indus Valley and
later the Hellenic world. In the second and first millennium BC the area belonged to
the Himyartic Kingdom of Southwest Aramia which meant that the Kingdoms of
South Arabia had direct contact with the East African coast at that time (Prins, 1961).
The strong influence of Islamic states in the area occurred between the seventh and
thirteenth centuries, when people from the Arabian peninsular and Persia settled along
the coast. Significantly the leaders and followers of these settlers set out to play a
political and economic role in the region (Prins, 1961). These Asian and Arabian
settlers formed relationships with the coastal people they met, intermarrying and
settling (Knappert, 1979).
Who the Arabian, Asian and Mediterranean people were trading with is of some
debate. The pre-history of East Africa suggests that the origin of the people of the
northern region of the coast as far as modern southern Somalia, was Afroasiatic, and
further south the people were of Bantu origin (Prins, 1961; Spear, 1978; Knappert,
1979; Hromnik, 1981; Sutton, 1981a; Allen, 1993). The people of Biga, the
community of this study, are Bantu and are a member of one of the two main ethnic
groups of the Kenya coast. These two coastal ethnic groups are the Mijikenda who
are Bantu and the Swahili who have mixed Bantu and Asian/Arabian origins. The
Mijikenda constitute a group of nine subgroups 24 to which the people of Biga belong
to the Digo.
The early history of the Bantu, 8,000 to 10,000 years ago, suggests a distinctive way
of life in the central region of Africa from the Atlantic coast to the Nile basin. The
region was thought to be much wetter than at present with many waterways. The
people were assured food and water and they developed an aquatic tradition with
advanced techniques of boat building and fishing. They were more sophisticated than
other late stone age hunter gatherer cultures in the region (Sutton, 1981a). The
starting point of the Bantu now on the East African coast is thought to be in the area
24Kauma, Giriama, Chonyi, Jibana, Kambe, Ribe, Rabai, Duruma and Digo.
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of central Cameroon (Hromnik, 1981) or the headwaters of the Zambezi and Lualaba
rivers (Knappert, 1979). They are thought to have started moving eastwards in the
middle of the first millennium BC (Knappert, 1979; Hromnik, 1981) along the
tributaries of the Zambezi river by means of canoes (Knappert, 1979). At some point
in the eastward migration there was a split, some continuing east to the coast of
present day Mozambique and others heading north (Hromnik, 1981).
This split may explain the possible separate origins of the Mijikenda and the Bantu
aspect of the Swahili. The Bantu branch that continued to the Indian Ocean coast
made a transition from riverine paddlers to maritime fishers and began a northerly
migration along the coast, establishing small fishing villages along the way. This was
possible because at some point in the middle of the first millennium AD the Bantu
learned to sail and build outrigger canoes, a Malay-Polynesian invention (Knappert,
1979; Allen, 1993), from people of Indonesian origin who had reached the East Coast
of Africa via Madagascar. The Bantu villages became remote trading and fishing
outposts along the coast north to modern day southern Somalia and east as far as the
Comoro islands. Their northerly migration was probably halted by contact with the
Cushitic peoples such as the Galla and Oromo (Knappert, 1979; Sutton, 1981b).
During their northerly migration the Bantu came into contact with the Arabs, Persians
and Indians with whom they intermixed and became the Swahili people. The use of
outrigger canoes became less common as they moved north and took on the sailing
technologies of the Arabian and Asian traders (Allen, 1993). By 800 AD Swahili was
a distinct language and by the 1400s it was used all along the East African coast
(Nurse and Spear, 1985). The linguistic roots of Swahili remain Bantu and words
common to the Bantu languages from the East Coast to Central Africa relate to
boating and fishing (Knappert, 1979; Hromnik, 1981).
The origins of the Mijikenda suggests that this geographical grouping of Bantu lost
their fishing and boating skills as they migrated further north and east from the point
of the inland split with the coastal branch. Through contact with southern and eastern
Cushitic people and changing environments they became pastoralists and
agriculturalists (Spear, 1978; Hromnik, 1981). Again their northerly spread in the
east was halted by the Cushitic peoples in the region of southern Somalia, an area
known as Shungwaya. Allen (1993) suggests that the Shungwaya peoples were the
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antecedents of all the East African coastal Bantu people, including the Swahili, but
Spear (1978) and others (Hromnik, 1981; Robertson, 1984) prefer the split theory.
According to Mijikenda traditions they arrived in their present homeland of the hilly
coastal hinterland of Kenya and northern Tanzania from Shungwaya in the mid
sixteenth century following conflicts with the Cushitic peoples (Spear, 1978; Allen,
1993). On the strength of their agricultural activities they developed trading
relationships with the coastal Swahili communities and also with the Kamba, Waata,
Chagga and Galla peoples inland and to their north. Through trade cultural and
political relationships developed and these in turn became inter-ethnic institutions set
up to deal with their trading situations (Spear, 1978). Much of the Arab ivory trade in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was established through the trading relations
the Mijikenda had with hunting tribes further inland.
As agriculturalists the Mijikenda supplied the coastal settlements of the Swahili with
grain and other foodstuffs, dominating the food trade for coastal communities who
could otherwise only import food by sea through their maritime trade networks. Only
in drought years were foodstuffs imported by sea and the trade of grain went from the
Swahili to the Mijikenda. This integrated local economy continued through the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The situation at the time in the area of the study
site is illustrated on map (a) in Figure 4.1. Gazi was a Swahili town and Kinondo was
one of the main Digo villages established on the lowlands as the Digo people
expanded from the range of hills further inland.
During the nineteenth century the influence of the Swahili and Arab villages and
towns along the coast began to increase. This was because they were under the
jurisdiction of the Sultan of Zanzibar whose power and wealth was based on the slave
trade, a booming industry at the time. Influential Swahili and Arab households all
along the coast were able to develop a plantation economy of their own based on
slave labour. Slave labour originating from southern central Africa was imported
from Kilwa four hundred miles to the south via Zanzibar and as a result the trading
relationship with the Mijikenda began to collapse (Figure 4.1 (b)). The slave driven
plantation economy continued to thrive despite the abolition of sea trade of slaves in
1873 by the British. The plantation economy had strengthened the influence of the
Sultan of Zanzibar and slaves could be imported overland and then exported from
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numerous small ports along the coast. In many areas the Mijikenda were forced to
move off the land they had previously occupied. The plantations were eventually
abandoned some time after 1876 when the land transport of slaves was also stopped
by the British (Brantley, 1981). After the abolition of slavery in 1907, slaves
remained on the plantation land, still owned by Swahili-Arabs, as squatters working
as casual labourers and small-scale farmers on the most fertile coastal strip of land.
The Mijikenda also resettled parts of the coastal where they had been kept off by the
plantation economy (Cooper, 1986).
By the early twentieth century British influence in the region was strong. A market
for land developed, which further strained the old alliances between the Mijikenda
and the Swahili. Where previously the Swahili had been the political representatives
of the Mijikenda to outside powers, they now used their position to sell land to
European and Indian speculators (Willis, 1987).
Half a century of British colonial rule followed the plantation era, with equally
dramatic effects on resource access for the Digo. Under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act
of 1890 Crown lands were established where there were no settled forms of
government or where land had not been 'appropriate either to the local sovereign or to
individuals' (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991). This was the precursor to the Crown Lands
Ordinance of 1902 which asserted "that the Crown and not the local people had title
to some land" (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991:12) and was the basis for establishing native
reserves (Figure 4.1 (c)). The ramifications of these manipulations of land ownership
continue to be felt by local people today (Figure 4.1 (d)). As the case study of Biga
will show, their continued reduced access to land since the nineteenth century
plantation era has had a direct influence on their activities in the sea.
4.3 The take up of fishing by the Digo
If the genealogical history of the Mijikenda and the Bantu aspect of the Swahili
separated some time ago is correct, as suggested by a number of writers (Prins, 1961;
Spear, 1978; Knappert, 1979; Hromnik, 1981; Sutton, 1981b), then the Digo took up
fishing relatively recently. The exodus from Shungwaya eight age sets ago was by
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Figure 4.1 Changing land tenure over the last 400 years in the area of the study site.
Early 20th Century
	 Late 20th Century
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agriculturists who settled the hilly and densely forested hinterland overlooking the ten
mile wide coastal plain. This area was sufficiently far south from their northern
aggressors and the hilly territory meant that their fortified villages (Kayas) were also
more secure. The region was also wetter than the north and therefore more
productive, particularly in the southern zone of their range. The Digo settled the
southern and most fertile part of the range and it was on the strength of their
agriculture that they formed the closest relationship with the Swahili through trade.
The expansion of the Digo from their fortified hilltop Kayas to the fertile coastal plain
occurred during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Spear, 1978). Smaller sub-
Kayas were established along the coast near Swahili coastal settlements where the
Digo exchanged sorghum, maize, sesame, copal and coconuts for fish, cloth, beads
and wire from the Swahili (Spear, 1978). With the collapse of the trading economy
due to the growth of the Arab slave trade and the establishment of Arab-Swahili
plantations the Digo now living near the coast were also competing for land with the
plantation developers. Having lived in close proximity to the trading and fishing
Swahili communities for over a hundred years the Digo would have been exposed to
fishing techniques and opportunities and many could well have been fishing with or
for the Swahili. The fact that Islam is more widespread among the Digo than other
Mijikenda people may be further evidence that the Digo took up fishing with the
Swahili and at the same time taking on their religion and customs (Mkangi, 1995;
Glaesel, 1997). Without the trading economy many more Digo living on the coast
would have taken up fishing to supplement the food from their agricultural activities.
During the nineteenth century Digo communities living on the coast became
dedicated fishing and farming communities. They traded their fish with other Digo
people from further inland and also with other Mijikenda communities. Older
members of Biga community said they remember trading fish for millet and cassava
and other agricultural produce with Durnma people (the most inland of the southern
Mijikenda) earlier this century. The families and clans who had taken up fishing
established settlements on the seafront. As older members of Biga explained,
agricultural activities took up more time than fishing, which were only a few days a
week to meet their needs. There were fewer fishermen earlier this century applying
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much less effort to catch sufficient fish for the needs of the small communities (cf.
Chapter 7).
The relatively recent role of fishing amongst certain Digo communities suggests that
their other forms of livelihood, namely agriculture, would have remained important.
Yet some Digo communities have become predominantly fishing dependent over a
relatively short period, as will be shown by the community in this study. The reasons
for this, as suggested above, are because of the reduced access to land for cultivation.
Further evidence of this in recent years has been the increasing number of young men
who have taken up fishing as a livelihood of last resort. These two aspects of fishing
amongst the Digo, the relatively short take-up period and an activity of last resort,
may mean that the traditional institutions used by Digo people to govern their fishing
related activities are not sufficiently embedded to persist through changing social and
ecological conditions. The traditional aspects of resource use and allocation are
discussed below.
4.4 Local beliefs and Islam
The early expansion of Islamic people on the East African coast started in the seventh
century and continued through to the thirteenth century (Prins, 1961). Yet the
Mijikenda were not part of this and it was only until the trading era of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries did they begin to assimilate aspects of Islamic culture and
then it was only by those who lived close to Swahili/Arab settlements. Conversion to
Isalm was done on an individual basis and as a result Digo fishing communities held a
mix of Islamic and local beliefs which, among other things, affected their access to
and control over resources (Trimingham, 1964; Glaesel, 1997).
4.4.1 Local beliefs
The local beliefs of the Digo are spirit-based. Belief in a potentially harmful spirit
realm that can be partially controlled through acts of appeasement or codes of
behaviour affects every aspect of life in Digo society (Gleasel, 1997). There were
numerous cases of the spirit realm affecting life in Biga during this study. In one
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significant case a household had not cultivated their land because evil spirits had
possessed it for many years. It has been suggested by Mkangi (1995) that some of the
earliest Mijikenda to enter fishing were the sons of traditional healers (mganga) who
were known for their ability to manipulate powerful spirits. This may have given
them the confidence to venture into the unfamiliar marine environment.
Trimingham (1964) identified three classes of spirits: ancestral spirits (mizimu),
nature spirits (jini and shetani) and possessive spirits (pepo). All these types of spirits
may require offerings (sadaka) at sacred sites either to abate their anger or bring good
fortune. All these kinds of spirits inhabit terrestrial and marine habitats, but their
activities tend to be restricted geographically at specific sacred sites or physical
features (Glaesel, 1997).
Among Digo fishing communities the maintenance of good spirit-human relations
were considered to be of great importance. Certain spirits, such as vibwengo, were
considered to inhabit beaches and inshore areas, and if they were sited bumper
harvests of fish could be expected. Other spirits include ngoloko, which inhabits
mangroves areas and was greatly feared for its murderous claw, along with kitu nusi
who drowned sleeping night fishers and fishers using their canoes for sexual activities
(Glaesel, 1997). Great importance was given to making offerings to the spirits to
maintain good relations. Offerings were made at specific sacred sites (mizimu, kaya)
that tended to be entered only for reasons of spirit mediation. As a result some of
these sites (kaya) have become islands of biodiversity in the Digo areas, but none of
these sites are in the sea. Although there were sacred sites in the sea related to sites
on land, the extent to which they have been left untouched for customary reasons has
been very limited. Marine related customs may not be as embedded in the culture of
the Digo people as land based customs because fishing is a relatively recent activity.
The 'sacredness' of sacred areas in the sea has not been able to resist the growth in
demand for resources as pressure on land has increased.
In recent years belief in the spirit world has been challenged by the younger
generations who have either taken up stronger Islamic beliefs or taken on western
ideas. In many instances sacred areas have disappeared because sightings or evidence
of spirit activity have ceased to be reported. Elders of Digo communities lament that
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the lack of spirit-human mediation has been the cause of the problems fishing
communities now face (Glaesel, 1997). Although the belief in the spirit world
enabled there to be social causation of environmental problems, the dominant role
played by certain elders in spirit human relations was equally to do with the
maintenance of community power and influence structures. In the changing political
environment, younger generations and other authorities have challenged the
traditional power of the elders.
4.4.2 Islam
Despite contact with Islam for a number of centuries, mass conversion amongst the
Digo did not take place untit the ear ty twentieth century . The princ:Cip, reason Cor
conversion to Islam was in response to the British colonial government's land
allocation policies.
The ten-mile wide coastal strip had been a British protectorate since the signing of an
agreement between the Sultan of Zanzibar and the British in 1895. Strictly it should
only have included the pockets of land relating to the plantations around Swahili/Arab
settlements. However the British administered the ten-mile coastal strip as a
protectorate, with concessions to Muslims, until Kenya gained independence in 1963.
Access to land in the British protectorate was tied to ethnicity (Ng'weno, 1995),
which the British had difficulty defining and so used religion as the defining
characteristic. Under the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 the protectorate authorities
had extended their political jurisdiction to included claims to ownership of the
original title to the land (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991). To make more land available for
colonial use, the Crown Lands Ordinance reduced the amount of land with secure
tenure for indigenous people by removing the possibility of acquiring land through
clearance (Moore, 1991; Ng'weno, 1995) (see figure 4.1 (c)). This effectively
eliminated most Digo claims because shifting agriculture was how they used the land.
For them, the only form of ownership was vested in trees planted for fruit such as
coconuts, citrus and mangoes. As a result only Muslim subjects of the Sultan of
Zanzibar had their claims recognised and only a small proportion of the land was set
up as native reserves. So the indigenous people became tenants of the Crown in their
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own land (Ng'weno, 1995). Muslims were allowed to acquire freehold title to land
but Digo were not (Sperling, 1988).
However the British racial and ethnic segregation did not correspond in terms of
residence and land use because of the historical relationship between Swahili Muslims
and Digo people. There were enough Muslims who were Digo on the coast to make
the artificial distinction cause problems for the Protectorate administration in matters
relating to land ownership and inheritance. Further more the British subjected the
Muslim people and the 'native' people to different laws. The Digo were subject to the
British colonial Native councils and District Court whereas Muslims were subject to
Mohammedan law and under the jurisdiction of the Liwali and Mudirs (Sperling,
1988; Ng'weno, 1995). So it was in response to the British colonial policies that most
Digo people converted to Islam in the 1920s in an attempt to resist the loss of their
land, and to maintain a degree of independence through Mohammedan law.
In terms of increased access to and control over land for the Digo under British
policies, the mass conversions of the 1920s had limited success. However, within
Digo society the conversions had profound effects on resource use and allocation
because it was in direct conflict with many of their traditions. For instance Islamic
inheritance laws are patrilineal whereas customary Digo laws of inheritance are
matrilineal. Although the Muslim structures of authority provided an alternative to
the British colonial ones, it challenged the traditional structures of authority. The
most important member of a family changed from being the mother's brother to the
father in terms of inheritance, a situation reinforced by British policies. Married
women became economically dependent on men and notions of status taken from the
Islamic culture changed dress codes, introduced leisure time and encouraged a disdain
for agricultural work (Ng'weno, 1995). These conflicts of authority between the
structures of dominance and the differing social attitudes continue today.
Both the British colonial land policies and Digo conversions to Islam in reaction to
the colonial policies undermined the customary institutions by which resources were
used and allocated. Without the land available to continue traditional shifting
agriculture, and the increasing dependence on the growing cash economy, increasing
numbers of Digo were forced to enter fishing or increase their fishing effort, or seek
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wage labour elsewhere. These changing cultural and socio-economic conditions
would have reduced the effectiveness of many spirit-based rules because they ceased
to be appropriate or possible to adhere to.
4.5 Politics and power
Some of the impacts of the Arab plantation economy and the British land policies on
resource access and use have been described above. It is evident that power and
politics in the region are intimately linked to the relationship between the people and
the resources they exploit for their livelihoods. In pre-Islamic times the power of the
elders and certain individuals through the spirit-based traditions were a reflection of
the importance of natural resources in Digo society.
If the basis for political influence and power lies in the use and allocation of
resources, the mechanisms by which resources are used and allocated are important to
understand. The socio-cultural evolution of the Digo people described above
identifies three important influences: the traditional beliefs of the Digo, Islam and the
British colonial regime.
Whilst many traditional beliefs were maintained in conjunction with Islamic beliefs;
Islam changed the balance of power in many ways. Apart from challenging
customary inheritance laws, Islam also encouraged individualism and wealth
accumulation (Ng'weno, 1995). Traditionally success was considered to be a
function of supernatural forces or fate. Successful people were envied because people
feared that the wealth would be used to increase power and to extend influence and
control over resources at other peoples' expense. A prosperous individual was
typically called on to share wealth with kinsmen and wives. Failure to share resulted
in future community help being withheld and accusations that the individual's
prosperity had come about by cheating and stealing through the use of black magic
(Gerlach, 1964). Such traditional systems facilitated food distribution and reduced
big divisions in society. Prosperous individuals invested in their kin groups and thus
obtained a host of social, economic and political rewards, primarily by obligating
others to aid them in the future (Gerlach, 1964).
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The colonial administration found liasing with communities through the traditional
authorities, groups of elders, difficult and inefficient so they introduced a hierarchy of
representatives for the regions they administered. This included the position of chief
to represent a number of villages. Gerlach (1965) notes the demise of tradition in the
late 1950s when Digo elders made half hearted attempts to bring down rain,
previously an important ritual, because government appointed chiefs and headmen
were concerned that the district government would remove them if they carried out
such pagan activities. The appointed chiefs realised that their political futures were
no longer dependent on traditional activities relating to spirit based beliefs.
Despite the imposition of a new structure of authority by the British some traditional
institutions and organisations have adapted well to the changes and many a the .ad
beliefs and customs continue to play a role in contemporary Digo society. The layout
of settlements and the social organisation amongst the Digo are based on kinship
groups. Whilst describing the evolution of Biga to its present layout, the eiders
referred to clans and particular individuals who were heads of these groups. There
was no reference to a single leader in the past and it was explained to me that the
community consisted of an association of kinship groups. Traditional leadership was
based on kinship groups and authority exercised through the elders of the kinship
group. Elders of different kinship groups continue to meet to discuss issues of mutual
interest and to resolve conflicts despite the existence of administrative authorities
carried over from the British. The role however is now limited to very local concerns
and they are very careful not to undermine the authority of the government
administration.
4.5.1 Recent changes
As indicated above, the colonial system of administration has continued to the present
day, with the position of chief being government appointed. Lower levels in the
hierarchy include sub-chiefs or assistant chiefs, appointed to assist the chiefs and
village chairmen to represent each village (see Table 4.1). Throughout the study
period I frequently noticed an underlying conflict between the roles of the traditional
leaders and the appointed civil servants, particularly because they were members of
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the same community. I was required to present myself formally to both groups before
undertaking any research in the community, and suspicion on the part of traditional
elders in the early stage of the study held up aspects of the work for many months.
The mass conversion to Islam in the early 1900s, which was in response to colonial
government land regulations, brought about further change in the local leadership and
social organisation. The Islamic religious leaders in the villages became increasingly
influential in social aspects of everyday life. Many traditional laws were based on the
fear of the spirits, but the increasing influence of Islam and the more recent exposure
to western European cultures lead the younger generation to be sceptical of the
traditional beliefs.
4.5.2 Contemporary politics and power
Contemporary politics and the distribution of power in Kenya continue to be shaped
by the British colonial past. Since independence in 1963 the country has been ruled
by a single party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), in much the same way
as the colonial government. Rule has been legitimised on a paternalistic ideology of
trusteeship based on limited participation, non-democratic representation by an elite
and developmentalism (Klopp, 1998). Although a bicameral national legislature was
established after independence, the principal structures of governance established by
the colonial government, such as the provincial administration and county councils,
has not changed. These structures effectively extend central government into local
areas. Since there has only been a single party these structures ensure political control
throughout the country by the strategic appointment of KANU members to key civil
service positions. Thus the boundary between politicians and civil servants has been
blurred and the power wielded by politicians and their appointees is significant. It is
this characteristic of contemporary power distribution in Kenya that has such an
impact on people's access to and control over resources.
The mechanics of land allocation provides a good example of political influence on
access to and control over resources. One of the issues investigated in this study
relates to illegal allocation of land. The important relationship between the terrestrial
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and marine activities of the people of Biga is based on the fact that constraints to
resources in one environment increase pressure on resources in the other.
As described earlier, the British took control of all land in Kenya under the Crown
Lands Ordinance of 1902. The Governor had the power to alienate land at will, even
after 1939 when trust lands were established for the African population (Figure 4.1
(c)). This gave the Colonial authorities complete control over who gained access to
and control over land (Klopp, 1998). Following independence the President inherited
these powers of allocation through the constitution and the Trust Land Act.
Responsibility for trust lands in rural areas was given to county councils as a
mechanism to prevent illegal allocations through their locally accow)tabie
membership. However the county councils are not autonomous from central
government. Although two thirds of the councillors are elected by local people and
are therefore accountable to local people, the rest are nominated by the Minister of
Local Government. Thus local KANU members or clients, some of whom have been
rejected in local council elections, become councillors (Oyugi, 1993; Klopp, 1998).
In allocating land the county council has to ratify each allocation of land, following a
series of meetings and debates. The allocation is then screened by the provincial
administration when it passes through the District Plot Allocation committee chaired
by the District Commissioner (DC). Finally the allocation passes to the
Commissioner of Lands for the title deeds to be drawn up. Despite the theoretical
possibility of public scrutiny, KANU has such control over the councils and other
civil servants through political appointees, that the allocation of trust land, which is
public land, in return for financial and political favours is common place. The
beneficiaries are seldom the local people. A prospective councillor at the 1997 local
elections in Kwale district explained the situation. "People haven't understood that
the ruling party and the government should be separate. The party runs the
government, which is a toothless dog. The government is not independent,
administration has to do what the politicians say." (Mwabata pers. comm.). The
examples of illegal allocations in the coastal area in and around Biga are numerous.
In Diani, the neighbouring location to Biga, illegal allocation of land to a foreign hotel
group sparked violent protests by locals (East African Standard, 1997). In early 1996
fishermen in the area protested to the DC against the allocation of beach access roads
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to developers. The local Member of Parliament was implicated in the allocations
(East African Standard, 1996).
Table 4.1 The current (from the British colonial) administrative structure and
regional division for the study site of Biga community.
Administrative Division 	 Name	 Senior Civil Servant
Country	 Kenya	 President
Province	 Coast	 Provincial Commissioner (PC)
District	 Kwale	 District Commissioner (DC)
Division	 Msambweni	 District Officer (DO)
Location	 Kinondo	 Chief
Sub-location	 Galu	 Assistant Chief
Village (Mjiji)	 Biga	 Village Chairman (elected)
Within the administrative division of Kwale district outlined in Table 4.1, there are
three political constituencies, Matuga, Msambweni and Kinango. Moves towards
democracy began in the early 1990s when constitutional changes allowed for
multiparty elections in 1992 and again in 1997. Like much of the developed world in
the nineteenth century (Giddens, 1999), democracy has been strongly resisted by
established elites and changes to the way the country is governed have been slow to
come. Within Msambweni constituency, which incorporates the study site, the MP
(Mr Kassim Mwamzandi) had been in place for more than thirty years until the
second multiparty elections in 1996. This was also the case in the neighbouring
constituency of Matuga. The established elite has resorted increasingly to desperate
tactics to stay in power in the face of growing disillusionment from the public.
During the run up to the 1997 elections ethnic differences stirred by KANU connected
people lead to inter-ethnic clashes and the death of sixty people in Kwale district
(EIU, 1998). The use of land for political patronage have increased as the stakes for
power have risen following calls for liberalisation from the international community
(Klopp, 1998). More local conflicts over natural resources, including fisheries, have
also become increasingly politicised. Local fishers have questioned the relationships
between migrant fishers from Tanzania and local officials. As competition for fish
increase, prospective politicians have supported local fishers by exposing illegal
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identity card scams in a bid to remove the migrant fishers (East African Standard,
1996).
The current politicised environment is largely due to liberalisation and the influence
of politicians over civil servants. Groups seeking to resolve conflicts over resources
often use politicians to put pressure on civil servants, but the power imbalance means
that decisions are often based on local vested interests. As a result decisions relating
to resource allocation may have nothing to do with long term interests or the wider
social needs and sometimes decisions blatantly flout the law.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have sought to illustrate how events in the past have determil\e,d to a
great extent the current availability of resources for local people. Some examples
discussed in the chapter include cultural influences, such as Islam, that have changed
traditional resource access patterns. Powerful regimes such as the Arab plantation era
and British colonialism changed established livelihood opportunities. Traditional
systems of authority have been undermined and challenged causing the exploitation
behaviour of local people to change. Individualistic policies pushed by the state,
rooted in Western ideology, and the recently adopted Islamic religion have also
changed exploitation patterns of local people.
The final part of the chapter gave the illustration of land grabbing as an example of an
increasingly politicised environment. Politicians were shown to be disproportionately
powerful for historical reasons. The effect of this was the abuse of institutional
structures and the misallocation of resources. Small-scale fisheries have not escaped
the effects of this situation.
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5 ANALYSIS OF KEY ORGANISATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE
STUDY AREA
5.1 Introduction
An examination of different institutional arrangements that relate to human-
environment interaction in the study area forms a key element in understanding the
current circumstances of the people of Biga. It also sets the context for the analysis in
chapter 8 of their actions relating to resource access problems. In this chapter, the
main organisations and institutions that the studied community faced when dealing
with specific resource access and control situations are considered; principally those
that form part of the social network analysis (chapter 8). Some of the factors that
inform or influence these institutions, such as international policies and sources of
power, ai e also examined.
The hypothesis advanced is that the way groups or individuals tackle resource access
and control problems does not reflect identifiable institutional processes. This does
not mean that in every case institutions were not involved, for in most cases 'people's
resource access and control are shaped by many interacting institutions' (Leach et al.,
1997b). But the suggestion is that there may also be cases when people simply seek
whatever path is necessary to solve their problems (cf. part 2.6 and 2.7). This study
tests the hypothesis by investigating the actions members of the fishing community of
Biga took to solve resource access and control problems.
In the first and second parts of this chapter, the roles and functions of the institutions
that relate to resource access and control within the study area are identified and their
status is assessed. The role of an organisation's power in determining the outcome of
negotiations over resource access and control is considered in the first part. This is
followed by a look at the wider influences on national institutional arrangements, such
as international trade agreements and regional conventions. The difference between
organisations and institutions for the purpose of this study were given in section 2.2.
This chapter refers to formal and informal institutions and/or organisations for ease of
description. In this case, institutions that have a direct organisational manifestation
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are considered formal institutions, whereas those that are maintained by people's
practices or traditions are considered informal institutions.
In the third part of this chapter the environmental entitlements framework developed
by Leach et al. (1997) is used to illustrate how some of these institutions are linked to
resource access and control, and subsequently the livelihoods of the studied
community. The environmental entitlements framework links livelihoods,
environments and institutions to the way different people have command over
resources. Using this framework also illustrates how the different components of the
thesis are linked to the question of resource access and control. In addition, the
frameworks set a broad base for the detailed analysis of livelihood systems (chapter 7)
and problem solving actions (chapter 8) in Biga.
5.2 Formal institutions and resource access in the study site
The formal institutions identified below are dominated by Western European
approaches to resource access and control. The main reason for this is because Kenya
inherited most of its State organisations and institutions from the British, and because
Western organisations dominate international 'development' and trade.
In Kenya there are many pieces of State legislation influencing resource access and
control. For example, there are 77 statutes within various Ministries that set out to
govern the environment, but as Mbendo (1998) points out, they are not co-ordinated
in any way. The National Environment Action Plan (NEAP), which was initiated
after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in
1992, is a Bill that attempts to redress this problem, but has yet to be passed through
parliament.
5.2.1 An organisation's power
The roles and effectiveness of formal organisations in influencing resource access and
control has been closely linked to an organisation's power (Burkardt et al.., 1997).
When negotiating with other organisations and groups to determine the outcome of a
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resource-related conflict, or to influence policies, an organisation's role in the process
stems from that organisation's power. Lamb (1998) outlines an institutional analysis
method (Legal-Institutional Analysis Model, LIAM) that identifies four principal
organisational roles in negotiations or interactions. These roles are identified as:
advocates, which seek change in decision processes; guardians, which seek to protect
the status quo; brokers, which use tradeoffs and bargaining to manage decisions; and
arbitrators, which rely in knowledge and information in an attempt to make objective
decisions (Lamb, 1998: 1).
The power of an organisation, in the context of interacting with other organisations, is
derived from three elements: information, resources and constituency. These relate to
the organisation's attributes that influence how power may be acquired (Brass, 1984),
as opposed to power derived from relations with others (which is considered in the
social network analysis in chapter 8). The elements of power are summarised in
Table 5.1.
Power from information relates to an organisation's ability to process information and
present a coherent opinion. Thus power is derived from having a technical bndy af
knowledge few understand, and producing results that can be widely understood.
Resources power stems from having statutory authority, physical control of the
resource, legal management responsibility, financial backing, and available personnel
(Lamb, 1998: 3). Within this source of power are two sub-sources: the frequency and
intensity of involvement in a specific issue. Frequent involvement generates
experience with an issue, which is considered an asset. Intensity relates to how close
the issue is to the interests of the organisation, which usually means that the
organisation cannot be ignored. Constituency power derives from political or public
support for an organisation.
In relation to the issues analysed in chapter 8, the roles of each organisation are
considered in the final chapter. The analysis in this chapter outlines how the different
organisations derive elements of power. Some organisations are shown to have
certain elements of power, such as statutory authority, but are weakened because they
lack other elements such as financial or human resources. Others in turn have no
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statutory authority in relation to resource access and control issues, yet derive power
from political support.
Table 5.1 Elements of power in resource access and control negotiations or
interactions. (Adapted from Lamb, 1998: 4)
Power Element Examples of Strong Power
Statutory authority A clear legislative mandate to act
Physical control of resource Ability to restrict access
Legal control of resource Management responsibility
Political support Legislatively favoured
Public support Organised cohesive constituency
Financial resources Sufficient funds to focus on issue
Personnel Sufficient staff to focus on issue
Frequency Experiences with similar issues
Intensity Issue close to the organisation's 'heart'
5.2.2 Regional and International influences on formal institutions
Many international institutional arrangements have been set up to influence national
policies relating to people's resource access and control. These are generally
international agreements that fall into two categories, environmental conventions and
economic agreements. As an illustration, some of these conventions and policies
relating to national policies on coastal and marine environments or the economy are
presented below. The general effects of which were discussed in chapter 2.
UNCED, for example has had a significant influence on recent environmental policy
development in Kenya. NEAP is a direct response to requirements set out in UNCED
(1992). NEAP aims to tackle the lack of co-ordination in environmental legislation
within many different Ministries by integrating environmental considerations into
socio-economic planning in all sectors of government. In relation to the coastal
environment, another consequence of UNCED was the 1993 Arusha Resolution on
Coastal Zone Management in Eastern Africa including Island States (Linden, 1993).
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As with so many of these initiatives, implementation is dependent on external
financial assistance and expertise (cf. chapter 2). In this case from Sweden (SIDA)
and the World Bank within the Regional Marine Science Programme for Eastern
Africa. The most recent development of SIDA expertise and enthusiasm in the
region, along with World Bank financial support, is the Coral Reef Degradation in the
Indian Ocean (CORDIO) project, which was set up in response to the mass bleaching
and mortality of corals in 1998.
Other regional initiatives include the United Nations Environment Programme's
(UNEP) Regional Seas Programme, the East African Action Plan. Within the East
African Action plan there are programmes assessing land based pollution (EAF/6) and
coastal zone management (EAF/5). Similarly, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission (IOC) has a Regional Committee for the Co-operative Investigation of
the North and Western Indian Ocean (IOCINCWIO). This meets every three years to
assess scientific achievements and plan future research priorities in the region
(Coughanowr et al., 1995). The list of conventions includes the African Convention
on the Conservation of Natural Resources and the Nairobi Convention at a regional
level, and Ramsar, MARPOL, Biological Diversity, CITES and UNCLOS at an
international level (Mbendo, 1998).
The globalisation of trade, development loans and the policies of donor agencies are
economic influences on institutional arrangements at the national level. Some of the
effects of the conditions attached to loan agreements with the IMF and the World
Bank were highlighted in chapter 2. In many cases these economic agreements
conflict with other treaties, particularly environmental ones. The IMF/World Bank
agenda of privatisation and commitment to individual property rights has placed
public or community lands under great pressure. The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and its 1995 incarnation as the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
is another example. The Uruguay round of GATT, which was concluded in 1994, led
to policies favouring large multinational business over national producers in the
global economy. The WTO has also limited the ability to use economic sanctions or
pressures to enforce international environmental treaties (Milner Gulland and Mace,
1998).
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All these initiatives set out to inform or influence institutional arrangements at the
national level, and consequently can determine activities at the local level. But, as
was discussed in chapter 2, there are a number of major constraints to meeting the
expectations set out in these regional and international initiatives. These include the
lack of organisational and institutional capacity to implement agreements due to
technical, human and financial resource constraints (Bryant and Bailey, 1997), and
conflicting objectives of international economic agreements and environmental
treaties (Milner-Gulland and Mace, 1998).
5.2.3 Legislation as formal institutions in national government
Legislation affecting resource access and control falls within the roles and functions
of a range of different government ministries and their departments. In many cases
the institutions (laws, regulations, memoranda of understanding...) that govern the
functioning of government ministries or departments have indirect influence on social
behaviour relating to local natural resources. For example, there are limits to the size
of public gatherings set by law and enforced by organisations such as the police
department. In relation to influencing resource access and control there are numerous
government organisations and corresponding pieces of legislation to consider. Table
5.2 lists the departments of ministries that were associated, to differing extents, with
the three resource access and control issues analysed in chapter 8.
The main departments affecting the community in relation to the social network
analysis of the issues in chapter 8 were the Fisheries Department, Kenya Wildlife
Service and the Provincial Administration. These are discussed in more detail below.
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Table 5.2 Government ministries active in the study site and their functions relating
to issues of resource access and control.
Ministry Function relating to resource access and control in the
study area
Office of the President Provincial Administration
Police
Citizenship
Agriculture Land use and development
Veterinary services
Survey and control of Tsetse fly
Co-operative Development Co-operative legislation and extension services
Accounting and auditing for co-operative
societies
Environmental Conservation Environmental protection
Natural Environment Secretariat
National Environment Action Plan
Home	 Affairs,	 National
Culture and Social Services
Heritage, Museums and antiques
Community development
Lands and Settlement Administration of State and Trust land
Land registration and valuation
Mapping and land surveys
Land adjudication
Physical planning
Local Authorities Local Authorities policy
By-laws of all local Authorities
Natural Resources Forests and forest devetopment
Fisheries development and management
Wildlife management
Game control and preservation
Public Works and Housing Buildings
Roads
Rural Development Regional Development policy
Coast Development Authority
Tourism Development and promotion of tourism
Kenya Tourism Board
Supervision of Hotels and Game Lodges
5.2.4 Local government
Much of the decision making relating to local resources and associated activities takes
place at the District level, and sometimes at the Provincial level (cf. part 4.5.2, Table
4.1). The Administration, under the Office of the President, is the most influential
aspect of government at the local level. It is an extension of Presidential control to
the village level. Representatives of the Administration have executive powers within
most government committees at all levels. The District Commissioner, for example,
heads most committees at the district level. The County Council is the other key part
of local government and is the only potential check on the abuse of power and
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manipulation of legislation by politicians and goverment personnel. But, as was
pointed out in chapter 4, part 4.5.2, the relationship between the ruling KANU party
and national government effectively eliminates this check.
The County Council (Kwale County Council in the case of this study) is responsible
for the provision of basic services in the district, mainly water, education and
maintenance of markets. In addition the County Council reviews most activities
requiring some kind of formal government endorsement, such as the allocation of
State land or development proposals. Matters are then passed on to specific
committees set up to deal with particular tasks. These committees are made up of
members of relevant government departments and representatives of relevant
authorities. Land allocation, for example, is dealt with by the District Plot Allocation
Committee, which is chaired by the District Commissioner and includes District
personnel of the Ministry of Lands and Settlement. However, it is not uncommon for
the County Council to be bypassed in circumstances where there may be resistance to
proposals by some councillors, and the Clerk, District Commissioner, prominent
politician and necessary civil servants to go directly to the Commissioner of Lands
(Klopp, 1998).
Apart from land allocation, the other important committees that deal with situations
where resource access and control is an issue are the District Development Committee
(DDC) and the District Executive Committee (DEC). The District Development
Committee is made up of civil servants and elected representatives and co-ordinates
development activities in the district. There are a number of sub-committees within
the DDC that relate to education, agriculture, social development, water and sanitation
and loans. The relevant ministries are represented in each of these. The District
Executive Committee consists of the senior personnel of each of the ministries in the
district and oversees all major activities in the district.
5.2.5 Fisheries Department
The Fisheries Department is the principal State organisation concerned with fishing,
and therefore directly influences the activities of the people of Biga. The legislation
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behind the functions of the Fisheries Department is the Fisheries Act, 1989, revised in
1991. The purpose of the act is 'to provide for the development, management,
exploitation, utilisation and conservation of fisheries and for connected purposes'
(GOK, 1991b). Despite having comprehensive legislation to determine and support
its role and functions, it is evident that it falls short of meeting its aims. The main
reason for this is because the organisation is under funded and under staffed for the
tasks it sets itself (Oduol pers. comm.; pers. ohs.), and this in turn is due to the
historical approach of government to marine fisheries in Kenya.
Historically the emphasis during the British colonial period was to develop
commercial marine fisheries by supporting European and Asian businesses.
Development programmes in the 1950s and 1960s that provided nylon gill nets and
shark nets to businesses that sought to exploit stocks further offshore did not favour
local fishers. When it was evident that sea fisheries in Kenya was not going to
become a significant industry, and that tourism was to be the industry of the coast, the
relative importance of local small scale fisheries increased. However, the State took
less interest in coastal fisheries generally because the inland Lake Victoria fishery was
growing rapidly. The organisation remained rooted in its commercial fisheries past,
seeking to manage fisheries on the basis of Northern Hemisphere single species
concepts. In an attempt to meet the needs of these management approaches, Fisheries
Department personnel were faced with an impossible task. Catch and effort statistics
needed to be collected from a fishery that employs tens of thousands of widely spread
people who land numerous species at thousands of different landing sites. Similarly
impossible was the need to issue licences and collect revenue (see Johannes, 1998, for
a discussion of this issue and the need for data-less marine resource management).
This is the situation in the study site. The Fisheries Department's Diani substation
employs two fisheries personnel, a Fisheries scout and an Assistant Fisheries Officer
(FO). Their tasks include extension services, collecting statistics and law
enforcement. Data should be collected on the number of registered boats, the gear
types, number of fishers and traders and the species and sizes/weights of fish landed
(FO Mwangare pers. comm.) (for the list of species see Appendix II). Within the area
of responsibility for the two Diani Fisheries personnel there are 35 designated fish
landing sites over about 30 km of coast. This they must cover without a vehicle.
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There are also numerous other landing sites used by small groups of fishers and
traders. Less than half the area is served by public transport and most landing sites
are accessible only by foot or bicycle. This is the situation throughout the coastal
region, except that many other areas are far more remote. This raises questions about
the accuracy of the data. As the Assistant Director for Fisheries in Mombasa
admitted, field staff 'cook' the data (C. Oduol, pers. comm.). Figure 5.1 illustrates the
difference between data collected by the Fisheries department and that collected by
the Coral Reef Conservation Project in the Diani area that includes the study site.
CRCP is an independent organisation supported by the New York based Wildlife
Conservation Society that undertakes coral reef related research in Kenya.
Figure 5.1 The difference between catch statistics for the Diani/Galu Kinondo area
collected by the Fisheries Department (May 1992 — Sept. 1997) and CRCP (Sept.
1995 — Sept. 1997). (Source: Fisheries Department - Diani substation; CRCP)
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In relation to the quality of data, I did not see any Fisheries personnel collecting
statistics throughout the study. Also, the fishermen said that they were not required to
pay for licences and did not do so, contrary to statements from Fisheries personnel.
Some traders did pay their licences to trade because they transported their fish out of
the area they had bought the fish, but most traders avoided this requirement.
Furthermore, there was no record of any prosecutions for infringements of Fisheries
legislation in the five years up to the end of the study (Fisheries Department monthly
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and yearly reports). This was contrary to the Fisheries officer's statement that they
started prosecuting traders and fishers without licences in July (FO Mwangare, pers.
comm.).
From the point of view of the fishers, the importance of the Fisheries Department
personnel is their role as the link between the State and law and the fishing
communities on issues related to fishing, rather than performing any management
function.
The Fisheries Department has links with other state and parastatal organisations
through 'Memorandums of Understanding' (MOU). These Memorandums of
Understanding are signed by the directors of the organisations and are not legally
binding or passed in parliament. MOUs aim to reduce conflicts of interest and share
limited resources, and are an example of creating indirect institutional links to
resource use activities. Table 5.3 lists the organisations the Fisheries department has
MOUs with.
Table 5.3 Organisations that have MOUs with the Fisheries Department. (Source:
Oduol, pers. comm.)
Organisation Purpose
Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) Aerial surveillance in nearshore
commercial fisheries, co-ordination in
marine protected areas.
Kenya Marine Fisheries Research
Institute (KMFRI)
Research
Kenya Navy Policing commercial and foreign vessels,
preventing dynamite fishing.
Coast Development Authority (CDA) Integrated Coastal Area Management,
monthly meetings relating to the CDAs
role as co-ordinator of coastal activities.
5.2.6 Kenya Wildlife Service
The importance of the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) in the study area results from
the attempted implementation of the Diani Marine Reserve in 1995. The issue of the
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marine reserve is one of the resource access and control problems that is analysed in
detail in chapter 8.
The Kenya Wildlife Service is a parastatal organisation formed in 1989 to increase the
autonomy of the wildlife management and development authorities. These authorities
were previously set within the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife and are now within
the Ministry of Environmental Conservation. The relative autonomy of KWS and the
international popularity of wildlife and its importance to the tourism industry attracted
large sums of foreign financial aid. Consequently, KWS became an effective
organisation during the early 1990s under the directorship of Dr Richard Leakey.
This high profile also meant that KWS was able to develop a high level of expertise in
resource management through the involvement of foreign organisations and training
of personnel. For example, KWS collaborated with the University of Rhode Island to
implement an Integrated Coastal Zone Management plan near Mombasa, with
financial support from the United States (USAID). This has also meant that the
organisation has been in a position to assist other organisations such as the Fisheries
Department through, for example, workshops.
The Wildlife Conservation and Management Act allows the KWS to enforce property
rights to all wildlife within protected areas and also outside protected areas (Norton-
Griffiths, 1998). If the Diani marine reserve had been imposed the use of spear-guns
and seine nets would have been prohibited. Spear-guns are the largest sector in the
fishery and seine nets one of the most lucrative. Although the marine reserve in the
Diani area has not been implemented, it is officially gazetted and thus the role of the
KWS in the area continues to be a possibility. This has implications outside the
fishery as well. The agricultural activities of the fishing community are under
constant threat from animals that raid crops such as monkeys, baboons, wild pigs and
antelope. Wildlife legislation prevents individuals from killing animals without
consent. People in Biga have to rely on deterrents in most cases, but wild pigs are
such a problem they are occasionally killed.
An important change in the KWS policy objectives in recent years has been to create
an enabling environment within which landowners and resource users have incentives
to support KWS in achieving national conservation objectives (Norton-Griffiths,
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1998). A key part of this has been the Community Wildlife Scheme and Partnership
Officers, through which KWS has sought to have greater influence on the behaviour
of people depending on natural resources.
KWS' importance in the area of the study site stems both from its role in attempting to
establish a marine protected area in the region (cf. chapter 8 for details), and also from
its relative power as a resource management body thanks to international interest in
Kenya's wildlife.
5.2.7 Coast Development Authority
The Coast Development Authority (CDA) was established under the auspices of the
Ministry of Rural Development. The main function of the CDA is to co-ordinate
development activities in the coastal region that aim to improve the food security of
coastal people, increase employment opportunities and diversify the rural economy.
One of the roles of the CDA is to evaluate tourism developments in relation to
sustainable development and alternative developments. It was not evident at the time
of the study how effective CDA was. One of the problems for CDA as a cross
sectoral organisation was to achieve co-ordination between different sections of
government without the necessary legislation to do so. NEAP may change this. The
organisation also suffered from the political weakness. For example, CDA denied
being part of the Diani Marine Reserve process (Mwandoto pers. comm.), despite its
coastal zone management and development mandate and contrary to the analysis in
chapter 8.
5.2.8 Integrated Coastal Area Management (ICAM) Team
This is the most recently established governmental body concerned with the
sustainable and equitable development of the coastal region. As its name implies, its
mandate is specifically concerned with management, and its role is principally
advisory since it relies on sectoral legislation. Membership is flexible, depending on
the issues and activities being addressed, but the core representatives include technical
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representatives from the organisations listed above. In addition local and municipal
councils are represented and the Ministry of Culture and Social Services.
The importance of the initiative is that it is multidisciplinary, and as with NEAP and
the community programmes of KWS, illustrate a gradual shift in the way human-
environment interactions are tackled in Kenya.
5.2.9 Fishermen's Co-operative Societies
In 1991 there were five co-operatives in Kwale district co-ordinated by the South
Coast Fishermen's Co-operative Union under the auspices of the Ministry of Co-
operative Development. The co-operatives were established as a means of providing
financial support for fishing communities. Members sold their fish through the co-
operative and a small percentage was taken from their sales and placed in a central
fund from which loans could be taken. The co-operatives had long-term agreements
with traders so that fish were sold at prearranged prices that were periodically
adjusted. The fisheries officers and co-operative personnel said that the co-operatives
handled more than 60% of the catch within their areas of operation. Further
investigation of this figure showed that it was wishful thinking since very little fish
passed through the co-operative, for reasons described below. The figure derives
from Section 48 of the Co-operatives Act giving the co-operative the right to be the
monopoly purchaser if 60% of the catch passes through the co-operative.
None of Digo fishermen interviewed or spoken to in the course of the study saw any
benefit from the co-operatives. Many had joined in the 1970s when the concept was
introduced (from FAO influence), but no one had had a loan application accepted and
they had never heard of a fisherman getting a loan. The fishermen felt that their
money had been misspent and so they stopped selling their fish through the society
and consequently the society had ceased to function. In addition, as the former
Member of Parliament pointed out, the idea was foreign and therefore doomed and the
only successful co-operatives were based on salary deductions not voluntary
contributions (Mwamzandi pers. comm.).
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Despite the lack of significant membership, the co-operative society continued to have
influence in the area, and particularly the fishery. One of the problems analysed in
this study relates to the presence and activities of migrant fishermen from Tanzania.
Their use of fine meshed beach seines was a point of contention with the local Digo
people, and the mesh size was illegal under fisheries legislation. However, the beach
seine fishermen continued to 'support' the co-operative society long after it was
effectively defunct. Thus they were able to 'legitimise' their fishing activities by
supporting a government initiative (and personnel). The effects of the beach seines on
the fishery are discussed in chapter 7. Extraordinarily, Fisheries Department
personnel continued to cite the lack of fishers' and traders' organisation in the form of
co-operatives as the reason for many of the problems the fishers face. Such
comments would suggest that some government personnel do not place much
importance on the informal institutional arrangements and organising practices that do
function, some of which are identified below.
5.2.10 Land tenure
Land adjudication in the Biga area started in the 1970s with the beachfront and has
continued inland sporadically since then. Ostensibly to ensure local people were
granted title deeds to land, interest in the beachfront was primarily driven by its
potential for tourist development (the British had subdivided the adjacent Diani beach
area in 1908). All the individuals in Biga who received allocations of land on the
beachfront (based on interpretations of claims relating to stands of trees) were
'persuaded' to sell their land immediately. They did not appreciate the implications of
losing land under a system of property rights so different to their own (see part 5.3.1
and the previous chapter). Others claimed that they were not allocated all or any of
their traditional land, but instead the land had been allocated to well-connected
upcountry people (government is dominated by tribal groups from inland). One man
showed me the area of his family land that had never been allocated to him. He
pointed out the fruit trees that had been planted by earlier generations of his family, it
covered a number of beach plots, one of which had been developed for tourism and
the rest had been fenced in by absentee landlords. It was interesting to hear that his
strongest complaint was that he no longer had access to his coconut trees, and that
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many had been cut down (Chicho pers. comm.), rather than the loss of such potential
financial wealth. At the time, in 1996, the value of beachfront plots was about 3-4
million shillings an acre (KSh 85/£ 1996). His claim, based on the area of coconut
and mango trees, would have covered at least five acres. The value in 1996
represented 280 times his annual disposable income (cf. chapter 7 for calculations of
income for fishers with canoes).
The process of land adjudication has transformed the beachfront and changed land use
patterns. The land market and process of land allocation remains a significant
influence on resource access in the area. One of the issues analysed in chapter 8
relates to land ownership and access.
5.3 Informal institutions and resource access in the study site
Traditional rules relating to resource access and control are very different to the
formal institutions described above. Ideas of ownership of natural resources are
different, and the ways decisions are made relating to the allocation of resources are
also different. Contrary to the hierarchical decision making trees of the formal
organisations identified above, many traditional organisations are based on debate and
consensus with wider participation of individuals than formal organisations.
As with formal institutions, globalisation has had an influence on informal
institutions. For example, economic changes due to absorption into the global market
system has caused some East African societies to shift from matrilineal to patrilineal
societies (Gough, 1961; Ng'weno, 1995). These kinds of changes have implications
for customary inheritance laws, the relative authority or power of different age groups
and genders and consequently social relations. The effects of global markets for land
and products found within the study site and the cultural effects of tourism has lead to
changes in some traditional institutions in the Biga community.
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5.3.1 Traditional land tenure
In traditional Digo society land itself was not considered to be property in the sense
that an individual had rights of freehold tenure. Ownership was vested in trees
planted by individuals, in houses, livestock and rights of land use (Ng'weno, 1995).
Provided that land was available a person had full rights in a neighbourhood by virtue
of membership of the kinship group. Trees could be rented, sold or inherited by
descendants. Land under cultivation of seasonal crops was not owned, its was merely
used. Land could be accessed by taking-over fallow land, clearing forest or bush, or
areas under planted trees could be inherited or bought. Inheritance in Digo society
was traditionally matrilineal. Rules of inheritance were negotiable and flexible,
children inherited from male and female maternal relations as well as from their
matri-clans, but not usually from their father (Ng'weno, 1995).
The adoption of Islam and successive colonial and independent governments
(dominated by different tribes and externally influenced) ignored these arrangements
relating to land (cf. chapter 4), thereby undermining the traditional institutions and
ultimately changing patterns of land use. In the Biga area there continues to be some
use of these informal institutions relating to a market for squatter land on an estate
that covers part of the Biga area.
5.3.2 Traditional sea use and beach use organisation
From discussions with fishermen and from observing the way the newly created
fishermen's group functioned, traditional institutional arrangements relating to
activities in the sea continued to be used. The beach/sea chairman is an elected
position, usually taken by an older fisherman, with responsibilities for all marine
related activities in the area adjacent to the community. When the fishermen of Biga
formed a committee in 1996 the natural choice for the chairman was the traditional
beach/sea chairman. The effect of allocating responsibility for activities within the
lagoon adjacent to each community effectively partitioned the sea into community
territories. As a matter of protocol fishermen from other areas continue to introduce
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themselves to the resident beach/sea chairman and frequently pay a fee (ubani) to fish
in the area. The ineffectiveness of State fisheries institutional arrangements to deal
with problems fishermen face has contributed to the continued traditional role of the
beach/sea chairman.
Taboos and ceremonial acts are another important part of traditional institutional
arrangements. Glaesel (1997) found that Digo fishing communities continued to
perform ceremonies in relation to fishing activities in order to appease certain spirits,
but these activities were rapidly declining. The older members of Biga community
said that there were areas in the sea which were associated with sacred sites on land
(Kayas) known as Mizimu, and fishing was not permitted in these areas. However,
they admitted that since the 1960s these traditions had become increasingly less
respected and that fishing now took place everywhere. This was attributed to need for
fishermen exploit all accessible areas, and because the younger generation claim that
belief in the spirits is against their Islamic beliefs (Glaesel, 1997). Older members of
the community continue to recognise the marine sacred sites that they believe harbour
spirits, and they continue to be important sites for offerings (sadaka). But most
fishermen are reluctant to admit to ceremonies taking place at all. This indicates that
these informal institutions are becoming less effective in determining social
behaviour.
5.3.3 Traditional landing site organisation
As with the beach/sea chairman, a traditional trading institution exists, where each
landing site has a trader chairman voted in by the fishermen and traders. Every trader
must have permission from the chairman to buy fish at a particular landing site
(Balcari pers. comm.). Traders could guarantee a supply of fish by paying the
chairman to ensure fishermen supplied them. Informal credit systems were observed
to exist. Often traders would pay fishermen the following day or later, having sold
their fish, and in other situations fishermen would borrow from traders and repay in
the future. The landing site chairman ensured that individuals made their payments
by controlling who could do business and who could not. This process continued
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throughout the period of co-operatives and remains the main institutional arrangement
at the landing sites, whereas the co-operative societies have collapsed.
5.3.4 The Galu Fishermen's Committee
Illustrative of the organising capabilities within local communities, the fishermen in
Biga formed an interest group to tackle fishery related problems that State
organisations were incapable of dealing with (for the organisation of the group see
Appendix III). This group was not sanctioned by the State, but proved effective in
tackling the beach seine problem in the area (cf. chapter 8 for an analysis). This
short-lived informal organisation functioned despite constraints placed by formal
institutions, such as laws restricting public gatherings unless sanctioned by the Stare.
5.4 Institutional links to livelihoods
Having outlined some of the more important formal and informal institutional
arrangements and their associated organisations in the study site, their links to
resource access and control can be presented.
A recent approach to linking the range of different institutions that exist at different
levels to livelihoods is environmental entitlements analysis (for a full description see
Leach et al., 1997). This approach considers the problem of people gaining command
over resources by identifying what have been termed people's endowments and
entitlements and what they do with them. Endowments are the rights and resources
people have to make use of certain environmental goods and services. The
entitlements are the sets of benefits subsequently derived as a result of having
legitimate effective command over the environmental goods and services. What
people can do or be with these entitlements enhances their capabilities. At each stage
in this process different formal and informal institutions, at different scale levels, are
considered to interact to shape people's resource claims and practices. Legitimate
effective command over resources is an important distinction because it acknowledges
that resource claims are often contested. In many instances the resource claims of
more powerful actors tend to prevail over those of others. In addition it recognises
88
that not everyone is necessarily able to mobilise critical endowments, such as capital
or labour, in order to make effective use of other endowments such as land (Leach et
al., 1997). Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate some of these linkages in relation to fishing
in the lagoon and using beachfront land for trading and related activities.
Problems of resource access and control, such as the conflict between the local Digo
fishers in Biga and the migrant beach seine fishers or the marine reserve issue, would
be similar to the more generalised structure presented in Figure 5.2. The
environmental goods and services are found in a multispecies fishery in the lagoon
adjacent to the community's territory. The endowments the people have are rights of
access to fish in the lagoon. A range of institutions that affect different people in
different ways determines these rights of access. With access to the lagoon, fishers
gain entitlements such as fish, again within interacting sets of rules. Converting the
entitlements of fish to capabilities, such as contributing to wellbeing (schooling,
nutrition) are also considered to be influenced by sets of rules.
A similar process can be described for the problem of gaining access to beachfront
land to carry out other essential activities related to fishing, such as interacting with
traders or even getting access to the sea. A generalised structure is presented in
Figure 5.3. As the value for beachfront land has increased due to the growth of
tourism, fishers have found less and less space available to carry out their activities.
The value of land has reached such a level that even land held under trust by local
councils has found its way into private ownership (see the land issue analysed in
chapter 8). The institutional arrangements that ensure people do or do not continue to
gain access to that land include the effects of international policies on people in
positions of power at a national level (cf. section 2.5 on political patronage). Some of
the interactions between the different institutions result in conflicts of interest, as was
discussed above.
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Figure 5.2 Environmental entitlements analysis of fishing in the waters adjacent to
Biga.
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Figure 5.3 Environmental entitlements analysis of the use of beachfront land for
trading fish, getting to the sea and other marine related activities.
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5.5 Conclusion
Clearly institutional dynamics and local political manoeuvring play an important role
in determining people's resource access and control. Equally important are the
institutional arrangements, the organisations and politics that occur at other scale
levels, such as nationally and internationally. The interplay between the different
scale levels is an important influence on the rules that actually determine people's
actions at the local level. Formal macro institutions, such as GATT or international
development policies, influence the effectiveness of informal micro institutions
through indirect or 'trickle down' effects.
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There were a number of important differences between the formal and informal
institutions identified above. Formal institutions had a direct organisational
manifestation and were concerned with modern government departments or
international organisations. Informal institutions were principally concerned with
people's customary practices or traditions, many of which were pre-modern, reflecting
the type of society in Biga. The fishermen's committee was considered an informal
organisation. It was created to tackle a specific problem in the community, and was
therefore a short-lived. But, its importance lay in its effectiveness (cf. chapter 8)
despite the formal institutional environment, and was therefore illustrative of the
organising capabilities of community groups. Table 5.4 presents a summary of the
institutions identified in this chapter and their respective scale levels and roles in
influencing resource access and control.
Table 5.4 Institutional analysis matrix for the Biga community (adapted from Ahluwalia,
1997).
Community Local/National International
Mobilising • Community/clan • Local politics and • International loan
endowments
•
membership
Customary access •
Administration
Local government -
agreements — IMF,
World Bank...
mechanisms on land or DDC, DEC... • International
at sea • Fisheries legislation economic agreements —
• Inheritance and and other natural GATT, WTO...
religious/gender resources legislation • International/regional
implications • Commercial environmental treaties
• Traditional customs,
taboos and sacred sites •
networks and power
Land legislation
and initiatives —
UNCED '92, UNEP...
Gaining • Customary rules • Land legislation • International
entitlements • Ethnicity • Fisheries legislation development policies —
• Local power relations • Co-operatives USAID, SIDA...
• Gender/gear divisions • Local government - • Globalisation and
• Fishermen's
committee
• National
development policies
international markets
• Beach/sea chairman • Political networks
Enjoying • Number of wives • Fisheries legislation • Globalisation and
capabilities • Intra-household international markets
arrangements • Tourism
• Fisher/trader relations
and credit systems
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Having described the environmental, historical and institutional context of the
community of Biga, the next chapter considers the interactions between different
groups in the area and the resulting social and environmental impacts.
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6 BROAD ISSUES AND IMPACTS ON THE PEOPLE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT OF BIGA TODAY
6.1 Introduction
As indicated in the previous chapters, the community that is the focus of this study
does not exist in isolation from the other social groups and their activities in the Biga
area. The coast of Kenya, south of Mombasa has been an attraction to European
visitors from the highlands since the 1950s and international tourists since the 1960s.
The stretch of coast immediately to the north of Biga has been one of the principal
areas of tourism development in Kenya, and in recent times the development has
spread into the Biga area. These activities have direct and indirect impacts on
members of the community. Direct impacts may include competition for resources
such as land. Indirect impacts would include the effects of other activities on the
natural environment such as visitor pressure on coral reefs, which may in turn affect
members of the community.
The aim of this chapter is to link the main activities that occur in the local area to the
issue of resource availability for members of the studied community. Such an
understanding also places the role of different institutional arrangements that exist
within different stakeholder groups into the context of resource access and control
for the studied community. Evidently the rules that govern tourism development are
not necessarily part of the local communities' institutional arrangements, but they
may overshadow the functioning of local rules and organisations. The key
organisations and institutions that influence resource access and use were outlined in
the previous chapter; this chapter identifies the main groups they represent or relate
to.
The first part of this chapter identifies the other resource users or stakeholders in the
study area and the resources they use. Although the focus of this study was the Digo
fishing community of Biga, there were numerous other groups settled or working in
the same area. The different groups could be differentiated according to their
activities and distribution patterns. For example members of the Biga community
lived in a distinct place separate from expatriate residents or hotels, yet they shared
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many of the same resources such as ground water, the beach and the sea. The second
part of this chapter identifies direct and indirect impacts the different stakeholder
groups have on the studied community.
6.2 Resource users and stakeholders in the study area
Seven different societal groups that live or work in the Biga area were identified and
are listed below. A number of these groups are made up of people from inland tribes
who are collectively referred to as upcountry people.
i) Indigenous Digo community including fishers, fish traders, hawkers, farmers
ii) Seasonal and permanent upcountry farmers
iii) Migrant fishermen from Pemba <Tanzania)
iv) Upcountry hawkers and curio merchants
v) Upcountry and Asian businesses such as shops
vi) Tourism developers from Europe and upcountry
vii) Expatriate European residents
These societal groups can be further subdivided into stakeholder sub-groups. In this
case stakeholders are those groups who depend on the direct or indirect use of coastal
resources for all or part of their livelihood. Table 6.1 identifies the principal natural
resources in the study area and the different stakeholder groups who exploit them.
In some cases, competition for the same resources by different groups has lead to
conflict. The status of each stakeholder group is assessed below.
6.2.1 The Digo community
The local Digo community of Biga is the focus of this study. As described in chapter
4 they were the first inhabitants of this area and as such define the extent of the study
area. Their livelihoods have evolved over generations to take advantage of a wide
range of resources available in their local area. As a group they exploit all of the
resources identified in Table 6.1, and are therefore in competition with all of the
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Table 6.1 Resource use by different stakeholder groups in the study area of Biga.
Resource Direct use Indirect use
Coral and shells Shell collectors, tourism Fishermen, tourism
Seagrass beds Fishermen, migrant fishers,
curio collectors
Fish Fishermen, fish traders,
migrant fishers, tourism
Tourism
Beaches Fishermen, migrant fishers,
fish traders, tourism,
hawkers, expatriate residents
Forest Fishermen, fisher
households, farmers
Tourism, expatriate residents
Land for cultivation Farmers, fisher households,
migrant fishers
Kenya Sugar Estate
Land for habitation Fisher households, tourism,
expatriate residents, migrant
fishers
Ground water All
other groups to a greater or lesser extent. The analysis of the production systems of
the community in chapter 7 presents a more detailed account of resource use by the
different groups within the Digo community of Biga.
6.2.2 Tourism
Tourism is the largest single source of foreign exchange in Kenya. During the global
tourism boom in the 1980s the number of visitors to Kenya increased by 97%, from
362,000 in 1980 to 713,000 in 1989 (WTO, 1990). Numbers continued to rise during
the 1990s to a peak of 863,400 in 1994, but have since dropped to around 700,000
per year (GOK, 1997). The coast has been the main destination for the majority of
tourists because it offers both a beach holiday and good access to game parks. In
1996 the beach hotels accounted for 63.5% of occupied hotel bed-nights in the
country (GOK, 1997). Along the stretch of coast in the vicinity of the study site
there are 19 large hotels (Figure 6.1). Hotels were first built on this stretch of
coastline during the 1950s to cater for Europeans resident in the capital city Nairobi
and in the highlands. During the late 1970s and the 1980s eleven hotels were built
and a further six were built between 1991 and 1996 to cater for the overseas markets.
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Since then however the industry has suffered from negative press in Europe and
competition from other parts of the world. Some hotels have had to close and the
general trend for all the hotels has been to target budget tourists in order to maintain
reasonable levels of occupancy. The number of hotel beds on this stretch of
coastline, including the smaller enterprises is about 7,030 with yearly occupancy
rates of around 60% (Rubens, 1996).
Figure 6.1 The location of large hotels in the vicinity of the study site.
Figure 6.1 shows clearly the heavily developed area to the north of the study site
known as Diani beach. Within the Biga study area there is only one large hotel
catering for overseas tourists, however there is a large holiday villa development
catering predominantly for German tourists, and a number of smaller self catering
holiday cottage developments that cater for Kenyan or European residents living
upcountry. There is also a night club and three restaurants that cater for the tourist
industry. Tourism can be considered to be the main economic activity in the area,
but the degree to which this activity is transferred to the local Biga community is
97
very limited. Very few local people are employed in the tourist industry either
within the immediate area or in the Diani beach area.
Beach front land has been the primary resource used by the tourist industry. The
heavier development along the Diani beach stretch was possible because the land had
been expropriated from the local Digo people during the colonial era and divided into
20 acre plots. As the market for land grew, subdivision and development followed.
Further south, in the area of the study site, the beachfront land was not divided
during the colonial times, but after independence the new government continued the
colonial governments policy of land adjudication. In the 1960s and 1970s the market
for beach front land driven by the tourist industry lead to further expropriation of
land for well connected upcountry individuals (0. Chicho, pers. comm.; Jommo,
1986). The result now is that no seafront land is owned or occupied by local Digo
people.
The growth of tourism increased the demand for marine products both for food and
as souvenirs. But the tourist industry ceased to buy fish from the local Digo fishers
and traders in the boom of the 1980s because the supply was unreliable, instead using
wholesalers from Mombasa. The market for marine souvenirs has dropped in recent
years because tourists have become less inclined to buy environmentally sensitive
products. In any event, it is unlikely that the local environment could supply any
marine products to the tourist industry in its present state of degradation (cf. chapter
3 and 7).
Recreational activities such as sports fishing, SCUBA diving, windsurfing and
sailing have also grown with the tourist industry. Many people now use the
protected lagoon for different recreational activities alongside the local fishing
people. At low tide many tourists venture out onto the exposed reef flats, in the past
to look for shells and starfishes, but increasingly simply to look at not much at all
save for a mass of sea urchins.
The primary attraction to tourists was the idyllic palm fringed wide white sandy
beach and protected lagoon. The beach has been a strip of access for all users to
move along the coast. At low tide it is about 100m wide and enables tourists to
98
explore further afield and enjoy the space for sunbathing or other activities. The
present situation is somewhat different. Tourists are reluctant to venture onto the
beach except to dash to the sea for a swim because of the harassment they receive
from hawkers selling curios. Those who do venture further afield run the increasing
risk of being mugged.
6.2.3 Upcountry hawkers and curio merchants
As a result of the tourist industry many people from upcountry have been attracted to
the coast in search of work. Some of these people find work within the formal
tourism sector, but a large number make and sell curios such as carvings, jewellery,
cloths and baskets and provide services such as massage and prostitution. Upcountry
people form the majority of the hawkers on the beach. Young local Digo men tend
to specialise in selling boat trips to the reef, drugs and prostitution. This informal
sector is focused around the more developed Diani beach area where there are in
excess of 400 hawkers in the high season (December-March) (pers. ohs.), and is
relatively undeveloped in the Biga area, between 10-15 individuals (pers. ohs.), due
to the lack of hotels. Within the wider area of Diani and Galu the upcountry hawkers
are an important, well organised and vocal group. They have established stalls above
the high tide mark wherever there is space, usually between hotels and on public
rights of way. Many of them rent rooms from Digo people and are an important
contributor to the local economy. Within the Biga area itself they do not however
make a significant contribution.
6.2.4 Expatriate European residents
European expatriates own most of the beachfront land in the Biga area. Most of
these plots were developed as holiday houses, but the owners or tenants now occupy
many of them on a permanent basis. As a stakeholder group they are important
because of the land they own and in some cases their interest in environmental
issues.
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6.2.5 Seasonal farmers
Over the past 20 years Tharaka and Meru migrants from inland have come to the
coast to grow cash crops during the long rains, taking advantage of the local tenure
system which does not protect uncultivated land and absentee landlords. The
majority arrive in February to start clearing areas of bush and forest in preparation
for the rain and leave early in October at the end of the season. The main cash crops
grown are tomatoes and green peppers, but many other subsistence crops are grown.
The crops are sold in Mombasa, 40 km away. The migrant farmers only clear land in
the coral rag zone, where the soil is more fertile, working on a rotational basis of
three years fallow. This once densely forested zone was rapidly cleared during the
early 1980s, producing good charcoal from the hardwoods and subsequently cash
crops. The pressures for land in the Meru area upcountry continues to encourage
more people to move down to the coastal strip and increasing numbers are settling,
working as labourers on building sites during the dry season. Some of the migrant
farmers said that they were encouraged to clear private land, making it easier to
develop by the non-resident owners.
6.2.6 Upcountry and Asian businesses such as shops
This is a very small group within the Biga area, but through political affiliations is
influential. The development of at least one of the larger owned businesses is on
land previously owned by the state, and illustrates the relationship between wealthy
businesses and local politicians. This relationship is considered in the analysis of
one of the resource access issues in chapter 8.
6.2.7 Migrant fishers
One of the issues analysed in chapter 8 concerns the conflict between the local Digo
fishers and migrant fishers from Tanzania. Migrant fishermen from the islands of
Pemba and Zanzibar, and the associated smaller islands of Kojani and Tumbatu, in
northern Tanzania have been fishing in Kenya since British colonial times. These
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people are collectively known as the Wapemba (people from Pemba). At that time
the better market for fish in Kenya and the common currency in the two countries
attracted the island fishermen to travel on fishing expeditions as far north as Malindi.
Contacts between Kenyan fishing communities and people in Pemba had previously
been established because Bajuni men from Kenya had migrated to Pemba on a
seasonal basis to work in the clove plantations and some had intermarried (Glaesel,
1997). From the beginning the Wapemba fishermen were not universally accepted
by Kenyan fishing communities because they used seine nets. But the level of
competition between the two groups was sufficiently low to have made their
presence tolerable, to the extent that virtually every landing site on the Kenya coast
as far Malindi had Wapemba fishers. There was also the benefit to local fishing
communities of fees paid (ubani) for permission to fish in their areas. The main
influx of Wapemba to Kenya occurred in 1964 following the overthrow of the
Zanzibar government. The political unrest at the time caused sympathisers of the
Zanzibar government to flee the country. With the established links and some small
settlements in Kenya, many thousands of Wapemba moved to Kenya on a permanent
basis.
In the area of the study site a community of Wapemba had been settled on a
permanent basis for over thirty years. Elders of the Biga community had chosen a
site for their settlement and accepted their presence. Throughout this period
Wapemba people had migrated between the two countries, but a core group
remained, although always separate from the local Digo community of Biga. The
issue of fishing method continued to be the key factor in determining local
acceptance. Even if there was intermarriage, the children for instance would only be
accepted by the Digo community if their fathers did not use seine nets (Glaesel,
1997).
In terms of resource use the Wapemba fishers operate from large dugout canoes
fishing in the lagoon with seine nets up to 100 m long. During the calmer north east
monsoon they also fish the reef slope outside the lagoon. They have also planted
fruit trees such as coconut, mango and citrus around their settlements, and some have
cattle.
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6.2.8 Plantation estate
Although this has not been listed as a stakeholder group, land belonging to the
defunct Kenya Sugar Estates covers approximately a fifth of the Biga area, and is
therefore under private ownership. The estate was formed during the colonial era,
originally growing sisal and coconut and later sugar cane, coconut and cashew nut.
The last owner was an Asian businessman from Uganda, but the company collapsed
about fifteen years ago and the owner has fled the country in debt to the Government.
The title deeds for the estate land however are held by the Bank of India and cannot
be claimed by the Goverment (District Surveyor Maina, pers. comm.). The part of
the estate that incorporates part of Biga was never used for plantations and the local
community continued to use the land in the traditional way. In recent years however,
the need for land has become an issue and questions of land ownership are frequently
discussed. The fact that the estate land was never developed in Biga has meant that a
number of squatter households have been established, some of whom have been there
for more than a generation. A local, informal market for the land has developed,
drawing on traditional institutions of land tenure and kinship ties. The estate land
remains the only significant area of undeveloped land and the local community hopes
that the Government will somehow acquire the land and subdivide it among the
locals.
6.3 Direct and indirect impacts of the different stakeholder groups
The presence or activities of the various groups within the Biga area have different
impacts on the local Biga community. Some of these impacts relate to competition
for limited resources within the area and other impacts include social and cultural
effects. Degradation of the environment due to the activities of some groups has also
had an impact on the livelihoods of the Biga community. The different users of each
resource and their degree of interaction in Biga are summarised in Tables 6.2 and
6.3.
6.3.1 Competition for resources
102
Competition for land has been an ongoing issue in the area. Subdivision and
allocation of land on the beachfront has been in favour of wealthy and politically
influential people from upcountry (cf. part 5.2.9), many of whom sold on to
developers. As beach front land has become less available, development has moved
inland reducing the available space for the agricultural activities of the people of
Biga. In addition, many of the traditional rights of way used by fishers and traders to
access the sea have been closed off due to private land ownership. The more recent
and widely publicised illegal allocation of public rights of way to developers in
neighbouring Diani was also of concern to the people of Biga (Galu fishermen's
Committee pers. comm; East African Standard, 1996).
Competition for marine resources between the local Digo fishers and Wapemba
fishers has been the cause of significant friction between the two groups. This issue
is analysed in detail in chapters 7 and 8 and as indicated below, the local Digo fishers
blame the lack of fish on the methods used by the Wapemba fishers. There is also
competition between different fishing groups within the Biga community. As
highlighted in chapter 2, communities are not homogenous groups. In Biga there is
some friction between the older fishermen who use traps and the younger fishermen
who use spear guns (Galu Fishermen's Committee pers. comm.). This conflict stems
from the problem of limited resources and the cultural effects of Islam and
Westernisation on the younger generations and its impact on traditional authority (cf.
part 5.3.2).
Ground water is an important resource used by all the groups in the area because
there is no piped water. In the area of the fisher households (see Figures 3.5 and 7.1)
the water table is between 10m and 25m below the surface (pers. obs.). Wells sunk
within 800m to 1000m from the sea tend to be brackish (from discussions during
household interviews for socio-economic survey; pers. obs.), but within the area of
the households the water is fresh and has never been known to dry out (Chief
Mwaropia pers. comm.). One well in Biga, in the Madago quarter, was said to have
been built by the Arabs who plied the coast hundreds of years ago (this is very
possible as the Kongo mosque in neighbouring Diani dates to back to the 16th
century). More recently five bore holes with hand pumps were put in by Swedish
Aid, these are sealed and therefore do not have problems of collapsing or becoming
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polluted. Each bore hole is managed by a committee of user households who
contribute 20 Shillings (approx. KSh 100/£1) per household each month for the
maintenance of the hand pump (household survey).
The people of Biga consider there to be two threats to the ground water: the
increasing development which is a heavy user of water; and the goverment
requirement that pit latrines should be used by households, which locals say will
pollute the well water.
6.3.2 Environmental impacts
Within the Biga area the clearance of the natural woodland has reduced the natural
resources available to the Biga community for house building, boats, fishing gear and
other traditional uses. Coupled with the exclusion of the remaining stands of
woodland on private land these materials have to be collected or bought from further
afield. As discussed above and in previous chapters, clearance has been due to
changes in land tenure and land use patterns. The only remaining stands of naturai
woodland are the sacred sites of the Biga community (kayas) and land owned by
expatriates who take an interest in the environment.
As indicated in chapter 3, the marine environment is heavily degraded. The lack of
certain fish species, particularly trigger fish, and the large numbers of sea urchins
(Echinometra mathaei) suggest that fishing is the primary cause of this situation (cf.
part 3.2.1.3). Local Digo fishermen blame the fishing practices of the Wapemba.
Accusations made by the Digo fishermen are that the use of fine-meshed beach seine
nets and the process of dragging the nets catches juvenile fish and damages coral and
breeding areas (see Appendix III for the Galu Fishermen's Committee argument). A
comparison of catches from different gear types (chapter 7, Figure 7.4) support the
problem of catching juveniles. However, personal observations made during a
fishing trip with the Wapemba seine net crews casts some doubt on damage to corals
or seagrass beds. The number of fishers, both Digo and Wapemba, and the level of
fishing effort is more likely to be the cause of the degraded state of the marine
environment (cf. section 7.7). The impact of other groups on the marine
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environment is probably less chronic. The overflow water from some of the Diani
beach hotel swimming pools spills onto the beach, but there is no direct sewage out-
fall. Trucks collecting sewage from hotel septic tanks have been known to empty
their tanks into the sea without any action taken by local authorities (Daily Nation,
1997). The impact of tourists walking on the exposed reef flats at low tide is
unknown.
6.3.3 Socio-cultural impacts
Each of the stakeholder groups identified above are ethnically different and as a
result they have had an effect on local culture. It has been suggested that tourism can
have a potentially devastating effect on local culture and social equilibrium leading
to changes in the values and attitudes of the local population. The inevitable
demands of western tourists for prostitution, drugs and other entertainment have lead
to the commercialisation or bastardisation of traditional folklore and increased petty
crime and drug abuse among the local population (Migot-Adholla et al., 1982;
Robinson, 1999).
Hostility between the ethnic groups from upcountry and the local population has
been an underlying feature of the coast. People from upcountry began settling in the
coastal region during the British colonial era to work in the ports, railways and
factories (Willis, 1987). More recently the tourism sector has attracted many people
from upcountry. There are also seasonal migrants who move to parts of the coast to
farm. Although there were seldom direct conflicts between coastal and upcountry
people, the Government's policy to settle upcountry people in the coastal region
during the 1960s and the blatant grabbing of beachfront land by wealthy upcountry
individuals (Jommo, 1986) has antagonised the relationship between the coastal and
upcountry ethnic groups. These underlying ethnic tensions were used by politically
motivated trouble-makers during the 1997 general election to influence the results by
frightening away a proportion of the electorate (The same tactics in 1992 led to the
deaths of 1,500 people and the displacement of 300,000 people in western Kenya,
Odhiambo, 1997). The events resulted in numerous deaths, destruction of property
belonging to upcountry people and the exodus of tens of thousands of people (pers.
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ohs. Odhiambo, 1997). Conflicts based on religion have also taken place,
particularly in the neighbouring Diani area where there is a large Christian
population from upcountry. Senior Muslims blame the upcountry dominated District
administration in Kwale and Diani police for inciting violence, which in August 1999
led to the massacre of people in a local mosque (IANA, 1999).
Within the Biga area itself upcountry people tend to be employed by expatriate
residents or in the hotel and some of the smaller tourist establishments or be seasonal
farmers. Discussions with seasonal farmers and Digo people indicated that there was
no animosity between them, unlike the neighbouring Diani area.
6.3.4 Economic impacts
Price rises have been a significant economic effect of tourism. Land values have
moved far beyond the reach of the local Digo population (cf. part 5.2.9). For some
individuals who owned land in the second, third or even fourth strip from the
beachfront this has meant that they have been able to sell parcels of land for
enormous sums in recent years.
Competition for formal work in the tourist sector has tended to benefit upcountry
people more than local Digo people. In Biga community there was only one person
(of approximately 580 adults, Chief Mwarupia pers. comm.) who worked in a hotel,
as a swimming pool attendant (household surveys). Local Digo people have trouble
finding work in hotels for historical reasons. During the colonial era and post
independence education at the coast was less developed than in central and western
Kenya. As a result coastal people were at a disadvantage when it came to gaining
managerial or skilled positions in hotels (Migot-Adholla, 1982). The result
subsequently was that nepotism based on tribal affiliations has dominated
recruitment into the hotel industry. A study in 1996 estimated that Digo people
accounted for only 16.4% of employees at six of the biggest hotels at Diani (Rubens,
1996). The same study also showed that Digo positions tended to be the lowest paid
manual jobs such as gardeners and swimming pool attendants. This situation has
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also contributed to the resentment the local Digo population have towards both
upcountry people and the hotel industry as a whole.
Although there is less opportunity for selling to tourists on the beach in the Biga
area, Rubens (1996) found that in this sector local Digo people were also
underrepresented. In the Diani beach area only 10% of the beach sellers and hawkers
were Digo people (Rubens, 1996).
The export of octopus from Kenya by Mombasa based businesses has had a small
impact on the local economy. Octopus has become a target species for spear gun
fishermen who sell their catch to companies who have collection points on the main
Mombasa road. One of the Mombasa companies was exporting approximately 20
tonnes of octopus a month to Italy (P. Rocca, pers. comm) from Kenya. Other export
businesses include the aquarium trade and the export of sea cucumber (Holothurian
sp.). Occasionally Mombasa based aquarium fish traders send teams of fish
collectors to the Biga area, but they did not employ local people and consequently
had no economic impact on the area. Their environmental impact had not been
assessed, but having observed their method of using small scoop nets it was fairly
benign. Their infrequent visits reflected the degraded state of the local marine
environment, due more to local fishing activity than overexploitation by aquarium
fishers. There was only one sea cucumber trader in the Biga area, but only as a
sideline activity due to the very small numbers found in the area.
6.4 Summary of user interactions and resource-use in Biga
The importance of the different resources to the different user groups in the Biga area
is summarised in Table 6.2. This summary is based on the role of a particular
resource in the livelihood of a user group. In many cases the importance of a
resource is indirect (see Table 6.1). For example, the coral reef is important to
tourism because it creates a protected lagoon and wide sandy beach, rather than
direct exploitation by tourism (see Rubens, 1996). Similarly, foreign expatriates
have settled in the area because of the coastal environment, but don't depend directly
on many of the local resources for their livelihoods despite using them.
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The degree of interaction between the different groups according to their overlapping
resource use and direct and indirect impacts is summarised in Table 6.3. These
represent the principle natural resources different groups compete for or use share
use of. Ground water is not included because all groups use and depend on it (see
part 6.3.2 for details). Marine resources include seagrass beds, coral reefs and fish.
Land resources include forests and fallow land.
The spatial distribution of the main user groups in Biga is illustrated in Figure 6.2.
These include the local Digo community, the seasonal farmers from upcountry,
private landowners (including Kenya Sugar estate) and the tourist industry.
6.5 Conclusion
The presence of other groups in the vicinity of the study area influences the resources
available to the local Biga community in a number of ways. The changes in land use
patterns due to the introduction of land allocation pre and post independence and the
subsequent development of tourism and expatriate residences, have been the primary
causes of impacts (through loss of access) on the terrestrial resources used by the
local community. The observation that the tourism sector tends to aggravate existing
patterns of inequality (Migot-Adholla et al., 1982), runs true in the Biga and Diani
area. This inequality fails to ensure that the local population, whose land and other
resources may have been expropriated for tourism development and wealthy
expatriates, are in a position to benefit directly from tourism (the livelihood analysis
in the next chapter illustrates this).
The primary issue in the marine environment stems from the fishing activities of both
the local fishers and the migrant Wapemba fishers. The lack of fish (which will be
shown in more detail in chapter 7) due to the level of fishing effort and methods of
fishing has lead to competition and conflicts between the local Digo fishers and the
Wapemba.
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Figure 6.2 The distribution of user groups in Biga. (Source: District Surveyor; this study)
From the point of view of the local community, all the other stakeholder groups are
perceived as competitors for local resources. In many instances the precarious socio-
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economic predicament of the local community has lead to conflict over resources.
Unfortunately for the Digo people, they have become one of the weakest stakeholder
groups, despite having the most at stake in the local environment, because most of the
other groups are linked to the politically and economically powerful tourism sector.
The next chapter analyses the livelihoods of the Digo households in Biga.
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7 ANALYSIS OF LIVELIHOODS AND PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
THROUGH DISCUSSIONS AND SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
7.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an analysis of the livelihoods and production systems within
the Digo community of Biga. It forms the basis for understanding conflicts over
resources and reactions to perceived and real threats to local people's access to and
control over resources. The aim is to present the socio-economic situation of the
local community in the context of the social and biophysical setting developed in the
preceding chapters.
This part of the study is based on information collected through semi-structured
interviews and discussions with individuals and groups in the community. The
methods follow the principles of Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and Participatory
Rural Appraisal (PRA), which have been developed in the field of overseas
development. The former is used to elicit or extract information and the latter used
primarily to enable local people to analyse their local situation and to plan and act.
In terms of understanding local situations, the methods have proven to be more valid
and reliable than rigid questionnaire surveys (Chambers, 1992).
The process of eliciting information about livelihoods, presented in this chapter, was
also tied in with eliciting information about the issues investigated in the next chapter
(concerned with problem solving actions). Issues of access to and control of
resources are intimately tied to, or are an integral part of livelihoods. In some
situations the process shifted from eliciting information to the local people analysing
their situation. Thus engaging in conversation with a group of fishermen and
discussing their situation not only provided information, but it also facilitated
investigation and learning on their part. This is not to say that the process developed
a consciousness about their problems; this was already well established, but it did on
occasion lead to fuller and more confident discussion amongst them. Thus the
principle of an outsider initiating a process and sitting back, not interviewing or
interrupting occurred and was a consequence of the subjects being discussed.
Sharing of information, another principle of PRA, was a key part of our relationship.
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Chambers (1992) emphasises that the principles behind PRA tend to be personal,
relating to behaviour and attitudes of outsiders in their interactions with people.
The first section of this chapter presents the methods of information collection and
analysis. The methods of eliciting information are also those used for chapter 8. The
second section puts into context the previously described methods and their
application in the field and gives meaning to 'participation' in this case. It illustrates
the fact that the appearance of a researcher investigating some fairly sensitive issues
can be considered to be a resource to be exploited by members of the community,
and that the give and take of eliciting information is a consuming part of the research
process. The third section describes the physical layout and demography of Biga.
The fourth (production systems) and fifth (productivity and incorites secdocts
present the analysis of livelihoods of the Digo community. Emphasis is given to the
livelihoods of the Digo people because they are the focus of this study and represent
90% of the community. The importance of fishing to most households becomes
evident through the analysis, and therefore a brief discussion of the state of the
fishery is given in section 7.7. Some of the information on the fishery was collected
with another researcher25 . All the household interviews that form the basis of many
of the results presented in this chapter were carried out in conjunction with another
researcher26.
Presentation of the production systems includes the methods of production on land
and at sea and non-fishing/farming employment. Attention is given to the variety of
food crops grown and the methods of cultivation, the different methods of fishing
and selectivity of fishing gear. The seasonality of production and therefore incomes
both on land and in the sea is also an important characteristic of the livelihoods.
25 Jason Rubens, University of Newcastle, UK. MSc thesis: An analysis of the benefits and costs of
marine reserve regulations at Diani, Kenya.
26 Delphine Malleret-King, Institut d'Etude du Developpement Economique et Social, Paris. DESS
Memoire: Les systemes de productions des agricultures et pecheurs de Biga, petite communaute de
pecheurs.
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7.2 Methods
Chambers (1992: 15-19) presents a list of methods used in RRA and PRA. Some of
these methods were included in this study. The choice and application of these
methods in the field were based on the manuals compiled by Nichols (1991), Waters-
Bayer and Bayer (1994), Mikkelsen (1995), Slocum et al. (1995) and the extensive
anthropology text by Bernard (1995). Other literature on the application of PRA in
policy research and development has given terms to some of the approaches that
were used to elicit information (Nelson and Wright, 1995; Leach et al., 1997;
Holland and Blackburn, 1998). The analysis in this chapter and chapter 8 are based
on these methods of data collection.
7.2.1 Livelihoods and production systems information
Non-random sampling methods were carried out, principally purposive sampling of
households, where 'typical' households were selected following group interviews or
based on discussions with other households. This approach suited the small sample
sizes that resulted from the detailed and time consuming interviews carried out with
each household.
The identification of key informants was an important part of the fieldwork. The
focus of the overall study on problems faced by fishers in relation to resource access
and control meant that it was necessary to find out who the experts were.
Informal and unstructured interviewing took place throughout the fieldwork.
Informal interviews were essentially the process of building a rapport with
informants particularly early on when there was some suspicion about the presence
of researchers. Unstructured interviews were principally focused conversations and
these often took place on car journeys when there were one or two informants who
could talk more freely away from others. These sessions enabled the informants to
provide what information they thought necessary (Bernard, 1995). They knew what
the conversations were about but it was up to them what they said.
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Household surveys that sought to elicit information about incomes and productivity
were based on semi-structured interviews. There were two reasons for this: there
was a need to ensure that the same underlying information was collected from each
household; yet the questions needed to be sufficiently open ended to allow
informants to expand on responses if they wanted to. The household surveys were
devised and carried out in conjunction with another researcher 27 who was also
working on the production systems of the Biga community. Households were not
chosen at random because the different subgroups identified within the community
needed to be sampled (cf. Holland and Blackburn, 1998:170-178). Initially
households were selected through the village chairman and with members of the
fishermen's committee who were involved in group interviews (see below) relating
to the fishery. Once a number of interviews had been carried out it became possible
to select other households that were dependent on different sources of livelihood.
The questions used as the basis for the interviews are given in Appendix IV. The
principle areas of interest were the family and the number of dependants; land
ownership; work; agricultural activities; fishing activities and finally general
questions of socio-economic interest such as savings, education and the future of
Biga. This process also meant that people's responses could be checked and
triangulated to other discussions or interviews over the period of the fieldwork.
Group interviews were carried out with the fishermen's committee. These sessions
were also based on semi-structured interviews and sought to elicit different kinds of
information relating to the fishery, the socio-economic predicament of the
community and the perceived importance of different actors analysed in the next
chapter. One of the group interviews based on questions relating to the fishery was
carried out in conjunction with another researcher28 working in the area. The
questions that formed the basis of that interview are presented in Appendix V. The
principal areas of interest were the transferability of gear types; awareness of change
in catch and causes; seasonality of effort and catch; extent of fishing zone and
alternatives to fishing (cf. Rubens, 1996). It was partly based on that group interview
that it became evident that the informants identified different groups within the
community according to the fishing method used by the man of the household.
27Delphine Malleret-King
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Some of the questions asked at both the household interviews and the group
interviews sought information about changes that may have occurred over time.
Seasonal activity calendars have been used as a method of analysis and
presentation of results based on information derived from the household surveys. In
pure PRA terms, this method would be used as a method of eliciting information, but
in this case it would have taken too long (for the informants) in conjunction with the
semi-structured interviews.
Livelihood analysis is one of the underlying threads to this chapter. On the basis of
the semi-structured interviews carried out at the household level, incomes and
expenditure for the different groups and the range of activities within households
were calculated. These calculations include subsistence production. fn addition the
production maintenance threshold for an average family in the community was also
calculated and the different groups were considered in relation to this.
Identification of differences within community activities and structure is another
underlying thread to this chapter. As Leach et al. (1997) identified, communities are
not homogenous, differentiation occurs for a variety of reasons and institutional
arrangements affect the different groups in different ways. The household surveys
considered the main groups within the community based on different production
systems. The focus of this study was essentially the predicament of fishermen and
their households in relation to resource access and control. As such different groups
were identified on these terms, as has been described above. It is acknowledged
however that other groups did exist in relation to resource access and control, based
on factors such as gender, age, ethnicity, activity and wealth.
7.2.2 Additional fisheries information
Additional information to the semi-structured interviews collected on the fishery
included sample measurements of length, body depth and weight for three target
28 Jason Rubens
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species, Siganus argenteus, Lethrinus harak and Leptoscarus vaigiensis. The
objective was to compare the length class distributions of the selected species
between fish traps and beach seines. Some of the data were collected jointly with
another researcher (Jason Rubens). Length, body depth and weight data was also
collected to establish a relationship between fish size and weight. This enabled
visual estimates of fish lengths to be made and weights derived later, without having
to weigh fish and disrupt fishers (Laroche and Ramananarivo, 1995). It also enabled
some data to be collected when it was otherwise difficult, as fishers landed their
catch in different places within a given landing site, and when they didn't want their
fish weighed.
The primary source of fisheries data was provided by the Coral Reef Conservation
Project (CRCP cf. part 5.2.5). An officer from the Fisheries Department had been
seconded to CRCP to collect catch data at eight landing sites within an area that
included this study site. The data had been collected since September 1995 for
twelve days per month. Data was made available for this study for the period
September 1995 to September 1997. None of the Fisheries Department's data was
used in this chapter (for a discussion on the quality of Fisheries Department data see
part 5.2.5 and Figure 5.1).
7.2.3 A general note on sources of information
The field work covered two phases, five months in 1996, between May and
September and twelve months between February 1997 and February 1998.
Information was collected from informants, personal observations, official
government records and data sets from non-governmental research organisations.
This section relates to both this chapter and chapter 8.
7.2.3.1 Selecting the study site
The first phase of fieldwork was concerned with identifying an appropriate study site
and collecting information on the livelihood systems of a fishing community. The
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problem of the marine reserve (analysed in chapter 8) meant that all the communities
within the proposed boundaries of the reserve, which covered twenty kilometres of
coast (from Mwachema River in the north to Chale Island in the south, see Figure
3.5), were initially uncooperative. I visited the four main communities (Ukunda
area, Diani area, Galu-Biga, Kinondo) to introduce myself and to select a study site.
At one main landing site (Ukunda area) the fishers were unhelpful and one senior
fish trader was hostile each time I visited the site. That particular community had
been very threatening to KWS personnel, stoning KWS vehicles a few months earlier
(Kaka and Muthiga pers. comm.). The adjacent community had relatively few
fishers (Diani area) due to the level of tourism development in their area and was
therefore not appropriate for my research. The community I chose to work with
(Biga in Galu area) was not hostile, but their suspicions meant that the fishermen
were initially reluctant to discuss any questions relating to fishing.
7.2.3.2 Informants
The informants I worked with were fishers, fish traders, relatives of fishers,
government officials, researchers, boat operators, beach hawkers and European
expatriate residents. I worked with four key informants throughout the duration of
the field work (April-September 1996; February 1997 to February 1998). Three of
these informants were fishermen and were members of the local fishermen's
committee and one was a fish trader who was the chairman of a fish landing site. I
spent extended periods of time with key informants, often at the fish landing sites, on
journeys together when visiting government officials, or at their homes in the
evenings. I met with approximately seventy secondary informants on a number of
occasions. There were a number of government officials who gave me privileged
access to written records and were frank and open in many discussions. Because I
spent most of my time in Biga I frequently met many other people for short periods
of time at the landing points or in the village.
Initial contacts with fishermen and their families were made through a member of the
community I knew. Initially there was suspicion within the community about my
intentions because researchers were mostly associated with conservation projects and
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my association with expatriate residents who had pushed for a marine reserve in the
area did not allay the concerns of local people. This situation slowed down the
process of information collection for a period of about three months, but it provided
me with a good insight into the reactions and behaviour of the community in
response to perceived and real threats. Questions relating to why the community had
rejected the marine reserve were of interest to me. It was essential for example that I
had no association with KWS (who were very understanding) if I was to gain the
confidence of the community. It took two months before I could take length or
weight measurements of fish, such was the level of distrust as a result of the
attempted implementation of the marine reserve. As a result I spent much of the first
phase of the fieldwork focused on the land-based activities of the cairichttnity, This
served two functions: it reassured people that I was not part of an attempt to
reintroduce the marine reserve and it provided me with the information necessary to
under stand how the community lived.
The process of introductions to senior officials and members of the community
provided an insight into the social hierarchy in the area. Having gained permission
from the Office of the President to carry out research in Kenya it was necessary to
introduce myself to senior members of the Administration. This included the District
Commissioner (DC), from whom a letter supporting the research was necessary in
order to reassure other government officials and members of the community that the
research had been sanctioned locally, and introductions to the District Officers,
Chiefs and Village Chairman. The DC's letter was effective in opening doors to
most government offices in the district. Similarly introductions were made to any
government departments relevant to the research, such as the Fisheries Department
and the Kenya Marine Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI). In the early stages of
the fieldwork the Chief and Village Chairman arranged meetings with members of
the community. It was important to be perceptive of the established hierarchies if
there was any chance of discussing fairly sensitive social and political issues. In this
respect it was not possible to consider a random sample of informants, as some
individuals were clearly uncomfortable about some topics of discussion unless a
higher authority had sanctioned the meeting. Fortunately the time scale of the study
meant that I became sufficiently immersed in the community that I gained access to
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most members of the community, and also the wider community of officials and non-
local people.
Once the process was underway the fishermen's committee in the area considered
charging me a large fee to carry out my work and suggested certain obligations
surrounding use of the vehicle, but it went no further than that. On one occasion they
tried some gentle blackmail, saying that they had seen me wearing KWS marked
clothing and so I would have to show a high degree of loyalty in order to work in the
area (see Appendix VI disclaiming a link to KWS). It was inevitable that there were
attempts to sound me out and make what they could out of me. In the event the
situation was really a conflict between the local fishers and the migrant Wapemba
fishers (cf. part 8.3.2) who were trying to undermine the authority of the committee
by suggesting that they had been bought off by KWS.
Most of my interactions were directly with informants as I was able to speak Swahili
to a sufficient standard to carry out the interviews and discussions. One key
informant spoke very good English, so on occasion I could seek clarification from
him. There were a few occasions when older members of the community could not
understand my Swahili and in such instances a friend of theirs or member of their
family would translate into their language, Digo. Reciprocating with informants for
the information they shared with me took a number of forms. In almost every case I
avoided giving money in return for their time. For prearranged interviews and
discussions that were held at informants' homes, such as during the household
surveys carried out in conjunction with another researcher29, we would bring a gift of
one kilogram of sugar and two kilograms of rice or maize meal. We felt that a food
gift to the household was more appropriate than simply a gift to the man (fisher), as
conversations often included the senior wife of the fisher. In instances when
informants had given me their time on the spur of the moment, I would give them a
small thank you in the form of cigarettes (most men smoked) or cash. The
relationship with my key informants was established on the basis of reciprocation. I
was in the fortunate position to posses a vehicle and so was able to provide transport
for delegations of fishers to government offices that were normally inaccessible due
29 Delphine Malleret-King
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to public transport costs. I also made numerous journeys alone on behalf of the
fishing community to government offices, delivering letters or 'getting signatures'.
Other forms of reciprocation included rushing someone to hospital for an emergency
operation, occasionally buying medicines, using the vehicle to carry heavy loads of
plantains or copra to the main road for transport to Mombasa market and giving lifts
locally. I met with my key informants at my home on a few occasions, reciprocating
in the same way as they did with me.
Despite wanting to remain an impartial observer within the community it was
inevitable that my assistance in providing transport and facilitating access to
government officials influenced the outcome of the problems I was interested in. In
addition having to be seen to take sides in the conflict between the local fishers and
the migrant Wapemba meant that I did not get access to Wapemba households. I did
however go fishing with the Wapemba.
The results from the interviews and discussions are presented in the following
sections.
7.3 Demography of Biga
The village community (lapp) of Biga is located in Galu sub-location, Kinondo
location, Kwale district (Figure 6.1 map). Biga is a Digo community and like many
others is a collection of family homesteads (cf. Gerlach, 1963, on characteristics of
Digo communities) dispersed over an area of about 8 km2. There are also other
ethnic groups living within the village area (cf. chapter 6). Excluding the tourism
development and expatriate residences along the seafront, approximately 90% of the
population of Biga are Digo. The remaining 10% are made up of migrant fishermen
from Tanzania (3%) and migrant farmers from upcountry (7%) (Chief Mwarupia
pers. com .; household surveys). The number of people over eighteen years of age
was estimated to be 580 (Chief Mwarupia pers. com .). From the household 3° surveys
the average number of people per household was calculated to be eight. In general
30 Household was a group of people living together, usually but not necessarily related. Members
contributed to the household's maintenance and subsistance and shared the resources produced within
the household (food and money) (Mwadime, 1996).
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this was made up of two adult active producers 3I and six children or the same
number of active adult producers, one adult non-active producer (aged) and five
children. The number of children per household was less than the national average
of eight (GOK, 1995). The total population of Biga, including the main ethnic
groups, was estimated to be 1,500 people.
According to older members of the community Biga started as a collection of family
dwellings in three seafront sites. The community has subsequently grown to twelve
'quarters' (mtaa), the original three on the sea front: Mwaepe, Mvuleni, Mwanyaza
and nine inland: Mtangizeni, Kizimkazi, Tangulia, Mwangoloko, Silewe,
Nimadzitso, Mtetegwa and Madago (Figure 7.1). Each of these quarters is associated
with a family or clan and contains a cluster of family dwellings except in the seafront
area where the development of tourism and expatriate residences has forced Digo
people off the land (cf. Figure 3.7 and Figure 6.2). There are some dwellings that are
more dispersed and these tend to be the more recent arrivals, either the migrant
farmers or other Digo households (mostly 'squatters' on land owned by Kenya
Sugar, cf. part 6.2.8). Each sea front quarter has a gazetted (officially recognised)
fish landing site (bandari) that retains the same name as the quarter (i.e. Mwaepe,
Mvuleni, Mwanyaza). Figure 7.1, drawn by one of the Biga children, illustrates the
village area of Biga. Despite the seafront strip between the road and the sea being
unoccupied by Digo people, it is still considered part of Biga.
7.3.1 Community differentiation
From initial interviews and the household surveys the informants identified three
groups living within the Biga area based on ethnicity: the Digo community, the
Wapemba migrant fishers and the migrant Meru/Tharaka farmers from upcountry.
The core community of Biga was identified as the Digo group, but the other minority
groups were well established in the area. Some of the Wapemba had Digo wives,
some of the migrant farmers were now permanently based in the area, and their
31 Active producer includes any individual involved in generating resources for the household, either
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children attended the local primary school. Household differentiation within the
community was also associated with the principal food production system (activity)
or economic activity. Households surveyed were selected according to the different
production systems (Table 7.1).
Thirty households, 16% of the total number, were surveyed in depth about their
livelihoods and production systems. The low number of samples was due to the
detail and length, up to three hours, of each interview and in some cases the small
sizes of the groups. No household surveys were carried out with the Wapemba group
because of the conflict over fishing methods with the Digo fishers (the implications
for the fieldwork were outlined above, part 7.2). The subgroups and their defining
characteristics and proportion of the number of households in each group sampled
are presented in Table 7.1.
through agriculture, fishing or non farm/fishing employment.
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Table 7.1 The main household groups and subgroups within Biga according to
ethnicity and production system.
Ethnic group Group Subgroup (% sampled) Defining characteristics
Digo Fishers
Non fishers
With canoes (13%) Traps, lines, gill nets. 80% of fishers aged
over 40 yrs. Original clans.
Spear guns. Biggest group, most fishers
aged between 18-30 yrs. From fishing
families. Living on family land. A very
few older men using spears. Other fishers
sharing canoes.
Retired fishers for ieas-Ortis of aii-,illness -
or were unable to reinvest in capital items
(canoe). Only small areas of land
cultivated.
Without canoes (7%)
Subsistence agilaiii-ui-e	 —
(80%)
Non farm/fishing
employment (28%)
Fish traders, shop keepers, traditional
doctors. Many not from original fishing
clans.
Meru/Tharaka Migrant cash
crop farmers
Established -
Cultivating > 0.5
acre/active producer (44%)
Settled or regular migrants to the area,
either men 40 - 70 yrs old or second
generation.
Recent arrivals -
Cultivating <0.5
acre/active producer (40%)
Either young people recent to the area,
lack of capital or established people forced
off the land they were cultivating by local
Digos.
Wapemba Fishers Migrant fishers (not
sampled)
Seine nets. Established settlement with
fruit trees, supplemented food production,
frequent migration of younger men to
Tanzania.
(Source: 30 household surveys; group interview with the Galu is ermen sCommittee; discussion
with Chief Mwarupia and Village Chairman; Malleret-King (1996).)
7.4 Production systems of the Digo
The most important observation was that all the Digo households had land under
cultivation (surveyed and observed). This indicated that household livelihoods were
based on a combination of activities. As outlined in Table 7.1, the main activities
providing food and/or income for households were fishing, farming and non
fishing/farming activities such as trading, but in all cases this was supplemented by
household food plots (shamba). The extent of the household food plots depended on
a number of factors such as labour, age or health, security of land tenure, spare time
and the amount of income generated from the main activity. The crops grown for
subsistence, the methods of cultivation, seasonal activities and secondary sources of
income related to the sham bas are first described because they were common to all
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households. Fishing production systems, including methods, seasonal activities and
target species and non fishing/farming employment are then described.
7.4.1 Digo household and subsistence plots (shamba)
All Digo households grew crops for subsistence and some income. Most of the Digo
households were fishing households, but there were some that had retired from
fishing or had other sources of income. However, the division of labour, methods of
cultivation and types of crops were common to all households. Similarly, most
households had other (informal) sources of income. All households had some fruit
trees, mostly mango and coconut, that provided both food and additional income at
certain times of the year. The numbers and types of trees depended principally on
how long the site had been settled by a family (cf. part 5.3.1 on traditional land
tenure). Labour, rather than land has been identified as the primary constraint to
food production in sub-Saharan Africa (Mwadime and Hoorweg, 1996). For the
Digo households in Biga, division of labour was a key factor in producing a variety
of food and income sources.
Most Digo men were fishermen. This occupied most of their time, but they also
worked in the shambas, clearing the land, planting, weeding and harvesting. Those
men that did not fish either worked full time in the shambas or had other business
and divided their time with cultivation in the same way as the fishermen.
Women were responsible for looking after children, preparing food, collecting
firewood for cooking, collecting water from the wells, washing clothes, as well as
assisting in clearing land for cultivation, weeding and harvesting. Women also had
informal sources of income, such as baking and selling cakes, making palm thatch or
weaving mats.
Children spent most of their time at school, but would also help with the preparation
of land for cultivation and the weeding and harvesting. In the few households that
kept livestock, cattle or goats, the children were usually responsible for keeping an
eye on the herd when they were not at school.
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Reciprocal assistance among households was also an important source of labour
within the community, but because people were in very similar situations in terms of
activities, there were seldom spare hands available during the busiest times of the
year, such as clearing land and harvesting. On the whole people assisted in one off
jobs such as re-thatching, transporting large loads of produce to the main road and so
on. In some instances, if there was sufficient disposable income, households
employed temporary labour to assist in clearing land or harvesting at a rate of about
100 Ksh/day (£1) or paid in kind (fish, or maize during harvest time).
All cultivation was carried out by hand. The two tools were machete (panga) and
large bladed hoes (jembe) with long (mrefu) or short (mfupi) handles. All clearing
was done with pangas, and in the sandy loam zone (cf. Figure 3.7) the soil was
worked with hoes. Land cleared on the coral rag zone could not be worked with a
hoe. Here the method of cultivation was to use small pockets of soil in the rocks that
had been exposed after slash and burn clearing. The great majority of Digo homes
were in the sandy loam zone but those that cultivated maize had separate shambas on
the coral rag zone where the soil was more fertile.
The main staple food crops are maize (mahindi) and cassava (muhogo) for starch and
beans (kunde, pojo, mbazi) for protein. Important secondary food crops are sweet
potatoes, bananas and plantains, citrus fruit, pawpaws, mangoes and coconuts. This
range of food crops have remained the same for over fifty years (Gerlach, 1961). In
addition small quantities of millet, sesame, tomatoes, kale, groundnuts, capsicum,
chillies, ocra and aubergines were grown. The system of cultivation is rainfed and
therefore all activities are seasonally dependent. Figure 7.2 illustrates the seasonal
activities related to the main food crops. None of the households interviewed were
entirely self sufficient for food. In general the main staple crops provided food for 2-
6 months depending on the area cultivated (depending on other activities and
availability of land) and the success of the seasons (rainfall and ripening period).
Although maize flour (posho) is the principle source of food in Biga, only 20%
(Malleret-King, 1996) of the households interviewed grew maize, Zea mays
(scientific names for cultivated crops were found in Rehm and Espig, 1991). The
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main reason for this was the increasing inaccessibility of land on the coral rag zone
that was better suited to maize production (changes in land use patterns and
ownership). Two maize hybrid cultivars were grown in Biga, known locally as short
maize (mahindi mfupi) and tall maize (mahindi mrefu). The short hybrid was the
most widely grown because of its shorter growing season (three months). Treated
seeds were bought at the local market in Mwabungu (cf. Figure 3.5) on the main
Mombasa road in preference to keeping seed from previous crops. Despite the
relatively short growing season of the short hybrid variety, maize was only grown
during the long rains (masika) (Figure 7.2). The area cultivated varied between 0.2
and 2.5 acres. The larger areas were on the coral rag zone about 20 minutes walk
from the homes, whereas the smaller areas were adjacent to the homes. The areas
cultivated away from the homes required a permanent presence to guard against
baboons, bush pigs and other animals. Harvested maize was stored on the cob in
grain stores and milled for flour (posho) when needed.
Cassava, Manihot esculenta, (muhogo) was planted by 60% of households (Malleret-
King, 1996). Being a root crop it was grown in plots adjacent to homes in the sandy
loam zone (cf. Figure 3.7). Areas planted were between 0.1 to 1 acre. Two varieties
were cultivated in order to take advantage of the two rainy seasons and ensure some
food supply during the dry season, November to March. One took 7 months to
mature and the other 10 months. New plants were propagated from cuttings taken
from harvested plants. During the dry season no planting took place but cuttings
were stored in the shade ready for the long rains in April (Figure 7.2). Where
possible cassava was grown close to homes so that a permanent watch could be
maintained to ward off bush pigs.
All Digo households grew beans of some type. Often they were inter-planted with
the cassava or maize. The three principal varieties grown were cowpea, Vigna
uniguiculata (kunde), green gram, Phaseolus aureus (pojo) and pigeon peas, Ca' anus
cajan (mbazi). 90% of households grew between 0.1 to 0.5 acres of cowpea and
green gram as an important source of protein (Malleret-King, 1996). Most
households bought seeds. Pigeon peas are small shrubs and were grown by all
households as hedges between shambas. Seeds were seldom bought.
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No chemical fertilisers, organic compost or manure was used, instead people relied
on the fallow periods and inter-planting with legumes to maintain fertility.
Household plots were cultivated for about 3 to 4 years and where possible left fallow
for the same period. If land had been fallow for more than a year the secondary
undergrowth was sufficiently dense to require slash-and-burn clearing. Areas that
had been left for shorter periods were usually only overgrown with grass and this
was simply dug over and turned into the soil with a hoe. Inter-planting beans with
the maize and cassava limited the growth of weeds and reduced soil erosion.
All households kept poultry (5-15 chickens, 20% of households kept 2-7 ducks), as a
form of savings and for emergency food supply (Malleret-King, 1996). Some
households kept goats (Small East African Goat) and a very few kept cattle (Zebu).
Livestock was considered a good investment as a form of savings if there was
surplus income from fishing or another economic activity. However only 0.1% kept
cattle and it was evidently a risky investment because the area is very prone to
Trypanosomiasis which is carried by Tetse fly. One fisherman had lost 10 cattle,
nearly half his herd, in 1995 to Trypanosomiasis. In addition cattle do not generate a
regular income, but are sold off when times are hard.
7.4.2 Secondary sources of income in Digo households
In addition to providing food, many of the fruit trees and crops grown by Digo
households provide some income. The main trees planted for additional income are
coconuts, mangoes and cashew. All these trees have been planted in the sandy loam
zone around homesteads and some coconuts have been planted in sandy areas on the
seafront between Mvuleni and Mwanyaza beach landing sites. Very few of the trees
on the seafront remain accessible to Digo people because the land is under foreign
ownership.
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All Digo households have access to coconut trees (mnazi). These provide a wide
range of products used both in the home and sold. Uses in the home include thatch
from fronds, fuel for cooking (husks and frond stems), coconut oil for cooking,
coconut cream (tui) used in many dishes particularly with beans and cassava and the
liquid of young coconuts (madafu) as a drink. The principal products produced for
sale from coconut trees are copra, which is the dried flesh of mature coconuts from
which oil is extracted, and thatch. Only 10% of households had sufficient numbers of
coconut trees to make copra production worthwhile, although some households would
sell any surplus ripe fruit to copra producers. Copra is produced during the dry season
when the ripe fruit are split open and sun dried. Thatch is made throughout the year
and stacked until a sufficient quantity has been produced to sell.
Mango trees (mwembe) are grown by 95% of households both for food and for sale.
The three most popular varieties grown for cash are apple mango, boribo and dodo.
There are two seasons, June-July and December-January following the long and short
rains. Households interviewed sold between 300-7000 mangoes per year. In addition
large old trees were occasionally sold to make canoes.
Cashew nut (korosho) trees were once widely grown as a cash crop in the area, but
world cashew nut prices have become too low to make it an important crop.
Approximately 20% of households had cashew nut trees, but they were either old or
neglected and not very productive. Only three households interviewed sold any
quantity of nuts (20-100 kg).
Any surplus from other fruit and vegetables grown in household plots were either sold
or bartered. Two households were growing tomatoes, peppers, aubergines and chillies
as cash crops to supplement household income. Other activities included weaving
mats and baskets and making cord from the dried fronds of Dwarf palms, Hyphaene
coriacea (mnya), other palms and grasses. Some households sold cakes and fried fish
within the village or at stalls on the road, and one lady bought tobacco leaves and
made snuff for sale.
The planting of fruit trees around homes and on the household plots has reduced the
amount of land available for cultivation of staples. This is a recent problem because
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of the lack of land now available (due to encroaching development and closure of
private land) around the periphery of the homesteads.
7.4.3 Fishing
Fishing is the most important economic activity in Biga. It accounts for over 70% of
the income in 80% of the households (cf. part 7.5.2 below; Malleret-King, 1996;
household surveys; group interviews with fishers; surveys of fishers at sea). The main
groups that were identified were households that had canoes from which to fish and
households that did not (Table 7.1). Having a canoe determined to some extent the
method of fishing, and therefore there were subgroups according to the methods of
fishing. For the majority of households fishing was a full time occupation for men.
There were no women fishers. The number of fishers according to fishing method
and the landing site used are presented in Table 7.2 below. There were also a number
of part time fishermen who preferred to focus on agriculture during the wetter months
when the fishing was poor, or had other forms of employment throughout the year.
The four main methods of fishing used by Biga fishermen were traps, spear guns, nets
and hand lines. Within each of these methods there were a number of gear types used.
There were two types of vessel, simple dugout canoes and outrigger sailing canoes,
none of which were motorised. The vessels and gear types are described below.
Simple dugout canoes 4-5 metres in length (dau is the local term, although mtumbwi
is a more widely understood Swahili term for a small dugout) were commonly hewn
from a single mango tree. These canoes were poled in shallow lagoon waters and
paddled in deeper water. In the past local hardwoods were used but these no longer
exist. The large mango trees now used are also becoming scarce near the sea. Basket
traps, gill nets and hand lines were the fishing methods used by canoe fishers. The
outrigger canoes (ngalawa) were also dugouts made from mango tree but with an
additional wash strake superimposed. The outriggers were lashed across the canoe
and a lateen sailing rig was the main form of propulsion (for origin cf. chapter 4,
section 4.2). They tended to be slightly longer, 4-8 metres, than the dau. These
vessels tended to be used for trolling or bottom fishing outside the reef during the
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calmer NE monsoon. The vessels were careened about every two weeks by burning a
fast fire underneath the hulls, no other method of anti-fouling was used.
Approximately 23% of the fishers in Biga used woven cane hexagonal basket traps
(malema). These traps varied between 0.5-2 m across, with mesh sizes of 5-7 cm and
an entrance depth of about 15-20 cm. The larger traps had larger mesh sizes and were
only used in deeper waters outside the reef during the calmer NE monsoon. Traps
were made from the split canes of four local trees, Mlanga, Mvamva or Mushumari
for the sides, top and cone and hard wearing mnya (Dwarf palm) for the base and ties.
The traps are weighted with coral stones tied to the sides with mnya cord. All these
materials were gathered locally, but fishers complained of having to search further
afield because of increasingly restricted access to forested land. A trap had a working
life of about three months, with the ties renewed every two weeks when the traps were
sun-dried for a few days to remove algae.
Hand lines (mshipi) were used for bottom fishing and trolling. During the calmer
weather two or three fishers would fish for five to six hours from an ngalawa outside
the reef. One or two fishers worked from duas either in the reef channels or on very
calm days outside the reef.
The only gill nets used by Digo fishermen in Biga were relatively small meshed (1.5"
- 3") nyavu ya kutega. These were usually operated by one or two fishers from a
canoe inside the lagoon, and in very calm weather outside the lagoon. Many of the
fishers aspired to having large meshed nets (jarife) (6" or greater) to use outside the
reef, but the costs were prohibitive and none were in use at the time.
Other nets in use were sardine nets (nyavu ya simu) made of synthetic material with a
19 mm mesh and sewn to form a long pocket. This type of net was only used for the
occasional shoals of sardines that passed through the lagoon. Similarly cast nets
(kimia) were very occasionally used.
The most widely used fishing method (approximately 50% of fishers) was the spear
gun (bunduki), despite being an illegal fishing method in Kenya (cf. GOK, 1991b).
This method required the lowest amount of capital investment because the guns were
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home made from easily acquired materials. The metal spear was usually made from
fine reinforcing rods used in the building industry, either scavenged from building
sites or bought by the three-spear length. The rubber was ideally bought as new
bicycle inner tube. The rest of the gun was fashioned from wood. Most of these
fishers were young, very few older than thirty years old, although one of the most
successful was over fifty years old. Most part time fishermen used spear guns
because of the low investment. The other kind of spear used in Biga was a spike
about 4m long (mkonzo). Local forest timbers are the preferred material for the shaft,
the metal head is bought. This is a traditional method that requires great skill and
accuracy and has largely been replaced by spear guns.
There were approximately 180 Digo full time fishers in Biga. Fishers tended to use
the landing site nearest to their homes, about half an hour away by foot. Table 7.2
shows the numbers of fishers at each landing site according to fishing method.
The main families of fish caught by Biga fishermen are given in Table 7.3. These
families reflect the predominant habitats found within the lagoon (cf. chapter 3),
namely seagrass beds and coral rubble.
Table 7.2 The number of Digo fishermen for each of the main gear types at each
landing site in Biga. The numbers in brackets include part time fishermen.
Gear/Landing site Mwaepe Mvuleni Mwanyaza Total
Trap (Malema) 10 15 16 41
Spear gun (Bunduki) 25 (30) 20 (30) 40 (45) 85
Gill (N Kutega) 6 8 5 19
Hand line (Mishipi) 8 14 13 35
Total 49 (54) 57 (67) 74 (79) 180 (200)
(Source: group interview with the Galu Fishermen's Committee, see Appendix V.
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Table 7. 3 The main families of fish caught by Biga fishermen (pers. obs.).
Common name	 Local nameFamily
Siganidae
Lutjanidae
Lethrinidae
Mullidae
Scaridae
Acanthuridae
Gaterinidae
Labridae
Rabbitfish
Snapper
Scavenger/Emperor
Goatfish
Parrotfish
Surgeonfish
Sweetlips
Wrasse
Octopus
Tafi
Tembo
Chango
Mukundasi
Pono
Tongo
Foote
Bua
Pwesa
Outside the lagoon the fishery targeted larger pelagic species such as tuna, jacks,
kingfish, barracuda and sailfish as well as demersal species such as groupers and
snappers. However, the amount of fishing outside the lagoon was very small due to
the limitations of vessels to cope with the rough conditions for six months of the year
and also the lack of suitable fishing gear (farifel in Biga.
Observations showed a degree of species/family and size selectivity according to gear
type. Table 7.4 shows the selectivity of the different gear types. The seine nets used
by the Wapemba fishers are also included in this table because the issue of
competition between Digo fishermen and Wapemba fishermen is discussed in chapter
8. Factors that determined gear selectivity included bait used in traps or on fishing
lines and where gear was set or used.
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Table 7.4 Gear selectivity (F) in the Biga fishery from observations of catches.
Family/Gear Trap Seine net Spear gun Hand line Gill net
Rabbit fish - Siganidae F F F
Snapper - Lutjanidae F F
Scavenger - Lethrinidae F F
Goatfish - WI idae F
Parrot fish - Scaridae (seagrass) F F F F
Parrot fish - Scaridcte (coral) F
Sweetlips -Galerinidae F
Wrasse -Labridae F
Mixed coral fish F
Puffers - Tetraodontinae F
Grouper - Serranidae F
Octopus F
Jacks - Caranguidae F
Barracudina F
Wolfherring F
Halfbeaks - Hentirhamphidae F
The productivity (catches) and incomes of the different gear types are calculated in
section 7.5.
7.4.4 Non fishing/farming employment
The three main non-fishing/farming activities that households depended on in Biga
were fish trading, shop keeping and for two households, traditional medicine. Income
earned from these activities was invested predominantly in the household plots to
produce food and cash crops. In the case of the shopkeepers, income from cash crops
was then reinvested in the shop.
Fishermen seldom sold their catches directly to consumers, but to traders, most of
who were men who sold the fish from their bicycles to expatriate homes, hotels and
within the villages. The majority of traders who bought fish from the three Biga
landing sites were not from Biga but from other local villages. They travelled to the
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landing sites by bicycle, some were from much further afield and travelled by public
transport to the Mwaepe landing site. On the whole traders did not process the fish,
although one trader smoked fish during the low season (rough SE monsoon) when the
supply was low and another trader sold shells to tourists in addition to selling fish. At
Mwaepe landing site there were between 5-8 traders buying fish on a daily basis, with
similar numbers at the other two Biga landing sites Mvuleni and Mwanyaza. Under
fisheries legislation fish traders in rural areas were required have a licence which cost
100 Ksh per year. In addition any trader who transported fish out of the area paid an
additional 50 Ksh for a movement permit.
During the early stages of the study there was also a group of up to fourteen women
who bought small fish at Mwaepe landing point to sell fried within Biga and other
villages. However the supply of small fish for sale ceased when the local Digo
fishermen stopped the Wapemba fishermen from landing fish or operating in Biga
waters (cf. section 7.7 on the size selectivity of gear). Not having bicycles, the
women were restricted to Mwaepe landing site because it was the most accessible by
foot or public transport. Most of the women had an hours walk to the landing site.
There were three very small shops in Biga which sold basics such as sugar, soap,
maize meal, cigarettes and tea. The main market was in the neighbouring village of
Mwabungu on the main Mombasa road. There was also an Asian owned supermarket
next to Mwaepe landing site.
7.5 Digo household productivity and incomes
Household incomes were calculated from the thirty household surveys carried out
with another researcher32 for each of the activity groups within Biga in 1996.
Malleret-King (1996) calculated the basic maintenance threshold for a household in
Biga based on the household surveys. The methods of calculation and results
presented below were adapted from Malleret-King (1996) with the addition of fish
catch data from 1997. The results of household incomes for each activity group are
presented in relation to the maintenance threshold.
32 Delphine Malleret-King
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7.5.1 Calculating the maintenance threshold
The maintenance threshold was the minimum amount of income required to maintain
the household at its current level of production and supplied in essential items such as
basic food, clothing and education. This was determined from interviews,
predominantly with women, during the household surveys. The most important factor
in determining regular income supply was the work carried out by members of the
household (fishing, cultivation, weaving, trade etc.) rather than income from capital
items such as buildings. The only situation where capital items were an important
factor was expensive items of fishing equipment and vessels. In these cases 500
Ksh/year (based on capital depreciation of these items) was added. to the maitxtetahee,
threshold. Table 7.5 presents the weekly and annual cost of essential items for an
average Biga household of eight people (cf. section 7.3).
Table 7.5 Calculation of the maintenance threshold for an average Biga household in
Kenya shillings (at the time of the household surveys there were 85 Ksh/f).
Essential item Cost per week Cost per year
Tea with milk (breakfast) 22 1144
BreadlMahambre 20 1040
Maize meal or equivalent 560 29120
Salt 5 260
Sugar 196 10192
Soap/washing powder 36 1872
Paraffin (lighting) 21 1092
Clothing 200
Schooling 600
Total 860 45520
(Source: 30 household surveys; calculation by Malleret-King (1996))
Thus each active producer per household (on average 2) needed to earn a minimum of
22,760 Ksh/year. If the daily income was not sufficient, about 123 Ksh, the strategy
was to reduce consumption of essential items, which on a daily basis tended to be
food.
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7.5.2 Calculating incomes and productivity
As indicated in the description of the production systems above, households depended
on a combination of cultivation and another activity such as fishing or trading. In
calculating household incomes, the productivity of each part of a household's range of
activities was calculated and converted to a monetary value based on market prices.
Thus subsistence production has also been included in the calculation. Productivity of
subsistence crops for each household surveyed was calculated according to the area
cultivated or the number of plants grown, depending on the crop. Maize, for example,
was converted to the number of meals derived from their own production (2 kg of
flour/meal) and this figure was cross checked with the acreage cultivated and
estimated kg/acre. Prices for the staple food crops, maize, cassava and beans did not
change during the year. The production and incomes from fishing was based on 164
daily catches sampled between September 1995 and September 1997 (CRCP data),
interviews (Malleret-King, 1996; this study), and cross checked with samples of
fishers' catches at Mwaepe (this study). Fish prices changed according to the seasons
and the species or sizes, therefore mean values were derived through discussions with
fishers. The basis for the calculation of household disposable income is presented
below in Table 7.6. Note that the depreciation of capital items is not deducted in the
final calculation because disposable income is the money available to spend. The
values for depreciation of capital items are calculated to illustrate the amount of
income that would be needed to be saved for their replacement. This situation only
affects the boat and gear owners.
During the household surveys an attempt was made to determine the change in
productivity and incomes over three years, and to have an average figure for
productivity and incomes. However none of the households kept any records or
mental notes of the amount of land they cultivated or how much they had produced or
caught in the preceding years. Generalised statements were made about changes over
longer periods of time, such as fish catches had dropped by 90% over the last thirty
years, which were useful, but not for income calculations.
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Table 7.6 Calculating household disposable income (adapted from Malleret-King,
1996).
Gross income income from main activities (cash crops, fishing, trading etc.) + subsistence
consumption + changes in stocks (poultry, livestock) + other income (weaving,
cakes etc.)
Disposable income net value added — non monetary income (e.g. a calf born) — costs of the factors
of production (wages, land, capital items) + unpaid costs (e.g. depreciation,
death of an animal)
ote: the net value added is the gross income — the intermediate goods (seeds etc.) — the depreciation
(of vessels and gear).
The productivity, costs and incomes of the different Digo groups are presented below
(calculations in Tables 7.8 - 7.11).
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7.5.2.1 Fishing households with boats
This group were those who fished with traps, lines and nets, most of whom owned the
canoes they fished from or were members of a household that owned a boat. There
were very few instances where boats were shared on a long-term basis. The
fishermen were mostly over forty years old. The range of catch per man per day for
each of the fishing methods based on 164 daily catches between 1995 and 1996 are
presented in Table 7.7. The seasonality of catches is highlighted in the table below.
For example samples taken in August (low season) 1996 from 10 trap fishers at
Mwaepe landing site found mean daily catch to be 1.038 kg/man/day. Whereas
figures collected during the previous NE monsoon in the same area were 4.46
kg/man/day (Rubens, 1996). Based on the results presented in Table 7.7 the mean
catch per fisher for those with vessels was 3.93 kg/day. This figure is used in the
calculation of disposable income in Table 7.8.
Table 7.7 Daily catch range per fisher for the three gear types used by canoe
fishermen. The range reflects the seasonality of the fishery.
Gear Daily range of catch
(kg/man/day)
Sample size
Trap 1.34 - 6.0 155
Line 1.18 - 7.08 75
Gill nets 0.74- 7.24 21
Source: 164 daily catches sampled between Sept. '95 — Sept. '97
Bearing in mind the cost of capital depreciation, households were asked about their
savings or whether they needed to borrow money. Overall they were not keen to
discuss the subject in detail, but most fishers said they borrowed from friends or took
out loans from local creditors. None of the households interviewed had savings
accounts. One fisher used cattle as a means of saving, but as explained in part 7.4.1, it
was a risky business. Households said they would not trust their savings with
organisations such as banks or the post office. They said it was impossible to get
loans from banks because they did not have title to their land or were not prepared to
put family land as security against loans.
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Table 7.8 Calculation of disposable income per year for fishing households with
boats (Ksh).
Activity Product Value
Ksh/yr
Cost Value
Ksh/yr
Monetary Fishing. 3.93 kg/man/day — 0.5 kg
taken home for subsistence. 	 Mean
prices	 throughout	 the	 year:	 50
47162.5 Depreciation	 of	 Boats.
Fishers said the new price of
a boat was between 6000 —
1000
Ksh/kg.	 275 days/yr fished due to
illness (malaria), tides and religious
12000 Ksh.	 They estimated
the boats lasted 6-10 years.
days. Depreciation	 of	 Gear. 800
Mangoes 1000 Lines 500 Ksh last 3 yrs.
Coconuts and Coprah 900 Nets 2000-3000 Ksh last 7
Chickens (average 3 @ 80 Ksh
each)
240 yrs.	 Sardine nets owned by
many fishers 10000 Ksh last
10 yrs.	 Averaged over the
Subsistence Cassava.	 Average	 0.1	 acres
producing 60 meals @ 40 Ksh/meal
over 6 months.
Fish.	 0.5	 kg	 of very	 small	 or
2400
2062.5
group:
Seeds.	 1-5 kg of maize @
80 Ksh/kg.	 0.25-1	 kg of
beans @ 35 Ksh/kg.
463
unpalatable	 fish	 taken	 home.
Lowest value @ 15 Ksh/kg.	 275 Note: other costs such as salaries for
days fished/yr. labour were negligible. 	 Only one of
Beans. Average production was 50 1750 these fishers had livestock it has not been
kg/yr @ 35 Ksh/kg. include.	 Disposable income does not
Maize. Only 20% grew maize of
significant quantity of 1 	 acre on
average. Produced 40 meals @ 40
1600 have depreciation deducted because it is
the money to spend.
Ksh/meal over 4 months.
Mangoes. 1000
Coconuts. 4 per week @ 3 Ksh
each.
624
Other
activities
Cakes, Thatch, Snuff, Weaving..
were examples of income earning
activities	 of	 women	 in	 the
households.
5000
ross income/year	 6373911 Disposable income/year
(Source: 6 household interviews - 13% of group; group interviews with fishers; 164 daily catches;
adapted from Malleret-King (1996).)
7.5.2.2 Fishing households without boats
This group was predominantly the households of spear gun fishermen based on a
subdivision of the family plot. They were young families, the fishermen were in the
age range 18-30 years, and did not have title to the land. The fruit trees they planted
were still young and not very productive and thus provided negligible income. Spear
guns were the most accessible fishing method due to the low cost, but it was also the
most physically demanding and this affected their work on land. As a result only 0.3
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acres were cultivated on average. They depended to some extent on gifts of fruit and
crops from friends or more established members of their family.
Mean daily catch per man between 1995 and 1997 was 3.66 kg (SD 2.66, sample size
154). This group in particular were regularly observed to target easily shot fish such
as pufferfish (Arothron sp.) and lionfish (Pterois sp.), which were of no commercial
value, to take home for food.
Spear gunners represented the largest number of fishers by gear type in Biga (most of
the part time fishers). This method was taken up due to the lack of alternative sources
of employment. In other villages closer to the tourist development men of this age
group tend to become hawkers to supplement their income.
Table 7.9 Calculation of disposable income per year for fishing households without
boats.
Activity Product Value
Ksh/yr
Cost Value
Ksh/yr
Monetary Fishing. 3.66 kg/man/day - 0.5 kg
taken home for subsistence. 	 Mean
prices 50 Ksh/kg. 275 days fished.
43450 Depreciation	 of	 Gear.
Material for spear guns cost
about 200 Ksh every 2 years.
Masks cost about 500 Ksh,
replaced every 3 years.
Seeds.	 The	 only	 seeds
bought were about 0.5 kg of
beans @ 35 Ksh/kg.
266.7
17.5
Subsistence Fish.	 0.5 kg of unpalatable fish
taken home, valued at the lowest
price of 15 Ksh/kg.
Cassava. 40 meals @ 40 Ksh/meal
over 2 months.
Beans.	 Very	 small	 cultivation
produced on average 15 kg @ 35
Ksh/kg.
Mangoes.	 Most	 trees
unproductive.
Coconuts.	 Most	 trees	 still
unproductive,	 supplemented from
family plot.
2062.5
800
525
300
150
Other
income
The wives were still preoccupied
with looking after babies and young
children.
Gross income/year 	 47287.5 IliDisposable income year 
(Source: 7 household interviews - 7% of group; group interviews with fishers; 154 daily catches;
adapted from Malleret-King (1996).)
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7.5.2.3 Households depending on subsistence agriculture
This group were either households that had retired from fishing for reasons of age or
illness, or were unable to reinvest in capital items such as boats or gear because they
were not part of established Biga families and had problems borrowing money.
Within this group men were able to go fishing up to twice a week by borrowing a boat
from another fisher when he came ashore.
Table 7.10 Calculation of disposable income per year for subsistence agriculture
households.
Activity Product Value
Ksh/yr
Cost Value
Ksh/yr
Monetary Mangoes. 1000 This group had no capital
Coconuts. 900 items required in production
Sesame. 500 except for jembe (150 Ksh)
Chickens. 160 and panga (120 Ksh) which
lasted for 20 years.
Subsistence Beans.	 These were interplanted
with cassava and substantial hedges
of pigeon pea were cultivated.	 On
average 130 kg/yr were produced
@ 35 Ksh/kg.
4550
All this group kept some of
their seeds from the previous
crop to plant the next season.
Cassava.	 About	 0.1	 acre	 was
culitvated producing 35 meals @ 40
1400
Ksh over three months.
Mangoes. 1000
Fish.	 Being able to borrow a boat
about twice a week provided about
900
75 Ksh worth/month.
Coconut. 4/week @ 3 Ksh. 624
Other
income
They seldom had any other income
earning	 activity.	 In	 absolute
desperation one household said they
would sell land.
Gross income/year	 lO34IIIDisposablee income/year
	 11034
(Source: 4 household interviews - 80% of group; adapted from Malleret-King (1996).)
Many were squatters on small plots (on average 3 acres) on Kenya Sugar land which
they had bought in the informal land market that exists in Biga (cf. part 6.2.8). As a
group they cultivated very small areas of land, on average 0.2 acre, but relatively
intensively.
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The only source of income was from their fruit trees, some sesame or the occasional
sale of chickens. They were in the worst long-term socio-economic situation in Biga,
relying heavily on gifts from other people.
7.5.2.4 Non fishing/farming households
This group consisted of households that traded fish, had a shop (duka) or were
traditional doctors (mganga). They cultivated 0.5 acre of land for subsistence crops
and planted the rest of their land with fruit trees (predominantly coconut, mango
Table 7.11 Calculation of disposable income per year for non fishing/farming
households.
Activity Product Value
Ksh/yr
Cost Value
Ksh/yr
Monetary Sales of Fish or from Shops was on
average 2000 Ksh/month.
24000 Depreciation	 of	 Bicycles.
For fish taders this was an
200
Mangoes.	 Grown	 for	 income,
particularly the higher value kinds.
6000 essential capital item.	 New
cost 3000 Ksh and lasted 15
Coconut and Coprah. 3000 yrs.
Cashew nut. The low prices mean
that the trees were old and not very
productive,
1500 Seeds.	 Up to 2 kg of beans
@	 35	 Ksh/kg.	 One
household	 used	 chemical
pesticides and fertilizers on a
70
Subsistence Cassava. Relatively large amounts 3200 very small scale.
were grown providing 80 meals @
40 Ksh/meal over 8 months.
Salaries.	 Some	 of these
households employed labour
2000
Beans. On average 50 kg/yr @ 35 1750 to clear land.
Ksh.
Coconut. 5 per week @ 3 Ksh. 780
Chickens. 3 per year @ 80 Ksh. 240
Other
income
Cakes, thatch.. in much the same
way as the households with boats.
5000
Gross income/year 45470 Disposable income/year	 I	 43400
(Source: 5 household interviews - 28% of group; adapted from Malleret-King (1996).)
and cashew nut). The produce from the fruit trees was either sold to local traders or
transported to Mombasa market for sale. They were not from fishing families and
some were relatively recent migrants to Biga, although they were Digo people.
For fish traders the two problems they faced were the increasingly smaller catches and
small fish sizes (lower value) landed by fishermen and the rapid deterioration of the
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fish due to the lack of cheap ice. The best prices for fish were from door to door sales
to holiday cottages and expatriate residences, but these were not guaranteed and
involved significant distances. Any remaining fish were usually sold within the
villages at lower prices.
7.5.2.5 Other groups in Biga
Household interviews were carried out with four established migrant farmer
households (more than 0.5 acre cultivated) and four new migrant farmers (less than
0.5 acre cultivated). Calculations were carried out by Malleret-King (1996), and their
incomes relative to other groups are illustrated in Figure 7.3. The very low disposable
income for the recently arrived migrant farmers was due to the failure of their crops
that year due to bad rains and inexperience. They therefore depended on help from
other migrant farmers and would return to their homelands without funds. The more
established migrant farmers were relatively successful and sold most of their produce
at Mombasa market.
There were no household interviews with the Wapemba seine fishers, but their fish
catches were estimated from 20 daily samples in 1995 and 1996, and observations of
their cultivation suggested it was similar to the less productive Digo households in
terms of area and number of trees. Subsistence production was estimated to be
approximately 3837 Ksh/year (as with spear gun fishers). Mean catch per man per
day was calculated to be 4.33 kg. Much of their catch was small fish (cf. part 7.7)
which was of lower value, estimated to be approximately 30 Ksh/kg over the year.
The figures of income and capital are only an indication because their fishing method,
way of life and distribution of income make it difficult to calculate without detailed
information. The crews were large, up to ten per canoe, made up of young men who
returned to Pemba Island in Tanzania regularly. Only a small number were full time
resident in Biga. The beach seines were approximately 100 m long and were operated
by teams in two large canoes, thus the value of the gear and boats were much higher
than Digo operations. However, the crew did not own the gear and thus the catch was
divided between the crew, the captain and the owner of the gear and vessels in
different proportions. The capital value is estimated on the value of the gear and the
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boat divided by the average crew size of eight because the exact division of income
was not known (21000 Ksh/8 crew).
7.6 Socio-economic position of households in relation to the maintenance
threshold and other groups.
The relative positions of each group in relation to the maintenance threshold are
presented in Figure 7.3. Included in this figure are the migrant farmers (in Malleret-
King, 1996) and an estimation for the Wapemba seine net group. The figure presents
the household incomes against the value of the capital items required in the respective
production systems.
Figure 7.3 Positions of the different groups in Biga relative to the maintenance
threshold.
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The group of households with boats had the highest level of disposable income, but
the amount of capital equipment needed in their production system was much higher
than the other groups. Only three groups were above the maintenance threshold, two
of which were the fishing groups. The established migrant farmer group had a
relatively high income compared with their capital investment, however their
activities were seasonally dependent and the study did not account for their
investments in their homelands. None of the groups were in a secure socio-economic
position in terms of threats to the resources on which they depended. For most Digo
households, income from fishing was essential. The state of the fishery and trends in
its productivity are discussed below.
•
•
•
• Capital
• Disposable income
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7.7 State of the fishery
The production systems of the different Digo groups presented above showed that
livelihoods were dependent on a range of activities. For fishing households, who
were the majority in Biga, the effort put into fishing determined to a large degree the
amount of time and energy available for activities on land. Fishers consistently said
that they were having to fish for longer and with more effort to catch sufficient fish
and this was having a negative effect on the productivity of their shambas. During a
group interview with older fishers they claimed that fish catches had dropped by 90%
over the last 30 years. Fishing effort for trap fishermen, indicated by the number of
traps per fisherman, had increased by three or four times over the same period (3-4
traps/man to 9-11 traps/man). Fishermen now had to fish at every opportunity
whereas in the past they only needed to fish every two or three days. They also
estimated that there were four times as many fishermen now as there had been 50
years ago. All the Digo fishers interviewed blamed the decline in catches on the use
of beach seines. Some also said that fish from traps were occasionally poached by
spear gun fishermen. Both fishing methods are relatively recent arrivals to the area
(within the last thirty years) and were not considered traditional methods. The impact
of these methods is discussed below.
7.7.1 Effect of non traditional fishing methods
Trends over the last thirty years for fishing effort and catches based on interviews
with fishers suggest that catch per unit of effort have dropped significantly. During
this period seine nets and spear guns were introduced to the fishery. The Digo fishers
in Biga blame the drop in catches to be due primarily to the seine nets used by
Wapemba fishers, which they claimed caught juvenile fish and destroyed marine
habitats. This was the basis of a conflict that is analysed in the next chapter. A
simple comparison of length-frequency distribution (Figure 7.4) and length-body
depth and length-weight relations of important food and income species from trap and
beach seine catches (Table 7.12 and 7.13; calculated by Rubens, 1996, based on
jointly collected data) supported the problem of juvenile catches. The length-body
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depth relation enabled the size of the fish recruited into each fishery to be estimated
based on the different mesh sizes of the gears. Using the length-weight relation the
weight and value of fish could be estimated for seine caught fish if they were left to
recruit into the trap fishery.
The problem of beach seines destroying habitats was less evident. Observations of
the seine net operations suggested that they avoided hard substrates such as coral in
order to minimise damage to the nets.
Table 7.12 Estimated size of recruitment to the trap (5 cm) and beach seine (2 cm)
fisheries of three important food and income species based on body length (cm) -
body depth (cm) relations.
Species Traps Seines	 ' Revession equation
Forktail rabbitfish 14 cm 6 cm Depth =0.11 + 0.3655 x length
Marbled parrotfish 18 cm 7 cm Depth = 0.36 + 0.2576 x length
Blackspot emperor 15 cm 4 cm Depth = 1.16 + 0.2621 x length
(Source: calculation by Rubens (1996) based on jointly collected data at Mwaepe fish landing site.)
Table 7.13 Estimated weight (g) and value (Ksh) of three important food and income
species when recruited into the trap and seine fisheries based on body length (cm) —
wet weight (g) relations.
Species Traps Seines Regression equation
g Ksh g Ksh
Forktail rabbitfish 164 2.5 13 0 Weight = 10 -II' x length 29 '
Marbled parrotfish 91 1.5 7 0 Weight = 10 - ' 	 ' x length 2f2
Blackspot emperor 65 1 2 0 Weight = 10	 1.2004x length I
Source: adapted from Rubens (1996) based on jointly collected data at Mwaepe fish landing site.
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Figure 7.4 Length-frequency distribution of three important food and income species
from trap (5 cm mesh) and beach seine (2 cm mesh) catches in Biga waters.
Forktail rabbitfish (Siganus argenteus)
6
5 -
Marbled parrotfish (Leptoscarus vaigiensis)
Length (cm)
Blackspot emperor (Lethrinus harak)
20
15 _
Length (cm)
(Source: this study collected in July and August 1996.)
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The price bracket for the smallest fish for sale was 15 Ksh/kg, which was essentially
determined by the smallest fish recruited into the trap fishery. The smallest fish
recruited into the seine fishery had no value and were therefore discarded. This
explains why the length-frequency distribution for seine catches (Figure 7.4) does not
show fish smaller than about 15 cm contrary to the indications in Table 7.12. From
observations during a fishing trip with the Wapemba seine crew, discards were at least
5% of the total catch.
The impact of spear guns probably relates more to the number of fishers than the
fishing method. Target species were not the same as traps (60% of observed catches
included octopus; Table 7.4), but they were the biggest group and they represented the
majority of part time fishers (Table 7.2). Analysis by McClanahan (1995b) showed
that fisher density (fishers/km2) was a significant contributor to catch levels.
McClanahan's (1995b) model showed that at fisher densities of 8 to 9 fishers/km2
there was a significant ecological phase shift from fish-grazer dominated communities
to urchin dominated communities (cf. part 3.2.1 on the state of the marine
environment, part 3.3.1.3 page 46). At densities above 9 fishers/km2 the catches and
catch per unit of effort dropped dramatically. Rubens (1996) calculated the fisher
density in the Biga lagoon to be 7.5 fishers/km2. This figure did not account for the
number of part time fishermen, which would push the number closer to the critical
density of 9 fishers/km2.
Thus non traditional gears have had an impact on the fishery during the last thirty
years, but for different reasons. Seine nets have tended to target juvenile fish that will
have lead to growth overfishing33 . Spear guns have dramatically increased the
number of fishers because of the low cost of the gear and the lack of alternative
sources of livelihood, and this has had an impact on the fishery as a whole. The
combined effects of the additional non traditional gears against a background of
continued use of traditional gear has lead to a situation of ecosystem overfishing
shown by the ecological phase shift to urchin dominated communities.
33 As opposed to recruitment overfishing which relates to abundance of young fish produced by larval
settlement (Russ, 1991).
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7.8 Conclusion
The community of Biga was found to be made up of different ethnic groups, 90%
Digo, 7% upcountry migrant farmers and 3% migrant Wapemba fishers. This chapter
focused on the livelihoods and production systems of the Digo community and made
some comparisons with the other ethnic groups. Analysis was based primarily on
information gathered from semi-structured interviews at the individual, household and
group level. Different groups within the community were identified according to their
production systems, which were either fishing based or not. Most households were
dependent on fishing, but the methods and capital equipment differed and this further
differentiated the community into subgroups (summarised in Table 7.14). Analysis of
household livelihoods showed that all groups depended on a range of activities to
provide food and income but the economic role of fish was dominant in the
community. Even within fishing households, however, the value of production from
land based activities was important for supplementing food and income (Table 7.14).
Seasonality was a feature of the production systems, influencing activities both on
land and in the sea. Prior to and during the long rains in April and May was the
busiest time on land and this coincided with poor fishing conditions and low catches
Table 7.14 The importance of fish for Digo household food and income in Biga
(monetary and subsistence values).
Group % income from fish
Fishers with boats 78
Fishers without boats 96
Non fishing/farming 55*
Subsistence agriculture 8
This figure is for fish traders.
(Figure 7.3). Thus, households were most food insecure from March — July while the
catches were low and crops had yet to be harvested. Fishing conditions were also
harder at this time due to strong winds and rain. This made fishers less able to work
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on the cultivation of crops due to fatigue. There were also more instances of malaria
and other illness at this time of the year. Some households stopped fishing at this
time and concentrated on cultivating food crops to increase food production.
The trend over the last five decades has been a relative decrease in productivity per
household. Traditional systems of cultivation can no longer be practised due to the
change in land tenure and land market (cf. Figure 3.7; chapter 4; part 5.3.1). The
small isolated household plots now cultivated are more susceptible to damage from
wild animals than the communal plots previously cultivated. Households depend
more on income earning activities, such as fishing or planting fruit trees, to buy food,
and this also reduces the time, energy or space available for food cultivation. The
lack of different sources of economic employment, despite the proximity of the tourist
development, has forced increasing numbers of people into fishing. This has lead to
overfishing, shown by the fall in catch per unit effort and the ecological phase shift to
urchin dominated communities in the lagoon.
The overall socio-economic situation of the community was found to be poor. This
was illustrated by the level of disposable income available to households when
compared to the amount of income needed to maintain the household at a productive
level (Figure 7.3). The highest earning households had the most capital investment
with relatively high levels of depreciation. Thus saving money was essential but it
was not evident how this was done. Most households were very close to the
maintenance threshold. This meant that they could maintain their current level of
production. However, with continued pressure on the fishery and the lack of
alternative sources of income, the productivity of households is not secure.
Consequently any further threats to their access to and control over the resource base
would be expected to provoke a reaction from the community. The community's
response to such threats is the subject of the next chapter.
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8 ASSESSMENT OF CONFLICT AND PROBLEM SOLVING ACTIONS
IN BIGA USING SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
8.1 Introduction
The precarious socio-economic predicament of the Biga community, presented in the
previous chapter, emphasised the importance of marine and terrestrial resources for
household survival. Analysis of both the social and biophysical histories of the area
in earlier chapters showed that the availability of resources for local people was
reduced by a combination of growing numbers of resource users and changing rules
surrounding resource allocation and use. These institutional changes, imposed by
more powerful or better-off sectors of society who did/do not depend directly on the
local environment for their survival, have caused the authority of traditional
institutions and practices to be undermined.
This chapter investigates the new institutional environment of resource allocation
and use in Biga through the responses of the fishers to situations where their access
to or control over marine resources is threatened (three issues). Based on the
observation that institutions evolve, reproduce and shape relations of power and
influence that exist in societies (Kanbur, 1992), the aim is to identify the people and
organisations (actors) that have power and influence in resolving these conflicts. The
inference is that the underlying institutions can be deduced from the actors involved.
The actors were identified through their communications with other actors involved
with each issue. Thus networks of actors were derived based on communication ties
and the importance of each actor was based on their role and position in each
network.34
8.2 Methods
Information was collected on the communication relations between actors involved
in three different conflicts or issues faced by the Digo fishers. The issues
investigated (which are described in more detail below) were: (1) the attempted
34 The rationale for this approach is given in chapter 2.
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implementation of a marine protected area that would have included the
community's fishing grounds; (2) the conflict between the Digo fishers and the
Wapemba beach seine fishers; and (3) the threat to Mwaepe fish landing site due to
illegal land appropriation.
8.2.1 Data collection
Information came from a variety of sources including 167 government documents,
letters, semi-structured interviews with government officials and fishing community
members, public meetings and informal discussions. The methods and sources of
information described in section 7.2 relate to this chapter as well. Snowball
sampling was used to find out who was involved in each issue (see Wasserman and
Faust, 1994: 34; Bernard, 1995: 97-98). This process was initiated through semi-
structured interviews with fishers (their response to each problem was being
investigated). This identified other actors in the network who were either
interviewed or their roles were verified in the documentation or by other actors.
Inclusion in the set of actors was determined by their role in an issue and the
frequency of their interactions. For example the tourist industry was central to the
wider issue of the marine reserve but peripheral to the issue faced by the fishers and
it was therefore excluded. In this way, it was possible to determine who the relevant
actors were and to establish a boundary to the set of actors.
8.2.2 Social network analysis
The data collected consisted of communication relations between actors. The
rationale for using this approach was given in section 2.7. The network
communication data that resulted identified the ties between different actors in the
networks. These ties were directional so that the actor who instigated a process of
communication was identified as a source and the recipient a sink. The use of this
method enabled the origins of a conflict and the process of problem resolution to be
mapped through communication networks of the actors involved.
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The network information was expressed in two ways: graphs and matrices. The
graphs provide a visual representation of the networks where each node represents an
actor and the lines are the communication ties. The matrices (sociomatrix), made up
of a row and column for each actor (node), indicate whether two actors are adjacent
or not. The networks are presented as graphs in the text below and the calculations
of actor importance were derived from the corresponding sociomatrices using
UCINET V network software (Borgatti et aL, 1998).
In the first part of the analysis, the scale of measurement for the communication ties
is considered in a number of ways to determine the extent to which the inherent
characteristics (attributes) of the actors determine their importance in the networks.
The second part of the analysis considers the importance of actors in each of the
networks, in other words their prominence in each issue. The third part attempts to
determine whether the institutional levels or types represented by the actors in the
networks are related to their importance in the networks. The final part of the
analysis considers the extent to which actors are affiliated through their joint
participation in the different issues.
8.2.2.1 Scales of measurement
Two measures of relations were considered for this study: binary and full-rank
ordinal (see Hanneman, 1997). The binary measures simply distinguish between the
presence of a relation (coded one) and the absence of a relation (coded zero).
However, this study is a retrospective analysis of three issues of which the outcomes
were known but the processes that lead to the outcome were not understood. The
aim is to understand these processes through the communications between
individuals and groups. It was evident during the fieldwork that the hierarchies that
existed in the community and the wider field of actors involved in the issues (the
Administration for example) had at least a qualitative influence on the outcome of
the issues. Simple hierarchies of power have been found to be prevalent in small
communities (Martin, 1998). Thus analysis of the networks using the binary
measures of the ties would not account for the inherent importance of an actor based
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on the established power structures. Therefore values were given to the relations in
order to weight the ties to reflect an actor's inherent importance (actor attribute),
semi-quantitatively, based on their position in established hierarchies. The scales
reflect the degree of importance, but not equal differences between each score
because this could not be measured (Hanneman, 1997) (see below for this case
study). Allocating actor attributes to the relations to give a value to the tie is an
accepted procedure (Everett pers. comm.).
As was outlined in chapters 4 and 5, the two hierarchies that dominate life in Kenya
are the Civil Service and the political structure, and therefore actors were allocated
scores in relation to their position in these hierarchies (Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 The basis of the hierarchy scores for valued graphs.
Administrative Hierarchy Score Political Hierarchy Score
State 7 President 6
Province 6 Cabinet Minister 5
District/Constituency 5 Deputy minister 4
Division 4 Member of Parliament 3
Location 3 Political party rep. 2
Sublocation 2 Chief 1
Village 1 Not Political 0
No admin. level 0
The administrative hierarchy score reflects an actor's position in the administrative
sector of government or an equivalent position in any other government department,
parastatal or formal organisation. This score reflects the recognised levels of
importance people have at different hierarchical levels of government departments.
The political hierarchy score is based on the national political hierarchy associated
with government. The score encompasses not only politicians but also overtly
political bodies and individuals whose positions are widely recognised to have
political weight in relation to the issue in case (for example political appointees).
The County Councils, for example, were shown in chapter 4 to be very politicised.
The intention was to avoid as much as possible the subjectivity of allocating political
weight based on, among other things, measures of status such as wealth or age.
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The relationship between the administration and politics was also observed to be
influential (consider the role and effect of state organisations and politics for
resource access and control discussed in chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6, and evident in the
issue descriptions below), and therefore actor attributes were also derived from a
combination of position in goverment and politics.
The scores given to each actor in the networks are presented in Appendix VII.
However, it was not known which of these hierarchies influenced the observed
outcomes of the three issues. Thus, the networks were analysed without weighting
(binary) and with each of the hierarchy scores in order to determine which model to
adopt for the social network analysis. For the purpose of choosing which hierarchy
to adopt the measure of Eigenvector centrality, which reflects an actor's overall
influence in a network, was used (see part 8.2.2.2 below). Only the final phases of
the issues, which could be verified from observations during the study period, were
analysed to determine which model to adopt. The results of the analysis are
presented in Appendix IX.
The analysis of the networks using the binary measures, which did not account for
actor attributes, did not fit the observed outcomes of the issues. Actors with few ties
but who were known to have been highly influential in determining the outcome of
an issue were not well reflected. This could be explained by the fact that hierarchies
were observed to be influential in the study site, and therefore actor importance
based simply on the links with other actors could not be expected to reflect the
observations made during the study.
Similarly the results based on either the administrative or political hierarchies did not
reflect observations made during the study. The results tended to overemphasise an
actor's importance in the networks if they were members of the hierarchy being used
to weight the ties. Thus administrative actors dominated when the administrative
hierarchy was used, and political actors dominated when the political hierarchy was
used.
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The results based on the combination of administrative and political hierarchy scores,
which aimed to reflect the effect of both administrative and political weight, closely
reflected the observed outcomes of the issues. The link between the government
administration and politics, which was discussed in earlier chapters, was also
observed in each of the three issues analysed below and largely explains the fit
between this model and observations made during the study. Based on these results
the model of combined hierarchy scores was used for the social network analysis of
the three issues.
8.2.2.2 Analysis of actor importance
The idea that power is inherently relational, and therefore a fundamental property of
social structures (Mingers, 1992; Nelson and Wright, 1995; Hannemann, 1997), is
the basis for the analysis in this chapter. The definitions and measures of the
different notions of power with respect to this study were discussed in chapter 2.
Each measure stems from the concept of centrality which is based on the idea that
prominent actors are those that are extensively involved in relationships with other
actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Most of the centrality measures are based on
this concept. However, the centrality-power relation has recently been questioned in
communication networks 35 , and as in exchange networks36, power has been shown to
relate to the network structure and actor position as well (Mizruchi and Potts, 1998).
These findings have influenced which measures have been selected for the analysis
of actor importance in this study. Three different measures of centrality have been
used in this study in order to consider different derivations of importance in the
networks based on communication ties. Each measure is described below, based on
the texts of Scott (1991), Wasserman and Faust (1994), Hanneman (1997).
Degree centrality is the simplest to define because it is based on the idea that central
actors must be the most active because they have the most ties (Wasserman and
Faust, 1994). It is therefore a measure of local centrality (Scott, 1991) and does not
account for the overall structure of the network. However the direction of the ties are
35 In communication networks power is the ability to influence the outcome of a decision, regardless
of whether this occurs at the expense of others.
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accounted for, which in the context of this study may reflect the importance of an
actor depending on whether they are the object (indegree) of many ties or the source
(outdegree) of many ties. Actors with high indegrees can be considered to be
prominent because other actors seek to communicate with them. They may be
important because they are sources of information or because they perform some sort
of supporting role. On the other hand they may simply be the source of instruction or
information about the activities of other actors. Actors with high outdegrees set out
to communicate with many other actors to pursue a cause or interest and as a result
can be considered to be influential. They are often sources of action either co-
ordinating or organising activities. The difference between an actor's indegree and
outdegree can indicate their overall network activity (Everett pers. comm.).
Eigenvector centrality, used in this study, is an extension of closeness centrality
with an attempt to incorporate the influence of the overall structure of the network on
actor importance. Closeness centrality considers an actor to be important if it lies at
short distances from other actors in the network. It is frequently used to measure
relative access to network resources and information, and can also be interpreted as
measuring the degree of independence from others in the network (Hagen et al.,
1997). However, closeness centrality does not account for the fact that the
importance of an actor may also be proportional to the strength of its ties to other
actors and the importance (centrality) of these other actors (Faust, 1997; Hanneman,
1997). Eigenvector centrality (an eigen decomposition method) does this by a
identifying the dimensions of distances (by factor analysis) among the actors and
giving each actor a value (eigenvalue) based on its location with respect to each
dimension identified. The measure takes the distance between two actors as the
longer of the direct paths between them in the calculation and as a result considers
the overall structure of the network rather than the local patterns. Most of the
variability in the locations of the actors are usually accounted for in the first few
dimensions (referred to as factor 1, 2 etc.) (Hanneman, 1997; Richards and Seary,
1997). Eigenvector centrality has been used to study the extent to which actors are in
a position to influence other actors in a network (Faust, 1997).
36 In exchange networks power is the ability to gain benefits at the expense of others.
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Flow-betweeness centrality is another measure that extends a more straightforward
approach, betweeness centrality, by seeking to account for the position of an actor in
the overall structure of the network. Betweeness centrality considers an actor to be
important if it lies on the path between two others because it might have some
control over the interactions between the two nonadjacent actors (Wasserman and
Faust, 1994). In addition the two nonadjacent actors will also display a level of local
dependency upon the actor between them (Scott, 1991). Thus an actor with high
betweeness could have more control over resources, such as information, than other
actors and this could translate into power. In addition other actors may depend on a
certain actor to make connections between them. This measure only considers the
most efficient route between two actors (geodesic path). However, the geodesic path
may not be the only route to connect pairs of actors. If an actor sitting between two
others uses the position to block information flow, the pair of actors may try other
paths that connect them. Flow-betweeness considers this possibility, but it assumes
that actors will use the paths between them proportionately to the length of the paths.
Thus flow-betweenes centrality for an actor is derived by quantifying the extent to
which the maximum flow of information between all other pairs of actors depends on
the paths that include that actor.
Thus the actor centrality measures used in this study determine that an actor's
importance is a function of the number and direction of their ties (degree), the effect
of the overall structure of the network (eigenvector), their position in the network
(flow-betweeness) and their inherent characteristics (actor attribute).
In addition to the individual actor scores calculated for each of the three centrality
measures network centralization scores were also generated. Network
centralization describes the extent to which the network as a whole is organised
around a few actors according to a particular centrality measure. The degree based
measure of network centralization is considered by Scott (1991) to be particularly
sensitive to the local dominance of actors, whereas the betweeness based measure is
more sensitive to the 'chaining' of points. Network centralization based on closeness
has been suggested by Tichy (1980) to reflect how much a network is guided by a
formal hierarchy. These scores can only be derived from binary data, but for both
binary and valued data the underlying graphs are the same. High network centralities
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have been associated with a few actors having reputations of power and influence
over community affairs or economic sectors (Mizruchi and Galaskwieicz, 1994).
The analysis was carried out using UCINET V network analysis software (Borgatti et
al.., 1998).
8.2.2.3 Analysis of the importance of institutional levels and types in the networks
The basis of this chapter is to elucidate the important people, organisations and
institutions involved in three resource access and control issues. The proposition is
that the institutions (see section 2.2 for definitions) are represented by the actors
involved in the issues and that the actor's importance, based on the centrality
measures, also reflects the importance of the institution in the network. As was
shown in chapter 5, different types and sub-types of institution influence resource
access and control in the Biga area. For example the Fisheries Department, KWS
and the fishermen represent rules relating to natural resource management and
exploitation, whereas the District Commissioner represents State administrative
rules. Thus the institutions can be differentiated into types and sub-types, and into
formal or informal types. In addition the different scale levels (national, local...) of
institution were identified following the approach taken in the environmental
entitlements analysis (cf. section 5.4).
By coding each actor for its institution it was possible to investigate the relationship
between the importance of an institution in a network and the scale level, sub-type
and type according to the ranked importance of the actors (from centrality scores) in
each network. The institutional scale level, sub-types and types and their codes are
summarised in Table 8.2. The test for significance for the institutional scale levels
and sub-types was the Kruskal-Wallis test. This test was used because there were
more than two independent samples and the results of the social network analysis
were ranked ordinal data. The test for significance for the type of institution was the
Mann-Whitney U-test because there were two independent samples and the results
were ranked ordinal data (Argyrous, 1997). This analysis was carried out using
SYSTAT® 7.0.1 (SPSS, 1997).
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Table 8.2 Actor codes to reflect institutional levels and types in the networks
Type Code Scale level Code Sub-type Code
Formal 1 Local 1 Administrative 1
Informal 2 District 2 Political 2
Provincial 3 Natural resource management/exploitation 3
National 4 Non natural resource management/exploitation 4
Using the codes, for example, the District Commissioner in the networks represents
formal (1) district level (2) administrative (1) institutions, whereas the Biga
fishermen represent informal (2) local (1) natural resource management/exploitation
institutions (3). The codes for each actor's institutional level and type are given in
Appendix VIII.
8.2.2.4 Analysis of actor importance across all the issues
In addition to determining the importance of the actors involved in each issue, the
overall importance of actors across a range of issues was determined. The aim was
to determine whether there was a core group who were consistently important in all
the issues. The networks of actors analysed for each issue were also linked to each
other through their joint participation in each issue. The three issues being
investigated were considered to represent typical resource management problems.
Therefore actors common to all the issues may suggest an underlying quasi-resource
management network. This in turn would reflect the underlying institutional
structures. By linking the actors and the issues (events) it was possible to create an
affiliation network. This network consisted of a set of actors and a collection of
subsets of actors (issues/events). The information was represented as an affiliation
matrix and a bipartite graph.
Faust (1997) considered the measurement and interpretation of centrality in
affiliation networks. She concluded that centrality should be measured for both
actors and events. Her correlations between centralities for a bipartite graph and the
one-mode relations (separate actor and event networks) were strongest for
eigenvector centrality. Therefore this measure has been used in this study.
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The analysis was carried out using UCINET V network analysis software (Borgatti et
a!., 1998).
8.3 Presentation of Issues
In chapter 5 the main organisations and underlying institutions that the fishers faced
when dealing with the three issues described below were considered. These
organisations, or people within them, appear as actors in the social network analysis.
The environmental entitlements framework presented in section 5.4 illustrated how
different institutions at different scale levels interacted to shape people's resource
claims and practices. The environmental entitlement analysis presented in Figure 5.2
illustrated the process for fishing in Biga waters. It therefore relates to two of the
issues, the attempted implementation of the marine protected area (part 8.3.1) and the
conflict between the Digo fishers and the Wapemba beach seiners (part 8.3.2).
Figure 5.3 illustrated the environmental entitlements analysis for the use of
beachfront land for fish trade and fishing related activities. The figure relates to the
issue of access to and land for Mwaepe fish landing site being threatened (part 8.3.3).
8.3.1 The Diani — Chale marine reserve (marine reserve issue)37
The tourism boom of the 1980s brought increased numbers of visitors to the Diani
area and with it increasing levels of harassment of tourists by beach hawkers and
muggings/robbery. At the same time researchers were drawing attention to the
degradation of the marine environment in the area (McClanahan and Shafir, 1990).
Following the establishment of a marine protected area and beach management
programme in 1991 for the tourism area just north of Mombasa, the tourism industry
and expatriate residents petitioned for the same in the Diani area. The principal
incentive was the possibility of increased security for tourists resulting from the
presence of Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) patrols supporting the beach
management programme.
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In order for KWS (cf. part 5.2.5 for an overview) to have authority over activities on
the beach a marine protected area was proposed. The area proposed included the 20
km stretch of coast between the Mwachema River in the north and Chale Island in
the south (Figure 3.5), and incorporated the fringing reef and lagoon and 30 m of
land above the high water level. The marine protected area was to be the fifth in
Kenya, and as with the other sites, to be divided into a marine park and marine
reserve. In Kenya marine parks are areas of no exploitation and access requires a
fee, whereas marine reserves allow for traditional fishing. From the point of view of
local communities marine parks are total exclusion zones. The proposed marine park
was a small area in the vicinity of Chale Island and the remainder of the area was to
be reserve.
In May 1992 KWS and Fisheries Department representatives visited the main fish
landing points to explain the proposal to local communities. Initial reactions from
the Digo fishers were positive because one of the effects of the reserve would have
been to stop the use of seine nets. Other incentives for the local community included
promises of aid in the form of medical centres and the possibility of new fishing
equipment courtesy of a grant from USAID, the United States aid agency. The local
fishers were unhappy about the marine park proposal at Chale Island and it was
changed to reserve status.
Following the positive response from the fishing communities KWS sought approval
from the District Development Committee. However problems arose when KWS
found they had to insist that the USAID funding would be spent on the fishing
communities and not elsewhere in the District. Similarly an argument over the
income generated through the beach management programme (each visitor was to
pay US$ 0.50 per day through their hotel charges) developed between the local
Council and KWS. These problems and delays in getting maps drawn up for the
legislative process set the initiative back and little had been done on the ground by
1994, when the first democratic elections in Kenya were to take place. In March
37 Sources: KWS personnel Kaka, Muthiga and Kavu pers. comms.; KWS archives; Fisheries
Department archives; District Administration archives; unstructured interviews with fishers and
traders; Rubens (1996).
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1994 the Director of KWS resigned following a vituperative campaign by
government ministers. The reserve proposal was reviewed in parliament, as were
many initiatives of the previous KWS regime, setting things back further. The
reserve was eventually gazetted in June 1995, nearly three years after the initial and
only contacts between KWS and the fishing communities.
During the three year absence of KWS the local fishing communities had frequently
sought the assistance they had been promised in terms of aid, but were given no
explanation for the delays and as a result felt let down. In the light of this
atmosphere and the poor relationship between KWS and local Councillors and
Politicians relating to the sharing of funds, the fishers were easily persuaded to
oppose the marine reserve. Rumours spread that the park would be reinstated and
that seine fishers continued to operate in Mombasa Marine Reserve despite a KWS
presence. In addition there was evidently external influence on the local politicians
and civil servants to oppose the presence of KWS patrols when a US$ 1.5 million
hall of cannabis was discovered at Chale in April 1996 (East African Standard,
1996).
Not surprisingly KWS personnel arrived to a lukewarm reception in late 1995. The
issue had become highly politicised and local fishers had been successfully incited to
oppose the reserve by any means. KWS attempted to re-establish their rapport with
the local communities through stakeholder meetings, but with little • success. At a
public meeting at Mwaepe in October 1995 a KANU (ruling political party)
representative and a local Councillor openly incited anti KWS sentiments by
rewarding people with cash for provocative remarks and speeches. Following that
debacle the District Commissioner announced at a public meeting that the marine
reserve initiative was suspended.
Analysis was carried out on three phases of this issue:
Phase 1 The initial meetings between KWS and Fisheries Department personnel in
February 1992 to the presentation of the initiative to the fishers at the fish
landing sites in May 1992.
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Phase 2 The presentation of the proposal to the District Development Committee in
June 1992 to the parliamentary review in May 1995
Phase 3 The official gazettment of the marine reserve in June 1995 to the District
Commissioner's announcement in October 1995.
8.3.2 Beach seining by the Wapemba (beach seine issue)38
The use of fine meshed beach seines by the Wapemba was basis for the conflict
between them and the local Digo fishermen in Biga. The problem of seine nets
catching juvenile fish and the impact on the fishery was described in chapter 7.
Although seine nets were partly to blame for the current state of the fishery, the local
Digo fishers found the foreign Wapemba to be convenient scapegoats for the lack of
fish. The problem of numbers of Digo fishermen was not an issue for the local
fishers.
The Wapemba beach seine crews originated from the Island of Pemba in Tanzania
(cf. part 6.2.7). Originally only migrant fishermen, the Wapemba sought permanent
bases in Kenya in 1964 following the overthrow of the Zanzibar government. As
with many other sites in Kenya, Wapemba fishermen, seeking refuge from the
political unrest in Tanzania and better fishing than in their own overfished waters
(Glaesel 1997), approached the elders of Biga. At the time the Wapemba were not
considered to be a threat to the fishery and a settlement site was granted. The
Fisheries Department legitimised the use of their fine meshed beach seines by
granting the Wapemba licences. The Wapemba also capitalised on the establishment
of the Co-operative Societies in the 1970s by becoming active members, and by the
1980s the only members, thereby further legitimising their presence in the area in the
eyes of the authorities.
Over the following three decades the catch per unit of effort in the fishery declined.
During the 1970s and early 1980s some of the Digo fishermen began to suggest that
38 Sources: Semi-structured interviews with fishers and traders; Senior Fisheries Officer Ngoloma
pers. comm.; Chief Mwarupia pers. comm.; public meetings with fishers, traders, District Officer,
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the seine nets were having a detrimental effect on the fishery. By the mid 1980s the
Wapemba were perceived by the local Digo fishers to be a threat to their survival and
the Digo fishers asked them to fish elsewhere, which they did. In 1988 the Wapemba
returned to fish in the area, but said they would only fish outside the lagoon.
However the impracticality of fishing outside the lagoon throughout the year brought
the Wapemba back into Biga waters. Numerous requests by the Digo fishermen
were made to the elders and village level authorities and Fisheries Department
personnel to stop the use of the beach seines, but to no avail. The Digo fishermen
were convinced that the lack of action by the village authorities and the local
Fisheries personnel was because they were being bribed. In addition they were
certain that many of the Wapemba had somehow acquired Kenyan identity cards and
this would have implicated the chief and possibly more senior officials. By 1992,
frustrated by the lack of action by village authorities and the inability of the Fisheries
Department to recognise the problem, the Digo fishermen beat up some Wapemba in
an attempt to frighten them off. The attack on the Wapemba fishers lead to the arrest
and detention of the Digo fishermen and fuelled the conflict and raised its profile.
Concerted efforts by the Digo fishermen to remove the seine crews were supported
by local Councillors and KANU representatives who had become sensitised to the
'plight' of the Digo fishers during the marine reserve conflict. In addition the District
Commissioner's (DC) public announcement about the suspension of the marine
reserve in October 1995 had encouraged the local fishers to be more organised when
presenting their concerns. Galvanised by the marine reserve issue and the DC's
announcement the Biga fishermen formed a group, known as The Galu Fishermen's
Committee, to present their case to government officials (Appendix III). Intensive
lobbying of goverment officials by both the Digo fishermen and the Wapemba
fishermen continued until the middle of 1996, but again with no sign of action on the
part of the authorities. The Digo fishers then threatened to burn the houses of the
Wapemba if seine netting was not stopped. This caused the District Administration
to force the Fisheries Department to instigate a ban on seine nets on the grounds of
civil disorder. At a public meeting on the 14 th of August 1996 at Mwabungu (Figure
3.5), on the main Mombasa road, the District Officer announced the prohibition of
Councillors and Fisheries Department personnel; Fisheries Department archives; District
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beach seining. The Wapemba stopped their fishing activities in Biga waters although
they continue to live in the Biga area. They now fish to the north and south of Biga.
Analysis was carried out on three phases of the issue:
Phase 1 The arrival of the Wapemba in 1964 to the point when the Digo fishermen
requested them to fish elsewhere in 1988.
Phase 2 The recommencing of seine fishing in the lagoon at the end of 1988 to the
physical conflict in 1992.
Phase 3 The heightened profile as a result of the arrests and the eventual cessation
of beach seining in Biga waters in August 1996.
8.3.3 Land grabbing at Mwaepe (land issue)39
Some of the issues surrounding land ownership in the Biga area have been discussed
in earlier chapters. The seafront strip was shown to be owned by non-local people
following land adjudication after independence. In some instances, however, plots of
land were not sold and were held under trust by the county council. The purpose of
this was to ensure that there was land available for local development projects or
public use and that the locally accountable membership of the council would prevent
illegal allocation. However, as was explained in part 4.5.2, the county councils are
not autonomous from central government and the power politicians have over civil
servants means that the allocation of trust land for financial and political favours is
common place. This issue is a case in point°.
In the late 1980s a fisheries development project was initiated along the southern
Kenya coast to provide fish storage depots (a building with insulated boxes and tiled
work surfaces) at strategic sites. The project was funded by the International Fund
Administration archives.
39 Sources: Fisheries Department archives; Ministry of Land and Settlement archives; District
Administration archives; District Survey Department; Diani Fishermen's Co-operative Society
archives; semi-strucutured interviews with fishers and traders; Senior Fisheries Officer Etian pers.
comm.
40 I am grateful to Dr David Obura for his contribution to the investigation of this issue.
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for Agricultural Development (IFAD)4I . The Fisheries Department was responsible
for the execution of the project. The officially sanctioned Diani Fishermen's Co-
operative Society, which was theoretically functioning in the Biga area (cf. part
5.2.8), was contacted to propose a site for a depot. The Society suggested a piece of
land in the Kinondo area to the south of Biga (reflecting the origin of the Society's
management committee). This site was rejected by the IFAD project co-ordinators
due to its inaccessibility and an alternative site at Mwaepe, the northern fish landing
site in Biga (Figure 3.5), was proposed. At the time Mwaepe was at the end of the
sealed road. The seafront plot at Mwaepe was 0.6 hectares of trust land so the
Fisheries Department applied for the site for the development project. The County
Council and District Development Committee approved the proposal and the land
was allocated to the Fisheries Department in May 1991. However, while the land
was being released by the County Council a local Member of Parliament from the
neighbouring constituency communicated with the then Minister for Lands and
Settlement and had the land 'unofficially' allocated to a company called Kinondo
Fishermen's Inn Ltd.
The IFAD project continued unaware of the situation and started building the depot
in July 1991. During the initial stages of construction a debate between the Fisheries
Department and the Diani Fishermen's Co-operative Society developed over who
should own the land. During the wrangling the Fisheries Department discovered that
the land had been allocated to a politician who had had the designation changed from
a residential to a commercial plot and had sold the land to a private developer. The
situation threatened both the IFAD project and the continued use of Mwaepe landing
site by the community. Delegations of fishers and members of the Fisheries
Department sought to change the allocation but were unsuccessful. The District
Commissioner proposed a compromise and suggested that a portion of the land
should be allocated to the IFAD project. The subdivision was approved, allocating
approximately 3/4 acre on the seafront to the project, but it meant that part of the
depot had to be demolished because it straddled the two plots. The depot was
eventually opened two years later in August 1993 without the question of who owned
the 3/4 acre resolved.
41 Source: Fisheries Department Diani Depot IFAD project file held at Shimoni office.
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At the time of this study, in 1996 and 1997, the land ownership question had reached
a head. There were three factions involved, the Fisheries Department, the Diani
Fishermen's Co-operative Society and the local Biga fishers who had formed an
interest group (Mwaepe Fishermen's Group) in 1996. The Biga fishers felt that since
the Co-operative Society no longer functioned it was merely a ruse by the
neighbouring community to claim their land. The Co-operative Society was well
placed to claim the land because on paper at least they represented the interests of the
all the fishing communities in the area, and were considered as such by various
government bodies who were unaware of the situation on the ground. In reality the
Co-operative had not functioned for years and the management committee had
become an autonomous interest group from the neighbouring area. The Fisheries
Department stuck by their claim that as a government department they served the
interests of the wider community and would not be drawn into local politics. With
little track record of safeguarding the interests of fishers, and having been let down
by government departments before (Lands Department, Fisheries Department and
KWS), both fishing communities challenged the Fisheries Department. At the end of
the study the problem remained unresolved.
However, as a post script, in 1998 Dr David Obura, a marine biologist working in the
Biga area, assisted the Biga fishers in their cause by providing a delegation with
transport to visit the Lands Department in Nairobi (300 miles inland) and the Lands
offices in Mombasa (30 miles away). On the strength of these and other visits the
Biga fishermen at Mwaepe were able to have the plot allocated to the Co-operative
Society (to suit official requirements) with the intention of changing the name to
Mwaepe Fishermen's Association or similar to reflect the interests of the Mwaepe
fishers. The Co-operative Ministry, however, has been reluctant lose a 'paper co-
operative'. The only security the fishers at Mwaepe have, which is more than they
had before, is that they hold the letter of allocation (Obura pers. comm.).
Analysis was carried out on three phases of this issue:
Phase I The start of the IFAD project in 1988 to the first indication of a problem
over land allocation in February 1991.
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Phase 2 The illegal sale of the plot to the developer and subsequent subdivision to
the completion of the depot in July 1993.
Phase 3 The wrangling over ownership to the new Plot Development Plan in April
1998.
8.4 Results
The results below are based on social network analysis of the complex issues
described above. The salient actors were identified using a snowball sampling
approach of semi-structured interviews and reference to written records. Valued
sociomatrices for each phase of the three issues were derived from the
communication data and the combined administrative and political hierarchy scores
(cf. part 8.2.2.1). These matrices (which represent the graphs shown in Figure 8.1,
8.2 and 8.3) were analysed for actor importance using three centrality measures:
degree centrality (indegree and outdegree), eigenvector centrality and flow-
betweeness centrality.
The results are the absolute scores for each network and therefore cannot be
normalised and compared across the different networks, unlike binary data that can
be normalised (Everett pers. comm.). Thus the order of importance for each actor is
compared in this study. The network centralization scores were calculated from the
binary data because the calculation returns meaningless scores >100% with valued
data, although the structure of the graph is the same.
The position of each actor in the directed graphs (Figures 8.1, 8.2, 8.3) were
determined by multidimensional scaling of the valued sociomatrices. This gives a
visual indication of the importance of each actor in the network, the more central
actors being more important (referred to as core, semi-peripheral and peripheral). It
must be remembered that the position of each actor relative to the other actors is a
function of both the ties and the value of the ties.
All calculations and multidimensional scaling were carried out using UCINET V
software (Borgatti et al., 1998). Key aspects of the results are summarised in section
8.5.
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8.4.1 Marine reserve issue
The centrality scores for each phase of the marine reserve issue are presented in
Table 8.3 and the directed graphs are presented in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1 Directed graphs for the marine reserve issue (abbreviations in Table 8.3).
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There is some variation between the network centralization scores derived from each
measure for each phase. With respect to outdegree network centralization, the scores
suggest that the graphs are dominated by a small number of actors in each phase.
The indegree network centralization scores suggest that there is less concentration of
importance in a few actors.
The first two phases have high network centralization according to eigenvector
centrality, but a more equal distribution of centrality (importance) in the third phase.
The flow-betweeness network centralization measures are high for the first two
phases, but these scores are dubious because the graph is disconnected. The third
phase suggests a more equal distribution of importance with respect to this measure.
In the case of phase 1, the degree and eigenvalue measures indicate that the most
important actors are the district level KWS, the Senior Fisheries Officer and the
Chief. The most important actor as a source of communication is KWSdis closely
followed by SFO. KWSdis is also the most important recipient of communication,
followed by the Chief and the Biga fishers. This reflects the situation when the
marine reserve was proposed to the local fishing community and these actors were
the core group.
The flow-betweeness measure does not work well because the graph is very
disconnected and many actors are singletons and therefore not on paths between
other actors. The directed graph for phase 1 (Figure 8.1) illustrates the situation well.
During the second phase the Kwale County Council became the most important
actor as a source of communication (outdegree), followed by KWSdis, the local MP,
the Senior Fisheries Officer and the District Development Council. The most
important actors as recipients of communication are the same as for the outdegree
measure, although in a slightly different order.
In terms of importance in the overall structure of the network and communication
with other important actors, the eigenvector centrality scores also identifies the same
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actors as the most important. Again the order is slightly different, placing Kwale
County Council ahead of KWSdis, the local MP, the Senior Fisheries Officer, the
District Development Council and closely followed by the District Commissioner.
The flow-betweeness measure has not worked for all the actors for the same reason
as the previous graph, many actors are not on paths between other actors. However
the measure places KWSdis as more important than Kwale County Council in terms
of involvement in all the flows of communication between all the other pairs of
actors.
The directed graph of phase 2 (Figure 8.1) illustrates the position of the core group
identified by the centrality measures. The graph also shows that the Biga fishers are
a source of many communication ties, however their centrality scores are relatively
low. This is due to their low inherent importance in the established administrative
and political hierarchies. This accurately reflects the situation in phase 2 when the
other actors largely ignored the Biga fishers.
The results for the third phase of the marine reserve issue show that the overall level
of communication has increased compared to the previous phases. The provincial
level of KWS has become the most important actor in terms of initiating
communication (outdegree). This was because the individual who was responsible
for the implementation of the marine reserve was promoted form district to
provincial level responsibility in the organisation. The District Commissioner has
become the second most important source of communication and a group consisting
of the Distirct Officer, Coast Development Authority, Chief, Councillors and local
MP follow as somewhat less important but with similar scores. Most of the actors
are in a similar position in terms of recipients of communication (indegree), the Biga
fishers and the local Fisheries Officer are slightly more important than the other
actors.
In terms of communicating with other important actors throughout the network
(eigenvector centrality) the District Commissioner is the most important, followed by
KWSprov. There is then a group in similar positions of importance, including the
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District Officer, the Biga fishers, local councillors, the local Fisheries Officer, the
Chief, KWSdis and the local MP.
The flow-betweeness centrality measure works well in this graph because it is well
connected (Figure 8.1). Contrary to the eigenvector measure, the most important
actor in terms of being involved in most of the communication is KWSprov. The
Coast Development Authority is found to be more important using this measure than
with the other centrality measures. The next important group of actors is similar to
the eigenvector measure except that the Provincial Commissioner has risen in
importance and the local MP and Biga fishers have decreased in importance.
The directed graph of phase 3 (Figure 8.1) shows the increased number of
communication ties which also tend to be both ways between most pairs of actors. It
was during this phase of the issue that protest against the reserve took place,
involving a wide range of actors, and KWS failed to regain the support of local
communities.
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8.4.2 Wapemba beach seine issue
The centrality scores for each phase of the Wapemba beach seine issue are presented
in Table 8.4 and the directed graphs of the networks are presented in Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2 Directed graphs for the beach seine issue (abbreviations in Table 8.4).
Phase 1.
Phase 2.
Phase 3.
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The network centralization scores in this issue suggest that a small number of actors
dominate the networks, but not to the extent as in the previous issue.
For the first phase of the beach seine issue, the Chief is the most important actor in
terms of a source of communication, followed by the local Fisheries Officer and the
Village Chairman. In terms of important recipients of communication, the actors are
more equal, with the local Fisheries Officer slightly more important than the local
Biga fishermen and the Wapemba fishermen.
The importance of the Chief and local Fisheries Officer is supported by the
eigenvector measure. The Village Chairman, Biga fishers and Wapemba fishers are
of similar importance.
The flow-betweeness measure reflects a similar situation except that the local
Fisheries Officer is more important than the Chief in terms of being involved in most
of the communication flows between other actors.
The multidimensional scaling for the directed graph of phase 1 (Figure 8.2) places
the Chief at the core of the network.
In the second phase, the Chief is again the most important actor in terms of a
communication source. The next two actors are the Sub-Chief and Village
Chairman, who are subordinate to the Chief in the village hierarchy. The indegree
scores suggest that the Biga fishermen are the most important recipients of
communication, closely followed by the Chief. The other actors are considered
similarly important except for the local Fisheries Officer and the local Police.
In terms of the communication ties with other important actors and how close the
actor is to other actors, the eigenvector measure places the Chief as the most
important, followed by the Biga fishermen, the Sub-Chief and the Village Chairman.
The flow-betweeness measure reflects a similar situation, placing the Chief as the
most important actor followed by the Biga fishermen. The Sub-chief, Village
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Chairman, Elders and Wapemba fishermen are all of similar importance using this
measure.
As with phase 1, the directed graph of this phase (Figure 8.2) shows the Chief to be
at the core of the network.
The third phase of the issue involves many more actors than the previous two
phases although some of the actors are quite peripheral (Figure 8.2). In this phase, a
different group of actors have become important. The District Officer, Senior
Fisheries Officer, local MP and Chief are the most important in terms of sources of
communication (outdegree). The District Commissioner, Senior Fisheries officer,
District Officer and the Biga fishermen are important as recipients of communication
(indegree).
In terms of communicating with other important actors (eigenvector) the District
Officer is slightly more important that the District commissioner and they are
followed by the Senior Fisheries Officer and the local MP.
The flow-betweeness measure reflects a different result, finding the Chief as the most
important followed by the Senior Fisheries Officer and somewhat less important the
District Officer, the Biga fishermen and the local Fisheries Officer. The local KANU
political party representatives are also in this semi-peripheral group.
On the whole it is the same group of actors who are the most important according to
all the measures. The directed graph of phase 3 (Figure 8.2) illustrates the core,
semi-peripheral and peripheral actors quite well.
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8.4.3 Land issue
The centrality scores for the three phases of the land issue are presented in table 8.5
and the directed graphs for the three networks are presented in Figure 8.3.
Figure 8.3 The directed graphs for the land issue (abbreviations in Table 8.5).
Phase 1.
Phase 2.
Phase 3.
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The network centralization scores tend to be high for all the issues, suggesting that
there are a small number of actors dominating the networks. The flow-betweeness
measures are dubious in this issue, as in the marine reserve issue, because the graphs
tend to be disconnected with many actors not between any others.
For the first phase of the land issue the Senior Fisheries Officer is clearly the most
important actor in terms of outdegree which reflects his role in implementing the
IFAD project. The District Commissioner, the Chief and the MP from the
neighbouring constituency follow in importance. The Senior Fisheries Officer is also
the most important actor in terms of receiving communications (indegree), followed
by the Minister for Lands and the District Development Officer.
The eigenvector centrality scores also place the Senior Fisheries Officer as the most
important actor followed by the District Commissioner and the District Development
Officer. Both the Chief and the Diani Fishermen's Co-operative Society come
higher with this measure than the degree measures.
The flow-betweeness measure supports the importance of the Senior fisheries
Officer, but the graph is not well connected so many of the actors are not between
other actors and therefore have no scores.
The directed graph of this phase (Figure 8.3) illustrates the central position of the
Senior Fisheries Officer.
In the second phase the Senior Fisheries Officer again comes out as the most
important in terms of outdegree. The Minister for Lands has risen in importance and
the District Commissioner and MP from the neighbouring constituency remain
important as sources of communication, however the Chief has no outdegree score at
all. The Senior Fisheries Officer is again the most important in terms of receiving
communication ties. According to this measure, the Biga fishermen are a new group
of important actors that appear in this phase. The Minister for Lands is also one of
the more important actors according to indegree.
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The eigenvector scores support the degree measures, showing that in terms of
communicating with other important actors, the Senior Fisheries Officer is most
important followed by the Minister for Lands, the District commissioner and the
neighbouring MP.
The flow-betweeness scores also place the Senior Fisheries Officer as the most
important actor, closely followed by the District commissioner and the Minister for
Lands.
The directed graph of this phase (Figure 8.3) shows the Senior Fisheries Officer at
the centre of the network.
The final phase of the land issue shows a slight change in the order of actor
importance. The District Commissioner is the most important actor according to
outdegree followed by the Senior Fisheries Officer and a new actor, the District Co-
operative Officer. The Senior Fisheries Officer is once again the most important in
terms of indegree followed by a group in similar positions consisting of the District
Co-operative Officer, the District Development Officer and the District
Commissioner.
The eigenvector measure determines the District Commissioner to be the most
important in terms of communication with other important actors, followed by the
Senior Fisheries Officer and the District Co-operative Officer. The Biga fishermen
have risen in importance in this phase.
The flow-betweeness measure determines the District Commissioner to be the most
important actor in the phase, followed by the Senior fisheries Officer and the Diani
fishermen's Co-operative Society. However, as with many of the other graphs in the
analysis, there are a number of singleton actors that do not lie on paths between other
actors. The directed graph of phase 3 (Figure 8.3) illustrates this.
The core actors are shown to be the District Commissioner, the Senior Fisheries
Officer and the District Co-operative Officer.
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The key results for actor importance in all the issues are summarised in section 8.5.
8.4.4 Relationship between institutional levels or types and importance in networks
The results of the analysis of the importance of the level, sub-type and type of
institution as reflected by the actors involved in each network are presented below in
Table 8.6. The different levels were local, district, provincial and national. The sub-
types were administrative, political, natural resource management/exploitation, non-
natural resource management/exploitation. The types were formal and informal.
There was no significant relationship (p>0.05) between the four levels of institution
(Local, District, Provincial, National) and their importance in the different networks
using the Kruskal-Wallis test except in some instances of the marine reserve issue.
In the second phase of the marine reserve issue there was a significant relationship
(p<0.05) between the level of institution and its importance in the network according
to outdegree and indegree centrality. The relationship was highly significant
(p<0.01) for eigenvector centrality in the second phase. In the third phase of the
marine reserve issue there was a significant relationship between the level of
institution and its importance (p<0.05) in terms of flow-betweeness centrality.
There was no significant relationship (p>0.05) between the four sub-types of
institution and their importance in the networks using the Kruskal-Wallis test. There
was also no significant relationship between the type of institution, formal or
informal, and its importance in the network, except in the second phase of the
Wapemba beach seine issue according to outdegree centrality.
The implications of these results are discussed in the conclusion at the end of the
chapter.
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Table 8.6 Relationship between the levels or types of institution and the importance
of that institution to the network as reflected by the centrality scores of the actors.
(Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney U-test, not significant if p>0.05.)
Network Centrality
Measure
Scale level Sub-type Type
K-W df p K-W df p U p
Land 1 Outdegree 2.115 2 0.347 2.621 3 0.454
N = 9 Indegree 0.979 2 0.613 4.939 3 0.176 ALL
Eigen value 0.407 2 0.816 3.944 3 0.268 FORMAL
Flow-between 1.301 2 0.522 2.053 3 0.561
Land 2 Outdegree 2.995 3 0.392 1.978 3 0.577 16.00 0.877
N= 17 Indegree 3.692 3 0.297 3.240 3 0.356 3.00 0.071
Eigen value 4.355 3 0.266 4.456 3 0.216 10.00 0.454
Flow-between 2.586 3 0.460 1.307 3 0.728 9.00 0.317
Land 3 Outdegree 4.324 3 0.229 5.728 3 0.126 23.00 0.604
N = 16 Indegree 4.872 3 0.181 0.166 3 0.983 31.00 0.118
Eigen value 5.056 3 0.168 0.708 3 0.871 28.00 0.249
Flow-between 5.318 3 0.150 5.423 3 0.143 27.00 0.266
Reserve 1 Outdegree 2.630 2 0.268 2.829 3 0.419 6.00 0.881
N= 12 Indegree 0.513 2 0.774 1.065 3 0.786 2.00 0.258
Eigen value 1.659 2 0.436 3.098 3 0.377 3.00 0.468
Flow-between 0.000 2 1.000 2.933 3 2.305 5.50 1.000
Reserve 2 Outdegree 10.594 3 0.014 1.354 3 0.716 6.00 0.811
N= 15 Indegree 11.172 3 0.011 0.545 3 0.909 13.50 0.128
Eigen value 11.938 3 0.008 1.795 3 0.616 9.00 0.640
Flow-between 6.303 3 0.091 3.600 3 0.308 9.50 0.530
Reserve 3 Outdegree 3.195 3 0.363 2.970 3 0.396 11.00 0.444
N = 16 Indegree 6.472 3 0.091 2.085 3 0.555 0.00 0.103
Eigen value 2.731 3 0.435 1.711 3 0.634 3.00 0.329
Flow-between 7.996 3 0.046 4.159 3 0.245 7.00 0.913
U p U P U p
Seines 1 Outdegree 4.500 - 0.642 8.500 - 0.878 13.00 0.081
N = 8 Indegree 7.000 - 0.115 4.000 - 0.834 4.00 0.282
[only 2 scale levels Eigen value 7.000 - 0.124 9.000 - 0.772 10.00 0.453
and sub-types (U)] Flow-between 7.000 - 0.124 7.500 - 0.885 9.50 0.549
K-W df p K-W df p U p
Seines 2 Outdegree 2.017 2 0.365 15.00 0.024
N = 8 Indegree ALL LOCAL 1.761 2 0.415 2.00 0.097
Eigen value 2.529 2 0.282 7.00 0.880
Flow-between 2.831 2 0.243 6.50 0763
Seines 3 Outdegree 0.774 3 0.856 5.223 3 0.156 16.50 0.944
N = 18 Indegree 2.740 3 0.433 6.206 3 0.102 9.00 0.325
Eigen value 2.442 3 0.486 4.339 3 0.227 14.00 0.779
Flow-between 1.627 3 0.653 4.937 3 0.176 9.00 0.323
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8.4.5 Affiliation between actors and issues
The affiliation between the actors according to their involvement in each of the three
issues is presented in the bipartite graph (Figure 8.4). The results of the eigenvector
centrality scores for the actors based on their co-membership of each issue are
presented in Figure 8.4. The order in which the actors and issues are presented in
Figure 8.4 is based on these centrality scores.
The most important actors according to their involvement in all three of the issues
are the Chief, the Councillors, the District Commissioner, the Biga fishermen, the
local fisheries officer, the local KANU political party representatives, the local MP,
the Provincial commissioner and the Senior Fisheries Officer.
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Land
Beach Seines
Marine Reserve
Figure 8.4 Bipartite graph of the three issues and actors involved. The eigenvector
centrality (CO scores derived from the actor co-memberships of the issues are also
presented.
Actors	 CE
Chief	 0.268
Councillor	 0.268
DC	 0.268
BigaFishers	 0.268
FO	 0.268
KANU	 0.268
MPMsamb	 0.268
PC	 0.268
SFO	 0.268
ADF	 0.187
OCS	 0.187
DFCS	 0.180
KCC	 0.180
DO	 0.168
KWS	 0.168
AttnGenOf	 0.099
DDO	 0.099
DisCoopOf
	 0.099
DisEnvCom	 0.099
DisLandOf	 0.099
Expats	 0.099
MinLand	 0.099
MPMatuga	 0.099
PrivDev	 0.099
PSC	 0.099
Elders	 0.088
OCPD	 0.088
SubChief	 0.088
TanzConsul	 0.088
VillChair	 0.088
Wapemba	 0.088
CDA	 0.080
DDC	 0.080
DisExecCoun	 0.080
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8.5 Results summarised
Each of the issues described and analysed above were resource access or control
problems faced by members of Biga fishing community. The analyses set out to
comprehend how the Biga fishing community achieved an outcome in their favour.
The three phases of each issue aimed to reflect distinct periods in the sequence of
events. The general trend was the recognition of a problem followed by the pursuit
of a solution through a conventional process followed by a period of problem
resolution. The trends and characteristics of each issue are presented below followed
by a presentation of the overall trends and some underlying patterns.
8.5.1 Summary of actor importance
Each centrality measure has been used to identify the importance of the actors in
each network. A range of measures were used because an actor's importance in a
network differs according to its role in the network (cf. part 8.2.2.2).
8.5.1.1 Summary of actor importance in the marine reserve issue
The important actors according to their differing roles are summarised in Table 8.7.
The key actors and processes identified by social network analysis correspond well
with the reality of the marine reserve initiative, as discussed below.
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Table 8.7 The principal actors according to their roles in the marine reserve issue.
Phase Principal
organisers
Principal
sources of info,
Pursuing a
cause
Being
informed
Overall
influence
_
outdegree indegree outdegree indegree eigenvector
1 KWSdis
SFO
KWSdis Chief
Fishers
MP
KWSdis
SFO
Chief
Fishers
2 KCC
KWSdis
KWSdis
KCC
DDC
DC
MP DC KCC
KWSdis
MP
3 KWSprov
DC
DO
Councillors
MP
Fishers DC
KWSprov
Fishers
The active organisers involved in initiating the marine reserve process were clearly
identified as the district level Kenya Wildlife Service (KWSdis) and the Senior
Fisheries Officer in the first phase, as can be expected. Similarly the primary source
of information was identified as KWSdis. The main group being informed included
the Chief, the fishers and the local MP, reflecting the community approach taken by
KWS and the Senior Fisheries Officer. The key actors of influence in the first phase
were clearly identified as KWSdis, the Senior Fisheries Officer, the Chief and the
fishers.
During the second phase, when district authorities were considering the reserve
proposal and the legal status was being determined, a different set of actors were
identified as key organisers. The County Council and KWSdis were the most
prominent as was expected. The outdegree scores also identified the local MP as an
important actor. Since this measure also reflects actors who may be pursuing a
cause, it could explain why the MP is important following the questions asked by the
fishers regarding the US aid and control of beach seining.
The important sources of information are not surprising in view of the procedures
involved at this stage of setting up the marine reserve (Table 8.7). However the
District Commissioner appears to be important, either as a source of information or
an informed actor. Here again the fishers communicated with him, seeking
clarification of the situation in view of his authority in the district. In terms of
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overall influence in the network however, the County Council and Kwsdis were
found important. This was because they were negotiating the terms of the marine
reserve. The local MP however does appear to be influential and this reflects his
association with the County Council and why the fishers sought to communicate with
him.
In the final phase, which concerns the ultimate suspension of the marine reserve
initiative, KWS remains an important organiser but two senior members of the
Administration, the District Commissioner and the District Officer, have also
become important. In addition, the local Councillors and MP were relatively central,
reflecting the anti-reserve cause they were pursuing, ostensibly on behalf of the
fishing communities. The fishers were the most informed actors during the intense
lobbying against the reserve.
Interestingly, the District Commissioner is the most influential actor within the
overall network. This reflects his authority to suspend the reserve initiative
following discussions with KWS. This also explains why the KWS is influential on
the outcome, since they agreed to put their initiative on hold. The fishers are also an
influential group, which is surprising considering their low level of importance in
pursuing their cause. However it can be explained if their relations with the actors
who were pursuing the anti-reserve cause on their behalf (the Councillors, KANU
representatives and MP) are considered (see Figure 8.1).
8.5.1.2 Summary of actor importance in the Wapemba beach seine issue
The important actors according to their differing roles are summarised in Table 8.8.
The general trend in this issue is that it remains at the local level for many years
(Phases 1 and 2, 1964 - 1992). The results suggest that this may be due to the Chiefs
control of information flow.
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Table 8.8 The principal actors according to their roles in the Wapemba beach seine
issue.
Phase Principal
organisers
Principal
sources of
info.
Pursuing a
cause
Being
informed
Overall
influence
Controlling
info, flow
outdegree indegree outdegree indegree eigenvector flowbetween
1 Chief
FO
VillChair
FO
Fishers
Fishers
Wapemba
Chief FO
Chief
2 Chief
SubChief
ViliChair
Fishers Chief
FO
VillChair
Chief
3 DO
SFO
MP
Fishers MP DC
SFO
DO
DO
DC
SFO
Chief
The early stage of the beach seine issue did not involve any conflict between the
Wapemba fishers and the local fishers. After some time questions were raised by the
local fishers about effects of the beach seines on the fishery. The principle
organisers were the local authorities and the local Fisheries Officer, who seemed to
support the activities of the Wapemba. The Wapemba, local fishers and local
Fisheries Officer were important sources of information and were the recipients of
instruction from local authorities. Overall the Chief was the most influential at this
stage, which is not surprising while the issue remained of local concern.
Interestingly, the traditional leaders, the elders, are not prominent in the networks
despite being responsible for giving the Wapemba permission to settle in the area.
During the second phase the local fishers came into conflict with the Wapemba
fishers and attempted to stop their fishing activities in the area. The local fishers
continued to seek a solution through local level authorities, hence the importance of
the Chief, sub-Chief and Village Chairman as organisers. However the local fishers
increased their influence by communicating with many more actors. The Chief and
village authorities remained influential over the outcome of the situation by
constraining the flow of information to other actors. This frustrated the local fishers,
who had assumed the local authorities would support them, causing them to attack
the Wapemba in an attempt to prevent them fishing.
The third phase shows a shift to a different set of important actors reflecting the
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raised profile of the conflict. District level authorities replace the local authorities as
prominent organisers, and the local MP appears to be important. This was probably
because the local Councillors and KANU representatives were pursuing the cause for
the local fishers (cf. Figure 8.2). The District Commissioner becomes the most
important informed actor, followed by the Senior Fisheries Officer and the District
Officer. Ultimately it is the pressure brought to bear on the Senior Fisheries Officer
by the District Officer, District Commissioner and MP that lead to the ban on beach
seining and are found to be the most influential in the network. Interestingly the
Chief remains important as an actor with relative control of information by virtue of
his position, but the profile of the issue and the importance other actors prevent him
from using this to influence the final outcome.
8.5.1.3 Summary of actor importance in the land issue
The important actors according to their differing roles are summarised in Table 8.9,
and the results are expanded on below.
The land issue initially started as a fisheries development project funded by IFAD.
This is reflected by the importance of the Senior Fisheries Officer as an organiser
and the Chief and District Commissioner who were also involved in the process. The
ICANU Member of Parliament from the neighbouring constituency appears to be
important, but this relates to his pursuit of his own cause — the illegal acquisition of
the land proposed for the development project.
The main source of information was the Senior fisheries Officer, principally for the
District Development Officer, because of their roles in the development project.
However the Minister for Lands is also an important informed actor which is
surprising since the decision over the land allocation should be taken by the County
Council and usually only ratified by senior members of the Lands Department. The
Minister of Lands' importance is derived from his role in the informal
communications with the MP over the illegal allocation. This informal process
obviously occurred without the principle project organisers knowing. The results of
actors with overall importance in the network reflect the group involved in the
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development project.
The second phase relates to the discovery that the land had been 'grabbed' from the
project, and therefore the local fishing community as well. The Senior Fisheries
Officer and the District Commissioner remain the most important source of action in
relation to the project. The MP and the Minister for Lands are also important sources
of action, but this relates to their informal activities and the onward sale of the land.
The Senior Fisheries Officer retains his key role as a source of information, but the
local fishers are also important as they become involved in the process. In terms of
overall influence on the situation, the District Commissioner joins the core group of
Table 8.9 The principal actors according to their roles in the land issue.
Phase Principal
organisers
Principal
sources of
info.
Pursuing a
cause
Being
informed
Overall
influence
outdegree indegree outdegree indegree eigenvector
1 SFO
DC
Chief
SFO
DDO
MPmatuga DDO
MinLand
SFO
DC
DDO
2 SFO
MinLand
DC
SFO
Fishers
MinLand
MPmatuga Fishers SFO
MinLand
DC
MPmatuga
3 DC
SFO
DisCoopOf
SFO DisCoopOf
DDO
DC
DC
SFO
DisCoopOf
Fishers
Senior Fisheries Officer, Minister for Lands and the MP as prominent. The District
Commissioner's involvement was inevitable following the Fisheries Department and
local fishers raising the profile of the issue as they sought to regain ownership of the
land. The District Commissioner's solution to subdivide the land was politically
astute in view of KANU's dominance in government affairs. Although the fishers
communicated with local Councillors and KANU representatives, their absence as
prominent actors is conspicuous.
The final phase shows that the neighbouring MP and Minister for Lands are no
longer important actors. This was because the outcome of the illegal allocation had
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been satisfactory (to them) and the land had been sold on and 'legally', subdivided
and registered. However, from the point of view of the parcel of land for the
development project, the question of ownership remained unresolved.
The District Commissioner's position was again important, both as a key organiser
and with overall influence on the final outcome. The Senior Fisheries Officer
remained important since the Fisheries Department were claiming the land. The
District Co-operative Officer was also important because the Diani Fishermen Co-
operative Society were also claiming the land. All of these actors were influential in
the outcome with the addition of the local fishers who had been able to communicate
their concerns and wishes directly to the District Commissioner. On the strength of
the District Commissioner's suggestions the local fishers had secured the letter of
allocation, although not in their name.
The process that enabled the fishers to acquire the letter of allocation involved an
actor that has not been included in the networks, a researcher working in the area.
The local fishers may not have been so successful without the logistic and moral
support of this actor. However, excluding the external researcher does not affect the
underlying network and centrality scores. But the implications are discussed in the
conclusion.
8.5.2 Summary of general trends and underlying patterns across all the issues
The amount of activity associated with each issue tended to increase over its
development. The graphs (Figures 8.1, 8.2, 8.3) illustrate this well.
The network centralization scores for each measure showed that importance was
generally concentrated in a few actors. The eigenvector network centralization
scores suggested that some form of hierarchy guided the processes of communication
(Tichy, 1980).
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8.5.2.1 Level of institution and importance in the network
Although the Kruskal-Wallis tests did not reveal much significance in the
relationship between the level of an institution and its importance in the network (as
reflected by the actors, cf. part 8.2.2.1), there were some trends. The level at which
any initiative was conceived tended to determine the level of important actors and
respective level of institution in the first two phases. Whereas the final, usually more
involved phase, tended to include a wider range of levels.
In the marine reserve issue district level actors dominated the first two phases, but in
the third phase the local, district and provincial level actors were included. The seine
net issue was conceived at the local level, and this is reflected in the first two phases.
The third phase however includes district level actors as well. The land issue is a
little more complicated because the initial conception was the IFAD development
project involving district level actors. However, the land issue arose from the
informal relations of more senior actors, an MP and a Minister. However, district
level actors dominate the processes in all the phases.
8.5.2.2 Type of institution and importance in the network
The Mann-Whitney U-test showed that there was no significant relationship between
the type (formal, informal) of institution and its importance in the network (Table
8.6). However, the results summarising the most important actors for each phase of
each issue presented in Tables 8.7, 8.8 and 8.9 show that formal institutions dominate
in almost every case. This was reflected by the importance of State organisations,
particularly the Administration and the departments concerned with each particular
issue (KWS, Fisheries Department). Formal institutions also included the political
processes that involved MPs, Councillors and party representatives. Although the
relationship between sub-type and importance was not statistically significant,
administrative institutions tended to be the most influential in the final outcome of
each issue.
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8.5.2.3 Actor co-membership in the issues
The affiliation network analysis (Figure 8.4) identified a group of nine actors
involved in all three issues. This suggests certain actors tend to be included in
situations that involve resource access or control problems for the fishing
community. These actors include the local fishers and the local and district level
representatives of the Fisheries Department. This would be expected because of the
role of formal and informal marine resource related institutions. However the others
are three administrative actors, the Provincial Commissioner, District Commissioner
and Chief, and three political actors, the local MP, local councillors and KANU
representatives. The administrative actors and Fisheries Department and MP are
consistently among the most influential actors in this study. The District
Commissioner consistently stands out as the most influential actor in all the phases.
Although the Councillors and KANU representatives do not consistently appear to be
prominent in the networks, their presence in all the issues suggests an importance of
some kind. This indicates that these actors would be important in other issues of this
kind, but their membership is not obligatory.
8.6 Conclusion
The retrospective analysis, above, of three situations (issues) in which access to or
control over community resources was threatened, sought to identify how the final
outcomes were achieved. The outcomes were known to favour the local fishing
community, but in view of their poor socio-economic situation, low status and apathy
of certain government departments it was not evident how this was achieved. The
analysis sought to identify the important people or organisations and the underlying
institutions involved in the process of solving the issues. The three issues included
the attempted implementation of a marine protected area, a conflict between local
fishermen and migrant fishermen over fishing methods, and the threat to some land
used by the community for fishing related activities.
The analysis was based on a method that could identify the importance of actors
involved in each of the situations based on their communication relations. The
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importance of an actor was essentially reflected in their ability to influence the
outcome of a decision or decision process. Thus communication ties between actors
were identified and communication networks for each issue were generated. An
actor's importance was understood to derive from their position in the
communication network, their relationships with other actors and their inherent
characteristics.
The actors in each network, and their relative importance, were considered to
represent the underlying level of institution guiding people's actions. This inference
was based on Kanbur's (1992) observation that institutions reproduce and shape
relations of power and influence in society.
Figure 8.5 gives a generalised impression of the roles and importance of the different
actors and represented level of institution based on the results. The results showed
that the initial phases of each issue revolved around the actors that initiated the
situation and a status quo was maintained. The important actors reflected the nature
of the issue and tended to include the Fisheries Department or Kenya Wildlife
Service and local authorities such as the Chief. The institutions in the early phases,
represented by the actors, were dominated by these formal State organisations.
However, the final phases of each issue reflected a break in the status quo and the
involvement of different actors and the level of institution involved was higher. For
example the beach seine issue revolved around institutions at the local level for many
decades, but shifted to institutions represented at the district and national level at the
height of the conflict prior to its resolution.
Throughout each issue Administration members were consistently among the more
important actors in the networks, the District Commissioner was usually the most
influential actor. Initially this is surprising because each issue could theoretically
have been contained and resolved by resource management organisations, such as the
Fisheries Department or the Kenya Wildlife Service. But the analysis showed that
the Administration became important in the processes because of the lack of action
on the part of resource management organisations. This also reflected the dominance
of formal State institutional processes in determining the outcome of the issues.
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The analysis also showed that the shift to institutions represented at a higher level and
the involvement of senior members of the Administration invariably involved actors
from political organisations. However, the results did not suggest that an issue
needed to be politicised in order for the status quo to change, the political actors were
seldom very important in the issues. Their roles however were related to the course of
action pursued by the local fishermen.
The fishermen initially pursued a 'standard' course of action (guided by natural
resource related institutions) when seeking to address their concerns, but were
frustrated by the lack of action using these channels (phases 1 and 2). They then
sought other ways of dealing with their concerns and the local political
representatives, either party members or local Councillors, were obvious contacts with
inherent influence in the area. The relationship between political actors and civil
servants, particularly in the Administration, meant that the fishermen's concerns were
likely to be voiced at more senior levels. However, the politicians were not the only
actors involved for this reason. The fishermen, for similar reasons, also drew
researchers or expatriate residents living or working in the area into the process.
These people tended to have privileged access to senior government officials and had
the resources (vehicle) to provide access to government officials. These relations
reflected the importance of opportunistic behaviour on the outcome of the issues.
The role of traditional institutions was not important in the outcome of the issues.
The elders, for example, did not feature as important. The local fishermen were also
relatively low powered despite being the main stakeholders and being involved in a
high number of relations with other actors. One of the reasons for this was because of
their lack of inherent power within the wider community. Thus, their high number of
communications reflected their reliance on other actors to raise the profile of their
concerns, and the weakness of traditional institutions. Significantly, the actors they
relied upon were seldom within resource management organisations.
With respect to natural resource management and the processes by which people gain
access to and control over natural resources in the study area, the results in this
chapter have identified some key points. Different organisations had different roles.
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The Government Administration had the most power in the area and was the main
authority deciding the outcome of each issue. The natural resource management
organisations, which included the Fisheries Department and the Kenya Wildlife
Service, merely legitimised the actions taken by the Administration. The principal
agitators were local politicians on behalf of the local fishermen. Few of the formative
processes involved formal rules relating to natural resources. In fact natural resource
related organisations and the associated institutions served to maintain a status quo
and constrain the process of conflict resolution.
The final chapter relates the historical and current socio-environmental context of the
people of Biga, described in the earlier chapters, to these findings. The implications
of these results with respect to coastal resource management in areas that include
small-scale fisheries of this type are also discussed.
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9 GENERAL DISCUSSION
9.1 Scope of the study
The livelihoods of people dependent on locally available natural resources have been
characterised as complex, diverse and risk-prone (Chambers, 1997). This risk-
proneness is primarily due to a reliance on the natural environment (Dasgupta, 1982;
Chambers, 1997). The complexity and diversity of livelihoods are strategies aimed to
reduce risks (Tvedten and Hersoug, 1992; Chambers, 1997). Small-scale fisheries are
an extreme example of this, where livelihoods are dependent on a diverse range of
activities that exploit both marine and terrestrial resources. This diversity enables
people to cope with seasonal variations in climate and adverse events by transferring
effort from one environment to the other. Factors that reduce the portfolio of
activities (or options) carried out by small-scale fishers and their families are likely to
increase their risks. The effect of which is to reduce household food security and
increase pressure on the local environment. Since small-scale fisheries support more
than 140 million people world wide, and these are often livelihoods of last resort for
some of the world's poorest people (Russ, 1991), the situation of reduced options must
be widespread.
There are a number of reasons why people's livelihood options are constrained, but
the principal causes relate to either an absolute lack of resources or the loss of
people's command over resources (Sen, 1981). The loss of command over resources
in areas where small-scale fisheries are prevalent, namely the developing world, has
been linked to the superimposition of modern ideology over other approaches to
human-environment relations (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Robertson and Speier, 1998).
Where in the past people had many solutions to cope with many different problems
(Ostrom, 1990; Leach et al., 1997), these have been undermined by the global market
system and foreign structures of authority (Berry, 1989; Bryant and Bailey, 1997;
Chambers, 1997; Boukhari, 1999).
This problem is widely recognised in the fields of third world development and
natural resource management, particularly in the context of small-scale common
property regimes (O'Riordan, 1994; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Chambers, 1997;
203
Jentoft et al., 1998; Johannes, 1998). The response to which has been to shift towards
greater involvement of local people in solving environmental and socio-economic
problems. It has also highlighted the important role of institutions in mitigating
human-environment interactions, particularly those at local scale levels. The
understanding is that institutions play a central role in ensuring people have command
over resources, and threats to these institutions tend to threaten people's livelihoods.
However, there are indications that overemphasising the importance of institutions
has meant that other, less structured, processes have been neglected.
This study set out to investigate the role of institutions in determining local people's
behaviour when tackling resource access and control problems. Many of the
arguments set out in chapter 2 relate to factors that cause changes in the situations of
local people. These include the influence of cultural attitudes towards human-
environment relations and the overlaying of powerful regimes on local structures of
authority.
Social and environmental changes were understood to influence the rules that guide
(institutions) people's access to resources. Thus, in order to interpret people's actions
in relation to resource access and control problems, it was necessary to examine the
environmental and social context of a community. This examination involved a
reconstruction of the community's historical relations with other groups in their area
to explain their current predicament (chapters 3-6). Socio-economic analysis of
people's livelihoods was carried out to determine the current situation of different
groups within the studied community (chapter 7). People's actions in response to
resource access and control problems were analysed using a network approach
(chapter 8).
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9.2 Explaining the community's current predicament
The community of Biga was found to be made up of different ethnic groups, 90%
Digo, 7% upcountry migrant farmers and 3% migrant Wapemba fishers. Analysis of
livelihoods found that most households were dependent on fishing, but the methods
and capital equipment differed, further differentiating the community into subgroups
(Table 7.1). All groups depended on a range of activities to provide food and income
but the economic role of fish was dominant in the community. Even within fishing
households, however, the value of production from land based activities was
important for supplementing food and income (Table 7.14).
The diversity and complexity of the local environment had a direct influence on
livelihoods. Seasonality influenced the production systems both on land and in the
sea. Prior to and during the long rains in April and May was the busiest time on land
and this coincided with poor fishing conditions and low catches (Figure 7.3). Thus,
households were most food insecure from March — July while the catches were low
and crops had yet to be harvested. Fishing conditions were also harder at this time
due to strong winds and rain. Variations in marine and terrestrial habitats were also
shown to determine the resources available for local people, with seagrass beds being
the dominant habitat in the local fishery.
Changes in the local environments were shown to have led to a decrease in household
productivity over the last five decades. Traditional systems of cultivation had been
lost due to the changes in land tenure and land market (cf. Figure 3.7; chapter 4; part
5.3.1), and this was attributed to colonialism, international development approaches
and cultural changes. The small isolated household plots now cultivated were more
susceptible to damage from wild animals than the communal plots previously
cultivated. Households depend more on income earning activities, such as fishing or
planting fruit trees, to buy food, and this reduced the time, energy or space available
for food cultivation. In addition, resources had become scarce due to increasingly
reduced access to land. This again was attributed to the role of colonialism and
modern concepts of individual property rights and tenure that had led to the
development of tourism and private residences.
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Despite the proximity of the tourist development, few households were able to find
alternative sources of livelihood. This was attributed to the dominance of other tribal
groups in tourism due to the historical process of development on the coast and the
role of the state, which was predominantly controlled by people from upcountry. All
the factors that limited livelihood options on land were shown to have led to increased
effort in the sea. Similarly, the imposition of different approaches to the environment
and the overlaying of a more powerful system of authority had undermined the role of
traditional institutions. Factors such as the global market economy, cultural change
and politics had all had an influence on the way people determined resource access
and control. This ultimately has led to overfishing, which was shown by the fall in
catch per unit effort and the ecological phase shift to urchin dominated communities
in the lagoon.
Thus, the overall socio-economic situation of the community was revealed as poor.
This was illustrated by the level of disposable income available to households when
compared to the amount of income needed to maintain the household at a productive
level (Figure 7.3). Most households were very close to the maintenance threshold.
This meant that they could maintain their current level of production. However, with
continued pressure on the fishery and the lack of alternative sources of income, the
future productivity of households was considered insecure.
The high dependence on fishing and the increasing scarcity of the resource meant that
local people were having to compete with many different groups for increasingly
scarce resources. In some instances this led to conflict, such as with the Wapemba
fishers. However, a major problem for the local community was their relative
weakness compared to some of the other groups (Table 6.2, 6.3; Figure 6.2).
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9.3 Problem solving actions in context
The social network analysis of the three issues, in which access to or control over
community resources was threatened, sought to identify how the outcomes were
achieved. The outcomes were known to favour the local fishing community, but in
view of their poor socio-economic situation, low status and apathy of certain
government departments it was not evident how this was achieved.
The social network analysis determined the importance of each actor in influencing
the outcome of the issues. This was related to their roles and positions in the network
structure. It also showed that the people who were 'suffering' from the resource
access or control problems had to pursue many different paths to find a solution, and
that this appeared to be due to problems associated with relying on institutions.
However, the social network analysis could not be used to explain why each actor was
involved in the networks or how power was acquired (see part 5.2.1).
Clearly institutional dynamics and local political manoeuvring played an important
role in determining people's resource access and control. The actors involved in each
issue were shown to have inherent characteristics stemming from the relationship
between politics and the administrative state system. These attributes had an effect on
their roles and influence in the networks. In addition, the institutional analysis in
chapter 5 introduced the notion that organisations involved in such issues derived
power in different ways, and this influenced their respective roles and effectiveness.
The general trend for the first two phases of each issue was that the fishers pursued
processes directly linked to the issue at hand. This meant that those organisations
with a statutory mandate to resolve the issue were involved, and were usually
represented at the local or district level. Hence the importance of Kenya Wildlife
Service and the Fisheries Department. The effect of depending on the institutions
associated with these organisations was that none of the issues were resolved. This
problem relates to the relative power of the organisations, based on their statutory
authority, resources or political constituency and their role as guardians of the status
quo (see Lamb, 1998). This was demonstrated by the dominance of formal
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institutions represented at low levels in the early phases. Figure 8.5 illustrates this,
showing the status quo loop preventing problem resolution.
However, the final phases of each issue reflected a break in the status quo through the
involvement of different actors. The social network analysis revealed that in the final
phase of each issue the important actors were not the same as in the earlier phases.
By involving actors that did not have statutory authority to resolve the issues, the
fishers acknowledged that the time-tried processes of established institutions were of
no avail (see Figure 8.5). The social network analysis of the final phases of each issue
also showed that higher levels of representation were needed to resolve the issues.
Higher levels of the administration became important in the processes because of the
lack of action on the part of the organisations with statutory authority to resolve the
issues. The weakness of the Fisheries Department was because it lacked certain
elements of power, such as financial and human resources. Similarly, the loss of
constituency support for the Kenya Wildlife Service reduced their influence. The
network analysis also showed that the involvement of political actors or actors with
privileged access to higher authorities were key for the fishers to break the status quo.
The power of the administration and importance of the political actors was generally
derived from constituency support rather than statutory authority or legal mandates
with respect to the issues. The exception occurred when the threats of violence
between the Wapemba and the local Digo fishers gave the administration statutory
reason to become involved. However, the results did not suggest that an issue needed
to be politicised in order for the status quo to change, the political actors were seldom
very important in the networks. Their roles however were related to the course of
action pursued by the local fishermen and the alternative links they created.
The role of traditional institutions was not important in the outcome of the issues.
The elders, for example, did not feature as important. The local fishermen were also
relatively low powered despite being the main stakeholders and being involved in a
high number of relations with other actors. One of the reasons for this was because of
their lack of inherent power within the wider community. Thus, their high number of
communications reflected their reliance on other actors to raise the profile of their
concerns. It also illustrated the weakness of traditional institutions to provide
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solutions to their problems. However, their ability to organise themselves in order to
present a coherent argument to so many different actors in the networks must be
considered an element of power.
9.4 Alternative processes influencing local action
It was evident from the social network analysis that institutions can stifle the process
of problem resolution. If there is a tendency for organisations to use institutions to
maintain a status quo and prevent problem solving, then the environmental
entitlements analysis of, for example access to the fishery (see section 5.4), would
look different (Figure 9.1). The status quo loop, made up of locally represented
institutions, can be seen to prevent or reduce the feedback between people's resource
claims and practices and the processes that supposedly determine them (see Figure
9.1). In time, this lack of feedback would mean that the institutions would cease to be
relevant to the situation of the people depending on the local resources.
The fact that people dependent on local resources are able to pursue different courses
of action, as shown in the social network analysis, suggests that institutions are not
solely responsible for determining people's resource claims and practices. When
faced with a status quo situation, local fishers were able to use alternative processes to
force a decision (see Figure 8.5). This means that feedback between institutions and
people's actual practices can occur through these alternative processes, such as
through different people or organisations (see Figure 9.2). It may be through these
processes that institutions can adapt or change to cater for people's needs.
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Importantly for people dependent on local resources, it demonstrates that they can
find solutions to seemingly intractable problems.
9.5 Adequacy of research methods
The final section makes some generalisations based on the results of this study. It is
recognised, however, that there are limits to what can be extrapolated from a single
case study based on local and specific conditions. The perception in this study, that a
detailed understanding of people's past and present social and environmental
situations was needed to interpret their behaviour, constrained the possibility of
conducting parallel case studies. Nevertheless, the approach could be applied in any
setting and time saved if prior knowledge of people's past and current status existed.
In chapter 2 it was shown that scientific theory cannot be separated from its cultural
roots. The experience, economic policies and political interests of governments and
groups dominated by Western values has perpetuated received wisdom about human-
environment relations through much of the world. Examples of inappropriate
resource management approaches and loss of traditional systems of management
illustrate the weaknesses of this situation. The approach taken in this study was to
integrate social and natural sciences in an attempt to understand and explain people's
social and natural situation and people's behaviour. The use of participatory research
methods explicitly aimed to avoid cultural prejudice on the part of the researcher.
Such approaches are increasingly used in fields such as development and conservation
and have been generalised to both the developed and the developing world.
The validity of the social network approach relates to how closely the networks
reflected reality. The networks were models of people's communication relations in
relation to specific issues. The question of accuracy and validity of data in reflecting
the "true" structure of the network is discussed by Wasserman and Faust (1994: 56-
59). Research on informant accuracy suggests that people are not very good at
reporting on each individual interaction in particular situations, but the relatively
prolonged and stable patterns of interactions are well reported. The concern in this
study were the long term patterns of the network, which were well reported and
validated by cross checking with the different sources of information. In situations
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where an individual was interviewed or identified as a representative of an
organisation, care was taken to ensure that the individual was salient to the issue.
The use of semi-structured interviews and unstructured techniques to construct the
social networks ensured that people's responses could be validated through cross
checking. Similarly for the household surveys, the semi-structured interviews
provided more coherent detail needed for a wide understanding of people's situations
than rigid questionnaire surveys could have.
A different problem relating to the validity of the social network analysis was the
inclusion of actor attributes to weight the value of ties between actors. This arose
because the initial analysis of the networks, without any weighting, did not reflect the
outcome of the issues. This was easily explained by the fact that the socio-political
environment in Kenya is strongly influenced by established hierarchies. These
hierarchies were identified as the administrative structure of government and the
political hierarchy. Each hierarchy was considered separately, but again the results
failed to reflect the outcome of the issues. Finally, the combination of the two
hierarchies was used, as set out and justified in part 8.2.2.1. However, without the
comprehensive understanding of the local socio-political context developed in the
preceding chapters, it would have been difficult to identify which attributes influenced
the accumulation of power across the range of actors in the networks.
The approach taken in this study, to understand the behaviour of local people and the
relationships between groups and individuals, can be generalised to any setting. This
makes it an appropriate method for application by resource managers or developers.
In addition, the different methods also stand up independently. For example,
participatory approaches to conducting socio-economic assessments are widespread.
Social network analysis can be used independently to identify potential problems and
solutions in resource management or development strategies. The range of people,
groups and organisations important to the management or development process, not
just at the community level, can be identified according to their roles and importance.
This would also help to determine where funding effort and other forms of support
should go.
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9.6 Conclusion
The identification of a 'status quo loop' and the need for local actors to find alternative
processes to solve resource access and control problems, supports the hypothesis
presented in chapter 1. The institutions that were in place did not help solve the three
resource access and control problems in the studied community. It was found that in
all cases institutions contributed to the problems of local people.
A principal weakness in depending on institutions to solve people's problems was that
the rules that guided people's behaviour did not keep pace with changes on the
ground. This was attributed to the lack of feedback between people's activities and
guiding institutions, due to the role of government organisations (part 5.2.1), their
bureaucratic nature, prejudicial tendency from being in a position of power (part
2.4.2) and the low level representation at the local level. This problem also had
implications for people's livelihoods since institutions should theoretically reduce
risk. The results suggested that without feedback between people's everyday practices
and the guiding institutions, livelihood complexity and diversity was reduced because
people's ability to adapt was constrained (see Figure 9.1).
It is questionable, therefore, to assume that all actions are legitimised or authorised by
institutions, as suggested by the literature relating to human-environment relations
(Gibbs and Bromely, 1989; Watson, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Thomas-Slayter, 1994;
Mearns, 1995; Leach et al, 1997; Pido et al, 1997; Pinkerton, 1997; Forsyth et al,
1998; Jentoft et al, 1998). The communication networks showed that it was possible
to express multiple interests where no institutional arrangements existed, and that
conflict resolution was possible through the communication networks (see Ortegon,
1998 for similar findings). Clearly, Orstom's (1990) observation that people have
many solutions to cope with many different problems runs true, but it extends beyond
relying on multiple levels and types of institution.
Similarly, institutions cannot be considered to have the monopoly over guiding
people's behaviour in pursuit of collective goals. Both the exclusion problem and the
subtractability problem (Berkes and Folke, 1997) were tackled in the communication
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networks in the study. This suggests that institutions may not always cater for the
different goals individuals have in common property resource situations.
9.6.1 Implications for resource management
The findings in this study illustrate the applicability of integrating both social science
and natural science methodologies when considering human-environment
interactions. The need to understand people's socio-economic predicament prior to
developing resource management strategies is now widely accepted, underlining the
need to include a wide range of methods when tackling problems relating to the use of
natural resources. The use of participatory research methods can help resource
managers appreciate cultural biases and to challenge received wisdom in relation to
how people interact with other people and their natural environment.
The social network analysis highlighted the importance of understanding people's
relationships surrounding resource allocation and use. Resource managers could
make use of such an approach because key people, groups or organisations can be
identified and their roles understood. In addition, the notion that distinct phases can
be identified in the evolution of resource management type problems is of use.
Different actors at different levels are important at different phases of resource related
problems. Clearly, resource managers need to understand this and to ensure that
management strategies can adapt to such changes.
The analysis of the historical context of the local people's socio-economic situation
illustrated the role of external influences on local people and their behaviour.
Regulations and legislation that seek to influence how resources are allocated and
used must reflect the spectrum of processes that exist. International trade treaties, for
example, can conflict with national environmental policies, and national policies can
conflict with traditional institutions. Similarly, the regulatory ladder must also reflect
the processes by which natural resource governance take place, from the identification
of problems, the balancing of needs and capacities, to the mode of governance
(McGlade, 2000).
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This study also suggests that efforts to create a socio-political environment in which
solutions to problems can be found through a variety of processes, rather than
depending on institutions to solve problems, may improve resource management.
This is principally because many problems arise before there are rules to deal with
them. Management on the other hand often tries to fit problems into predetermined
rules. Not only must the rules be responsive to the problems — adaptive management,
but the socio-political environment must also facilitate problem solving.
This tackles at least two of the problem areas in resource management: that rules
don't respond to change and the socio-political environment actually prevents
problem solving (such as the blocking effect of the status quo loop). Understanding
the social relations associated with specific resource access or control issues could
well help to facilitate the problem solving process.
In the context of more recent approaches to resource management, the benefits of
involving local people may stem as much from facilitating problem solving, than from
the bag of institutions they bring with them. Resource management strategies in
common property situations should aim to manage for complexity and diversity. This
could be achieved by focusing on those institutions that promote or permit complex,
diverse and locally fitting behaviour (see Chambers, 1997 on managing for
complexity and diversity).
216
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and Turner, B. (1988). The Penguin Dictionary of
Sociolgy, 2"d edn. London: Penguin Books.
Adams, J. (1995). Risk. London: University College London Press.
Ahluwalia, M. (1997). Representing communities. The case of a community-based
watershed management project in Rajasthan, India. In: Community-based Sustainable
Development: Consensus or Conflict? Edited by Leach et al. IDS Bulletin 28(4), 15-
34.
Alexander, L. (1998). Somali Current Large marine Ecosystem and related issues.
In Large Marine Ecosystems of the Indian Ocean: Assessment, Sustainability, and
Management. Edited by K. sherman, E. Okemwa and M. Ntiba. Oxford: Blackwell
Press.
Allen, J de Vere. (1993). Swahili origins: Swahili culture & the Shungwaya
phenomenon. London: James Curry Ltd.
Argyrous, G. (1997). Statistics for Social Research. London: Macmillan Press.
Aunger, R. (1998). Group solidarity in tropical Africa. Paper presented at the
INSNA Sunbelt XVIII and 5 th European International Conference on Social Networks,
Sitges, Spain. May 1998.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Baird, D., McGlade, J. and Ulanowicz, R. (1991). The comparative ecology of six
marine ecosystems. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lon. B (333), 15-29.
Baker, R. (1984). Protecting the environment against the poor: the historical roots of
the soil erosion orthodoxy in the third world. The Ecologist. 14, 53-60.
Bakun, A., Roy, C. and Lluch-Cota, S. (1998). Coastal upwelling and other
processes regulating ecosystem productivity and fish production in the Western Indian
Ocean. In Large Marine Ecosystems of the Indian Ocean: Assessment, Sustainability,
and Management. Edited by K. sherman, E. Okemwa and M. Ntiba. Oxford:
Blackwell Press.
Baland, J, and Platteau, J. (1996). Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: is
there a Role for Rural Communities? Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bavinck, M. (1996). Fisher regulations along the Coromandel coast: a case of
collective control of common pool resources. Marine Policy. 20 (6), 475-482.
Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society. London: Sage
217
Berkes, F. (1985). Fishermen and 'The Tragedy of the Commons'. Environmental
Conservation. 12 (3), 199-206.
Berkes, F. (1989). Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based
Sustainable Development. London: Belhaven Press.
Berkes, F. (1995). Community-based Management and Co-Management as Tools for
Empowerment. In Empowerment: towards Sustainable Development. Edited by N.
Singh and V. Titi. London: Zed books.
Berkes, F., Feeny, B., McCay, B. and Acheson, J. (1989). The benefits of the
commons. Nature. 340, 91-93.
Berkes, F. and Folke, C. (1997). Linking social and ecological systems for
resilience and sustainability. In Linking Social and Ecological Systems; Management
Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building Resilience. Edited by Berkes, F and
Folke C. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Berry, S. (1989). Access, Control and Resource Use in African Agriculture. Africa,
59 (1), 1-5.
Berry, S. (1992). Hegemony on a shoestring: indirect rule and access to agricultural
land. Africa, 62 (3), 327-355.
Bernard, H. (1995). Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and
Quantitative Approaches, 2' d edn. London: Sage publications.
Borgatti, S., Everett, M. and Freeman, L. (1998). UCINET V Network Analysis
Software. Analytic Technologies.
Boserup, E. (1981). Population and Technology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boukhari, S. (1999). Indigenous Peoples Take on Big Business. The UNESCO
Courier. April. Paris: UNESCO.
Brantley, C. (1981). The Giriama and Colonial Resistance in Kenya, 1800— 1920.
California: University of California Press.
Brass, D. (1984). Being in the right place: a structural analysis of individual
influence in an organisation. Administrative Science Quarterly. 29, 518-539.
Britell, J. (1997a). Partnerships, Roundtables and Quincy-type groups are bad ideas
that cannot resolve environmental conflicts. Essay 10. Port Orford, USA.
Britell, J. (1997b). Straight talk about Gridlock, Consensus, "Intrusive"
Government, and "win-win" or "The tough guys always get the ground". Essay 11,
Part 1. IGC member conference, 15 September, 1997.
Bromley, D. (1991). Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy.
Oxford: Blackwell.
218
Bryant, R. and Bailey, S. (1997). Third World Political Ecology. Great Britain:
Routledge.
Burbridge, P. (1995). Planning Processes for Integrated Coastal Zone Management.
Proceedings of the ICES annual science meeting. St Johns, Newfoundland.
Burkardt, N., Lamb, B. and Taylor, J. (1997). Power distribution in structured
regulatory negotiations: does balance matter? Journal of Public Administration and
Theory. 31(2), 247-276.
Cappo, M., Alongi, D., Williams, D. and Duke, N. (1998). A Review and
Synthesis of Australian Fisheries Habitat Research. Volume 2. Issue 1: Natural
Dynamics in Fisheries Habitats and Environmental Variability. Australian Institute of
Marine Science.
Chambers, R. (1992). Rural Appraisal: Rapid, Relaxed and Participatory. IDS
Discussion Paper. 311. University of Sussex: IDS Publications.
Chambers, R. (1994). All Power Deceives. IDS Bulletin. 25. University of Sussex:
IDS Publications.
Chambers, R. (1995). Paradigm shifts and the practice of participatory research and
development. In Power and Participatory Development: Theory and Practice.
Edited by N. Nelson and S. Wright. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
Chambers, R. (1997). Whose reality counts? Putting the first last. London:
Intermediate Technology Publications.
Checkland, P. (1989). Soft Systems Methodology. Human Systems Management,
8, 273-289.
Chrisite, P. (1997). Trends in development of coastal area management in tropical
countries: from central to community orientation. Coastal Management. 25 (2), 155-
181.
Cooper, F. (1980). From Squatters to Slaves: Plantation Labour and Agriculture in
Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya 1890 - 1925. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Cooper, F. (1986). On the African Waterfront. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Coughanowr, C., Ngoile, M. and Linden, 0. (1995). Coastal Zone Management in
Eastern Africa Including the Island States: A review of issues and initiatives. Ambio,
24, (7-8), 448-457.
Crowley, E. and Appendinin, K. (1999). Rural poverty: population dynamics, local
institutions and access to resources. Sustainable Development Dimensions. Rome:
FAO
219
Crutchfield, J. (1958). Report to the Goverment of Kenya on the Sea Fisheries of
Kenya. Expanded Technical Assistance Program Report No. 990. Rome: FAO.
Daily Nation. (1997). Hotels 'polluting sea'. February 14, 1997.
Dasgupta, P. (1982). The Control of Resources. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
DCO. (1993). Kwale District Development Plan 1994-1996. Office of the Vice-
President and Ministry of Planning and National Development. Kwale: District
Commissioner's Office.
de Rivero, 0. (1999). Debunking the myths of 'development'. UNESCO Courier,
July/August. Paris:UNESCO.
de Soto, H. (1989). The Other Path. The invisible revolution in the third world.
New York: Harper & Row.
Doulman, D. (1993). Community-based fishery management. Towards the
restoration of traditional practices in the South Pacific. Marine Policy. March.
Durning, A. (1990). Ending Poverty. In State of the World 1990. Edited by L.
Brown. London: Unwin Hyman.
Eakin, C., McManus, J., Spalding, M. and Jameson, S. (1996). Coral reef status
around the world: where are we and where do we go from here? International Coral
Reef Initiative.
East African Standard. (1996). 2,000 Tanzanians settled in Kenya coast illegally.
August 6, 1996.
East African Standard. (1996). Beach access roads allocation revoked.
East African Standard. (1997). Rioting youths burn seven cars. March 1st 1997.
ECC. (1992). Mangroves of Africa and Madagascar. Luxembourg: European
Communities - Commission.
Ecologist, The. (1993). Whose Common future? Reclaiming the Commons.
London: Earthscan.
Economist, The. (1998). The Sea. May 23"11998.
Ehrlich, P. (1968). The Population Bomb. London: Ballentine.
Ehrlich, P. and Ehrlich, A. (1990). The Population Explosion. London:
Hutchinson.
EIU. (1998). Kenya country profile 1997-1998. London: Economist Intelligence
Unit.
220
Ensminger, J. (1996). Making a market: the institutional transformation of an
African Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Environmental Entitlements Research Team. (1997). Methods for Environmental
Entitlements Analysis. IDS Bulletin. 28 (4).
Everett, M. Unpublished social network analysis lecture notes. School of
Computing and Applied Mathematics. London: University of Greenwhich.
Eyben, R. and Ladbury S. (1995). Popular participation in aid assisted projects:
why more in theory than practice? In Power and Participatory Development: Theory
and Practice. Edited by N. Nelson and S. Wright. London: Intermediate Technology
Publications.
FAO. (1993). Marine Fisheries and the Law of the Sea: A Decade of Change.
Fisheries Circular 853. Rome: FAO.
FAO. (1995a). Safeguarding future fish supplies: key policy issues and measures.
International conference on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food
Security. Kyoto, Japan. 4-9 December 1995. FAO/Government of Japan.
FAO. (1995b). The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Rome: FAO.
FAO. (2000). Summary work programme and budget. Major Programme 2.3
Fisheries. Rome: FAO.
Faust, K. (1997). Centrality in affiliation networks. Social Networks. 19, 157-191.
Forsyth, T., Leach, M. and Scoones, I. (1998). Poverty and Environment: Priorities
for Research and Policy. An overview study prepared for UNDP and EU. Sussex:
Institute for Development Studies.
Freeman, L. (1979). Centrality in social networks: conceptual clarification. Social
Networks. 1, 215-239.
Galbraith, K. (1999). In the new century, the unfinished business of the old. LSE
Magazine. 11(2), 4-5.
Gaudian, G., Koyo, A. and Wells, S. (1995). Marine Region 12: East Africa. In A
global representative system of marine protected areas. Vol III. Edited by G.
Kelleher, C. Bleakely and S. Wells. The World Bank: Washington. Great Barrier
Marine Park Authority. The World Conservation Union (IUCN).
George, S. (1992). The Debt Boomerang. London: Pluto.
Gerlach, L. (1961). Economy and Protein Malnutrition among the Digo.
Proceedings of the Minnesota Academy of Science, 29, 3-13.
Gerlach, L. (1963). Traders on Bicycle: A Study of Entrepreneurship and Culture
Change among the Digo and Duruma of Kenya. Sociologus. 13, 32-49.
221
Gerlach, L. (1964). Socio-cultural Factors Affecting the Diet of the Northeast
Coastal Bantu. Journal of the American Dietetic Association. 45, 420-424.
Gerlach, L. (1965). Nutrition in its Sociocultural Matrix: Food Getting and Using
along the East African Coast. In Ecology and Economic Development in Tropical
Africa. Edited by D. Brokensha. Berkeley: Institute of International studies.
Ghai, Y. (1999). In traditional societies, the jury is out on legal reform. The
UNESCO Courier. November. UNESCO: Paris.
Ghai, D. and Vivian, J. (1992). Grassoots Environmental Action: People's
Participation in Sustainable Development. London: Routledge.
Gibbs, C. and Bromely, D. (1989). Institutional Arrangements for Management of
Rural Resources: Common-Property Regimes. In Common Property Resources:
Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development. Edited by F. Berkes.
London: Belhaven Press.
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of
Structuration. Oxford: Polity Press.
Giddens, A. (1999). Runaway World. Reith Lecture Series.
Glaesel, H. (1997). Fisher, Parks and Power: The Socio-environmental Dimensions
of Marine resource Decline and Protection on the Kenya Coast. PhD Thesis.
Universoty of Wisconsin-Madison.
Goerlich, J. (1998). Old dilemmas, new games: Colonial transformations of
violence in Melanesia. Paper presented at the INSNA Sunbelt XVIII and 5" European
International Conference on Social Networks, Sitges, Spain. May 1998.
GOK. (1991a). Farm Management Handbook of Kenya. Government of Kenya.
Nairobi: Government Printer.
GOK. (1991b). The Fisheries Act. Chapter 378. Laws of Kenya. Government of
Kenya. Nairobi: Government Printer.
GOK. (1995). Economic survey, 1995. Republic of Kenya, Office of the Vice
President and Ministry of Planning and National Development, Central Bureau of
Statistics. Government of Kenya. Nairobi: Government Printer.
GOK. (1997). Economic survey, 1997. Republic of Kenya, Office of the Vice
President and Ministry of Planning and National Development, Central Bureau of
Statistics. Goverment of Kenya. Nairobi: Government Printer.
Gough, K. (1961). Variations in interpersonal kinship relations. In Matrilineal
Kinship. Edited by D. Schneider and K. Gough. Berkely: University of California
Press.
222
Gould, S. (1991). Wonderful Life. The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History.
London: Penguin Books.
Gupta, A. (1995). Blurred boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of
politics and the imagined state. American Ethnologist. 22 (2), 375-402.
Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume I. Reason
and Rationalization in Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume II. The
Critique of Functionalist Reason. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hagen, G., Killinger, D. and Streeter, R. (1997). An Analysis of Communication
Networks Among Tampa Bay Economic Development Organisations. Connections.
20 (2), 13-22.
Handy, C. (1990). The Age of Unreason. London: Arrow Books.
Hanneman, R. (1997). Introduction to Social Network Methods. On-line textbook,
Sociology 157. Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside.
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science. 162, 1243-1248.
Hay, M. (1991). Fish-seaweed interactions on coral reefs: effects of herbiveroues
fishes and adaptations of their prey.. In The Ecology offishes on Coral Reefs. pp 96-
119. Edited by P. Sale. London: Academic Press.
Hays, S. (1959). Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Helbling, J. (1998). On shortcomings of New Institutional Economics in
conceptualising political phenomena in non-state societies. Paper presented at the
INSNA Sunbelt XVIII and 5 111 European International Conference on Social Networks,
Sitges, Spain. May 1998.
Hemminga, M., Slim, A., Kazungu, J., Ganssen, G., Nieuwenhuize, J. and Kruyt,
N. (1994). Carbon outwelling from a mangrove forest with adjacent seagrass beds
and coral reefs (Gazi Bay, Kenya). Marine Ecology Progress Series. 106, 291-312.
Holland, M. (1996). Ensuring sustainability of natural resources: focus on
institutional arrangements. Can. .I. Fish. Aquat Sci. 53 (Suppl. 1), 432-439.
Holland, J. and Blackburn, J. (1998) (Eds.) Whose Voice? Participatory Research
and Policy Change. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
Horkheimer, M and Adorno, T. (1993). Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York:
Continuum.
Horrill, C. (1998). A case study of collaborative management of marine protected
areas in partnership with communities. In Partnership for Conservation. Report of
223
the Regional Workshop on Marine Protected Areas, Tourism and Communities.
Diani Beach, Kenya. 11-13 May 1998. IUCN/Kenya Wildlife Service.
Hviding, E. and Baines, G. (1994). Community-based fisheries management:
tradition and the challenges in Marovo, Solomon Islands. Development and Change.
25, 13-39.
Hromnik, C.A. (1981). Indo-Africa: Towards a new Understanding of the History
of Sub-saharan Africa. Cape Town: Juta & Co.
IANA. (1999). Kenyan Muslims divided over census boycott. IANA Daily News.
August 19.
IUCN. (1993). Reefs at Risk: a programme for action. Rue Mauverney 28, CH-
1196 Gland, Switzerland.
Jameson, S., McManus, J. and Spalding, M. (1995). State of the Reefs: Regional
and Global Perspectives. International Coral Reef Initiative Executive Secretariat
Background Paper, US Department of State, Washington, DC.
Jentoft, S. and McCay, B. (1995). User participation on fisheries management.
Lessons drawn from experience. Marine Policy. 19 (3), 227-246.
Jentoft, S., McCay, B. and Wilson, D. (1998). Social theory and fisheries co-
management. Marine Policy. 22 (4-5), 423-436.
Johannes, R. (1978). Traditional marine conservation methods in Oceania and their
demise. Annu. Rev. EcoL Syst 9, 349-364.
Johannes, R. (1998). The case for data-less marine resource management: examples
from tropical nearshore fisheries. TREE, 13 (6).
Johnson, D., Mutua, M. and Kimani, E. (1982). Response to annually reversing
monsoon winds at the southern boundary of the Somali Current. Deep Sea Res. 29,
1217-1227.
Jommo, R. (1986). Indigenous enterprise in Kenya's tourist industry. Geneva:
IUED.
Johnston, R. (1989). Environmental Problems: Nature, Economy and State.
London: Belhaven.
Jorge, M. (1997). Developing capacity for coastal management in the absence of the
government: a case study in the Dominican Republic. Marine Policy. 36 (1-3), 47-
72.
Kanbur, R. (1992). Heterogeneity, Distribution and Cooperation in Common
Property Resource Management. Policy Research for the World Development Report.
Washington: World Bank.
224
Kennedy, A. D. (1990). Marine reserve management in developing nations: Mida
creek — a case study from East Africa. Ocean and Shoreline Management 14, 105 —
132.
Kent, P. (1982). The Somali Ocean basin and the continental margin of East Africa.
In The Ocean Basins and Margins. Volume 6 The Indian Ocean. Edited by A. Nairn
and F. Stehli. 185-204. New York: Plenum Press.
Khamala, C. (1971). Ecology of Echinometra mathaei (Echinoidae:
Echinodermata) at Diani Beach, Kenya. Marine Biology. 11, 167-172.
Kingdon, J. (1997). The Kingdon Field Guide to African Mammals. London:
Academic Press.
Kiser, L. and Ostrom, E. (1982). The Three Worlds of Action: A metatheoretical
synthesis of institutional approaches. In Strategies of Political Enquiry. Edited by E.
Ostrom. California: Sage Publications.
Kitheka, J. (1996). Water circulation and coastal trapping of brackish water in a
tropical mangrove-dominated bay in Kenya. Limnology and Oceanography. 41, 169-
176.
Klopp, J. (1998). The Politics of Land Grabbing in Kenya. Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association. Boston. September 3-6, 1998.
Knappert, J. (1979). Four centuries of Swahili verse: a literary history and
anthology. London: Heinemann.
Kooiman, J. (1999). Rethinking the Governance of fisheries. In Creative
Governance: Opportunities for Fisheries in Europe. Edited by J. Kooiman, M. van
Vliet and S. Jentoff. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
Lamb, B. (1998). Setting the stage for alternative analysis and negotiation. In:
Hydroecological modeling: research, practice, legislation and decision making.
Edited by Blazkova et al. Czech republic: T.G.Masaryk Water Research Institute.
Lang, H. (1998). Institutional change and public participation: the transition from
communal to private land ownership in Rehoboth, Namibia. Paper presented at the
INSNA Sunbelt XVIII and 5th European International Conference on Social Networks,
Sitges, Spain. May 1998.
Laroche, J. and Ramananarivo, N. (1995). A preliminary survey of the artisanal
fishery on coral reefs of the Tulear Region (southwest Madagascar). Coral Reefs. 14,
193-200.
Le Sann, A. (1998). A Livelihood from Fishing. Globalization and Sustainable
Fisheries Policies. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
Leach, M., Mearns, R. and Scoones, I. (Eds.) (1997). Community-based
Sustainable Development: Consensus or Conflict? IDS Bulletin. 28 (4).
225
Lieske, E. and Myers, R. (1994). Coral Reef Fishes: indo-Pacific and Caribbean.
Collins pocket guide. Harper Collins: London.
Linden, 0. (1993). Resolution on integrated coastal zone management in East
Africa signed in Arusha, Tanzania. Ambio, 22, 408-409.
Lutchman, I. and Hoggarth, D. (1999). Net Losses: Untying the Gordian Knot of
Fishing Overcapacity. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK. (iv + 32pp).
Ludwig, D., Hilborn, R. and Walters, C. (1993). Uncertainty, resource
exploitation and resource exploitation: lessons from history. Science. 260, 17, 36
(2PP).
MacKenzie, D. (1995). The Cod that disappeared. New Scientist. (1995), 16
September.
Malleret-King, D. (1996). Les systemes de productions des agriculture et pecheurs
de Biga, petite communaute de pecheurs. DESS Developpment Agricole - Memoire.
Institut d'Etude du Developpement Economique et Social. Paris I. La Sorbonne.
Malthus, T. R. (1798). An Essay on the Principle of Population. Edited by A. Flew.
(1982). Penguin.
Martin, J. (1998). Structures of power in naturally occurring communities. Social
Networks. 20, 197-225.
Mathews, W. (1999). The Fallacy of Post Modernism. University of Massachusetts.
Mbendo, J. (1998). Integrated environmental assessment of the Kenyan coast with
special reference to sea turtles. MSc Thesis. Department of Biological Sciences,
University of Warwick.
McCay, B. and Acheson, J. (1987). The Question of the Commons: The Culture
and Ecology of Communal Resources. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
McClanahan, T. (1988). Seasonality in East Africa's coastal waters. Mar. Ecol.
Prog. Ser. 44, 191-199.
McClanahan, T. (1994). Kenyan coral reef lagoon fish: effects of fishing, substrate
complexitiy and sea urchins. Coral Reefs. 13, 231-241.
McClanahan, T. (1995a). Fish predators and scavengers of the sea urchin
Echinometra mathaei in Kenyan coral-reef marine parks. Environmental Biology of
Fishes. 43, 187-193.
McClanahan, T. (1995b). A coral reef ecosystem-fisheries model: impacts of
fishing intensity and catch selection on reef structure processes. Ecological
Modelling. 80, 1-19.
226
McClanahan, T., Kamukuru, N., Muthiga, N., Gilagabher Yebio, M. and Obura,
D. (1996a). Effect of sea urchin reductions on algae, coral and fish populations.
Conservation Biology. 10(1), 136-154.
Mclanahan, T. and Muthiga, N. (1988). Changes in Kenyan coral reef community
structure and function due to exploitation. Hydrobiologia. 166, 269-276.
Mclanahan, T. and Shafir, S. (1990). Causes and consequences of sea urchin
abundance and diversity in Kenyan coral reef lagoons. Oecologia. 83, 362-370.
Mclanahan, T. and Obura, D. (1995). Status of Kenyan Coral Reefs. Coastal
Management. 23, 57-76.
McClanahan, T., Rubens, J., Glaesel, H. and Kiambo, R. (1996b). The Diani-
Kinondo Coral reefs, Fisheries and Traditional Management. Coral Reef
Conservation Project Report. October. Mombasa.
McGlade, J. (1995). Integrating Social and Economic Factors in Fisheries
Management in the European Union — An Issue of Governance. Environmental
Management: Review of 1994 and future trends. 2 (15), 77-80.
McGlade, J. (1997). SimCoast TM : An Expert System for Integrated Coastal Zone
Management and Decision-making. EU-NOAA Workshop on Managed Ecosystems.
Narragansett: NOAA
McGlade, J. (1999). Ecosystem analysis and the governance of natural resources.
In Advanced Ecological Theory. Principles and Applications, pp.309-341. Edited by
J. McGlade. Oxford: Blackwell Science.
MeGlade, J. (2000). Governance of Natural Resources. In Science and Integrated
Coastal Zone Management. Edited by B. Bodingen. Berlin: Dahlem University
Press.
Mearns, R. (1995). Institutions and natural resource management: access to and
control over woodfuel in East Africa. In People and Environment in Africa, pp.103-
114. Edited by T. Binns. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
Merton, R. (1957). Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
Migot — Adholla, S., Mkangi, K. and Mbindyo, J. (1982). Study of tourism in
Kenya with emphasis on the attitudes of residents of the Kenya coast. Study carried
out on behalf of Swiss Development Co-operation. Institute for Development Studies,
Nairobi. IDS Consultancy report No. 7.
Mikkelsen, B. (1995). Methods for Development Research: A Guide for
Practitioners. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Milner-Gulland, E. and Mace, R. (1998). Conservation of Biological Resources.
Oxford: Blackwell Science.
227
Mingers, J. (1992). Technical Practical and critical OR - Past, Present and Future?
In Critical Management Studies. Edited by M. Alvesson and H. Willmott. London:
Sage.
Mizruchi, M. and Potts, B. (1998). Centrality and power revisited: actor success in
group decision making. Social Networks. 20, 353-387.
Mizruchi, M. and Galaskeiwicz, J. (1994). Networks of Interorganizational
Relations. In Advances in Social Network Analysis: Research in the Social and
Behavioral Sciences, pp.250-253. Edited by S. Wasserman and J. Galaskiewicz.
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
Mkangi, K. (1995). The Perception of Islam by the Mijikenda of the Kenya Coast.
In Islam in Kenya: Proceedings of the National seminar on Contemporary Islam.
Edited by M. Bakari and S. Yahya. Mombasa: MEWA Publications.
Moore, S. (1991). From Giving and Lending to Selling: Property Transactions
Reflecting Historical Changes in Kilimanjaro. In Law in Colonial Africa.
Portsmouth: Heinemann.
Mwadime, R. (1996). Non-farm employment in rural Kenya: micro-mechanisms
influencing food and nutrition of farming households. PhD Thesis.
Landbouwuniversiteit Wageningen, Netherlands.
Mwadime, R. and Hoorweg, J. (1996). Effect of non-farm employment on factors
of subsistence-food production in rural coastal Kenya. In Non-farm employment in
rural Kenya: micro-mechanisms influencing food and nutrition of farming
households. R. Mwadime. PhD Thesis. Landbouwuniversiteit Wageningen.
National Geographic. (1998). Population map. (4) October 1998. Washington DC:
National Geographic Society.
Nelson, N. and Wright, S. (1995). Participation and Power. In Power and
Participatory Development: Theory and Practice. Edited by N. Nelson and S.
Wright. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
Ngoile, M. and Horrill, C. (1993). Coastal Ecosystems, Productivity and Ecosystem
Protection: Coastal Ecosystem Management. AMBIO. 22(7), 461-467.
Ng'weno, B. (1995). Reinventing Ground Rules: Inheritance of Land Among the
Digo of Southern Kenya. MA Thesis. Department of Anthropology: Stanford
University.
Nichols, P. (1991). Social Survey Methods: a fieldguide for development workers.
Oxford: Oxfam Publications.
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
228
Norton-Griffiths, M. (1998). The economics of wildlife conservation policy in
Kenya. In Conservation of Biological Resources, pp.279-293. E.J. Milner-Gulland
and R. Mace. London: Blackwell Science.
Nuitjen, M. (1999). Institutions and organising practices: conceptual discussion.
Sustainable Development Dimensions. Rome: FAO.
Nurse, D. and Spear, T. (1985). The Swahili. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Odiambo, C. (1997). Kenya - The other side of the tourist 'paradise'. Africanews.
18, September.
Okoth-Ogendo, H, W. (1991). Tenants of the Crown. Nairobi: ACTS Press.
Ominde, S.H. (1984). Population and Development in Kenya. London: Heinemann
Educational Books.
Ophuls, W. (1977). Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity: Prologue to a Political
Theory of the Steady State. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co.
O'Riordan, B. (1994). Development. What is it and who benefits? Conflicting
priorities for natural resource development in fisheries. Rugby: Intermediate
Technology Development Group.
Ortegon, T. (1998). The 'function' of the gossip network. Paper presented at the
INSNA Sunbelt XVIII and Sth European International Conference on Social Networks,
Sitges, Spain. May 1998.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The evolution of institutions for
collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oyugi, W. (1993). Local Government in Kenya: a case of institutional decline. In
Local Government in the Third World. Edited by P. Mawhood. Great Britain: John
Wiley and Sons.
Pauly, D. (1988). Some definitions of overfishing relevant to coastal area
management in Southeast Asia. Trop. Coastal Area Manage. 3 (1), 14-15.
Peters, T. (1989). Thriving on Chaos: Handbook for a Management Revolution.
London: Pan Books.
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. (1978). The external control of organisations: a
resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row.
Philips, R. (1978). Seagrasses and the coastal marine environment. Oceanus. 21
(3), 30-40.
Pido, M., Pomeroy, R., Garces, L. and Carlos, M. (1997). A Rapid Appraisal
Approach to Evaluation of Community-Level Fisheries Management Systems:
229
Framework and Field Application at Selected Coastal Fishing Villages in the
Philippines and Indonesia. Coastal Management. 25, 183-204.
Pinkerton, E. (1997). Anthropological vs Economic Models for Control of Fish
Effort: Where do Communities of Place and Communities of Interest Intersect? In
Proceedings of the workshop on Future Directions for Common Property Theory and
Research. Edited by B. McCay and B. Jones. 28 February, 1997. New Brunswick:
Ecopolicy Centre for Agriculture, Environmental and Resource Issues.
Pomeroy, R. (1995). Community-based and co-management institutions for
sustainable coastal fisheries management in southeast Asia. Ocean and Coastal
Management. 27 (3), 143-162.
Pomeroy, R., Pollnac, R., Predo, C. and Katon, B. (1996). Impact evaluation of
community-based coastal resource management projects in the Philippines. NA GA.
19 (4), 9-12.
Popper, K. (1994). The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and
Rationality. New York: Routledge.
Pretty, J. and Scoones, I. (1995). Institutionalising adaptive planning and local
level concerns: Looking to the future. In Power and Participatory Development.
Edited by N. Nelson and S. Wright. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
Price, A., Burbridge, P., Edwards, A. and Brown, B. (1993). Coasts.
Environment and Development Briefs. Paris: UNESCO.
Prins, A. H. (1961). The Swahili speaking peoples of Zanzibar and the East African
coast. In Ethnographic survey of Africa. East Central Africa. Edited by D. Forde.
Part XII. London: International African Institute.
Rasmussen, J. (1989). Goodbye Theory — Hello Reality. Recent trends in social
and regional theory and its consequences for network studies in Africa. Centre for
Development Studies. Working paper 88.3. Denmark.
Reid, T. (1998). Feeding the Planet. National Geographic: The Millennium
Series/Population. October. Washington: National Geographic Society.
Rehm, S. and Espig, G. (1991). The Cultivated plants of the Tropics and
Subtropics: Cultivation, Economic Value and Utilization. Institute of Agronomy in
the Tropics, University of Gottingen. CTA. Weikersheim: Margraf.
Richards, W. and Scary, A. (1997). Introduction to eigen analysis of networks.
INSNA Sunbelt XVII Conference, San Diego, 13-17 February 1997.
Ricupero, R. (1999). The Final and Optimal Crisis of the Century. The UNESCO
Courier. March, 20-22. Paris: UNESCO.
230
Robertson, P. and Speier, J. (1998). Organising for International Development: A
Collaborative Network-Based Model. Paper presented at INSNA Sunbelt XVIII and
51h European International Conference on Social Networks, Sitges, Spain. May 1998.
Robertson, S. A. (1984). The Status of Kaya Forests. In Endangered Resources for
Development. Proceedings on the workshop on the status and options for
management of plant communities in Kenya. 6-8 March, 1984.
Robinson, M. (1999). Is cultural tourism on the right track? The UNESCO Courier.
July/August, 22-23. Paris: UNESCO.
Rocheleau, D. and Slocum, R. (1995). Participation in Context: Key Questions. In
Power, Process and Participation — tools for Change. Edited by R. Slocum, L.
Wichhart, D Rocheleau and B. Thomas-Slayter. London: Intermediate Technology
publications.
Rubens, J. (1996). An Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Marine Reserve
Regulations at Diani, Kenya. MSc dissertation. Department of Marine Science and
Coastal Management, University of Newcastle, UK.
Ruddle, K. (1988). A framework for research on the traditional knowledge and
management of coastal systems, with particular reference to coral reefs fisheries.
Galaxea. (7), 179-184.
Ruddle, K. and Johannes, R. (1985). (Eds). The traditional knowledge and
management of coastal systems in Asia and the Pacific. Jakarta: UNESCO.
Russ, G. (1991). Coral Reef Fisheries: Effects and Yields. In The Ecology offishes
on Coral Reefs. pp 601-635. Edited by P. Sale. London: Academic Press.
Salancik, G. (1995). WANTED: A Good Network Theory of Organisation. Review
Essay. Administrative Science Quarterly. 40, 345-349.
Samoilys, M. (1988). Abundance and species richness of coral reef fish on the
Kenya coast: The effects of protective management and fishing. Proc. Int. Coral Reef
Symp. 6, 2, 261-266.
Sayer, J., Harcourt, C. and Collins, N. (1992). The Conservation of Tropical
Forests: Africa. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Schweizer, T. and White, D. (1998). Revitalising the study of kinship and exchange
with network approaches. In Kinship, Networks and Exchange. pp 1-9. Edited by T.
Schweizer and D. White. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scoones, I. (1994). Living with Uncertainty: New Directions for Pastoral
Development in Africa. Drylands paper 6. London: IIED.
Scott, F. (1995). Institutions and Organisations. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Scott, J. (1991). Social Network Analysis: A handbook. London: Sage Publications.
231
Sen, A. (1981). Poverty and Famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, S. and Nielsen, J. (1996). Fisheries co-management: a comparative analysis.
Marine Policy. 20 (5), 405-418.
Senge, P. (1990). The Fifth Discipline: the Art and Practice and the Learning
Organisation. USA: Doubleday (1992 ed. London: Random House).
Sheppard, C. (1999). Biodiversity patterns in Indian Ocean corals, and effects of
taxonomic error in data. Biodiversity and Conservation. 7, 847-868.
Shipton, P. and Goheen, M. (1992). Understanding African land-holding: power,
wealth, and meaning. Africa, 62 (3), 307-325.
Shiva, V. (1993). The greening of the global reach. In Global Ecology: A New
Arena of Political Conflict. Edited by W. Sachs. London: Zed Books.
Short, R. (1998). In retrospect: An Essay on the Principle of Population. Nature.
395, 456.
Slocum, R., Wichhart, L., Rocheleau, D. and Thomas-Slayter, B. (1995) (Eds).
Power, Process and Participation: Tools for Change. London: Intermediate
Technology Publications.
Sokal, A. and Bricmont, J. (1998). Intellectual Impostures. London: Profile Books.
Sopova, J. (1999). In the shade of the palaver tree. The UNESCO Courier. May, 42.
Paris: UNESCO.
Spear, T. (1978). The Kaya Complex: A History of the Mijikenda Peoples of the
Kenya Coast to 1900. Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau.
Sperling, D. (1988). The Growth of Islam Among the Mijikenda of the Kenya
Coast, 1826-1933. School of Oriental and African Studies: University of London.
SPSS. (1997). SYSTAT® 7.0.1. Statistical Packages for Social Sciences, Inc.
Sumaila, U. (1999). A review of game-theoretic models of fishing. Marine Policy.
23 (1), 1-10.
Sutton, J. E. (1981a). The prehistory of East Africa. In General History of Africa, I.
Methodology and African prehistory. Edited by J. Ki-Zerb. UNESCO/Heinemann.
Sutton, J. E. (1981b). East Africa before the Seventh Century. In General History
of Africa, II Ancient Civilisations of Africa. Edited by G. Mokhtar.
UNESCO/Heinemann.
232
Swift, J. and Baas, S. (1999). Pastoral institutions and approaches to risk
management and poverty alleviation in Central Asian countries in transition.
Sustainable Development Dimensions. Rome: FAO.
Thomas-Slayter, B. (1994). Structural change, power politics, and community
organisations in Africa: challenging the patterns, puzzles and paradoxes. World
Development. 22 (10), 1479-1490.
Throckmorton, P. (1987). History from the Sea: Shipwrecks and Archaeology.
London: Mitchel Beazley.
Tichy, N., Tushman, M. and Fombrun, C. (1979). Social Network Analysis for
Organisations. Academy of Management Review. 4(4), 507-519.
Tichy, N. (1980). A Social Network Perspective for Organisation Development. In
Systems Theory for Organisation Development, pp. 115-162. Edited by T.
Cummings. Great Britain: John Wiley & Sons.
TMRU. (1994). Habitats and Species of the Diani Coast, Kenya. TMRU Reports
and Paper No. 94/4. UK: The University of York & Hull.
Trimingham, J. (1964). Islam in East Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tvedten, I. And Hersoug, B. (1992). Fishing for Development: Small-Scale
Fisheries in Africa. Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
UNEP. (1985). Action plan for the protection, management, and development of the
marine and coastal environment of the East African region. Regional Seas Reports
and Studies No. 61. Nairobi: UNEP.
Ulanowicz, R. (1999). NETWRK 4.2a: A Package of Computer Algorithms to
Analyze Ecological Flow Networks. Copyright 1982, 1987, 1998, 1999. University
of Maryland Centre for Environmental & Estuarine Studies. Ref. No. 82- 7 CBL.
Uphoff, N. (1986). Local Institutional Development: an analytical sourcebook with
cases. West Harford Conneticut: Kumarian Press
Vandergeest, P. (1997). Rethinking property. The Common Property Resource
Digest. 41, 4-6.
Waldrop, M. (1994). Complexity: the Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and
Chaos. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Walker, L. (1995). Briefing: The Uruguay Round: In Whose Interests? Review of
African Political Economy. 564-568.
Wallace, M., Cortner, H., Moote, M. and Burke, S. (1996). Moving towards
ecosystem management: examining a change in philosophy for resource management.
Journal of Political Ecology. 3, 1-36.
233
Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and
Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wasserman, S. and Galaskiewicz, J. (1994). Advances in Social Network Analysis:
Research in the Social and Behavioural Sciences. London: Sage Publications.
Waters-Bayer, A. and Bayer, W. (1994). Planning with Pastoralists: PRA and
more. A Review of Methods Focused on Africa. GTZ Division 422 Working Paper.
Germany: GTZ.
Watson, D. J. (1989). The Evolution of Appropriate Resource-Management
Systems. In Common Property Resources: Ecology and community-based sustainable
development, pp.55-69. Edited by F. Berkes. London: Belhaven Press.
Weber, P. (1993). Abandoned seas: reversing the decline of the oceans.
Worldwatch paper. (4). Washington DC: WorldWatch Institute.
Weber, P. (1994). Net loss: fish, jobs and the marine environment. Worldwatch
paper. (120). Washington DC: WorldWatch Institute.
Wells, S. and Sheppard, C. (Eds.). (1988). Coral Reefs of the World, Volume 2.
Indian Ocean, Red Sea and Gulf. UNEP Regional Seas Directories and
Bibliographies. IUCN. Gland/Cambridge: IUCN, Nairobi: UNEP.
White, A., Hale. L., Renard, Y. and Cortesi, L. (1994). Collaborative and
Community-Based Management of Coral Reefs: Lessons from experience.
Connecticut: Kumarian Press.
White, D., Schnegg, M. and Brudner, L. (1998). Social networks, egalitarian
institutions, and wage economy: Compadrazgo in rural Tlaxcala. Paper presented at
INSNA Sunbelt XVIII and 5th European International Conference on Social Networks,
Sitges, Spain. May 1998.
Wilkinson, C., Linden, 0., Cesar, H., Hodgson, Rubens, J., Strong, A. (1999).
Ecological and socio-economic impacts of 1998 coral mortality in the Indian Ocean:
An ENSO impact and a warning of future change. AMBIO. 28 (2), 188-196.
Willis, J. (1987). "Why the natives will not work": The Mijikenda in Mombasa's
Economy, 1897 — 1929. Nairobi: British Institute in Eastern Africa.
World Bank (1997). World Development Report. Washington: World Bank.
WM. (1998). Sustainable Marine resource Management. Washington: World
Resources Institute.
WTO. (1990). World tourism Organisation Statistics. Economic Survey 1990.
XIst.org. Global Statistics web site.
234
PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS
Mwadzoyo, Bakari Chairman of Mwaepe fish landing site
Chicho, Omani	 Chairman, Galu Fishermen's Committee
Etian, Paul	 Senior Fisheries Officer, Kwale District
Everett, Prof. M.	 School of Computing and Applied Mathematics, University of
Greenwhich, London
Galu Fishermen's Committee (See Appendix III)
Kaka, Ali	 At the time of the fieldwork: KWS Senior Warden, Coast
Region. Currently Assistant Director, KWS
Maina	 District Surveyor, Kwale District
Mwabata, Ali	 Local Council Candidate, Mwabungu
Mwamzandi, Kassim Former (> 30 yrs) Member of Parliament for Msambweni
constituency (includes the study site)
Mwandoto, B.A.	 Coast Development Authority
Mwangare, Suleiman Fisheries Officer, Diani substation
Mwarupia, Mr	 Chief— Kinondo Location
Ngoloma, Mr	 Senior Fisheries Officer, Kwale District
Obura, Dr David	 Regional Coordinator, CORDIO
Oduol, Charles	 Assistant Director for Fisheries, Coast Province
Rocca, Paolo	 Sea Harvest (K) Ltd, Seafood Exporters, P 0 Box 2175,
Mombasa
235
-4
C0
E
E
o
U CS'.....c•I
"li
e•-n
O'
o
".
Z
..1)
aoZ0
c•)
CS
E.,
o0
,..L.
a3
z
___.¢)00L.1
•--.	 IL)CS	 .
rZ
—
"Izs
o
txZ•	 ...L-
,
,•.]
.d.
;..."/
CS
,...,
o0
,..L.
Z
,...ca
as0
c..)
..)0
cs
E--,
ts
o '100 0L. --
z
,z)0.	 z:1-0 •
.1	 "Ci
S'
o o
E--.	 E--.
in
en
os6
L
ci)
v
=
,,,
CA
6.,6 k_
W 7>	 .,..0U Tei
. ao
ON. it
VC1CLO
73
er
et
eth.
U
kr)	 tr)
--,
00 o oN N 00 en
0 tr) kr, 0I"- NO	 NO
in tr)	 N
N
,ocDoc:DN N kr) v-)
00 oN tn ti )
00	 kr)
.1. .--.	 en
0 00
o o
	 in
0en	 r- ON
o	 o 141S	 en
tr)
ON I"- Os
o kr) 0
.- N -.
0 ON 00 ON
0le")	 LelN
0°0001n0eitnOtr)001r1004,0,..,°,°tc100000 Ch 1/40 00
0	 0 0kr)
.-)
	 re)	 --.
00
__, ir) In ,..
00 — — —
0
-.
o
I"- en In kr)
in 0
-- s
0	 0 0
--	 kr)	 kr)
t'
el
.f0
.,k-.
0
a	 L.,'
os	 ol6 ,,,,
C
a)	 ,94...
co	 44h. cn4m.CI)
.0
0
V)	 ,..,
L .
CO
E7.,
CIO
ID
-0 "0 ,..Nd •-•Q .0
g g 0 10
ch	 tel	 L.	 E
a)
-0	 a)o 55	 -0
0 az	 g
,.. 4	 a	 CA
Q2,
CD
v.S4 .0 -NC
-2 8'coo2 6 	 , 6
a)	 a)
"0	 -0
-0 0
	 0
g	 t5	 L.a)
Ci) ._	 ,u
C.)	 C.)0	 66	 0
-NE -0 -0 "0
U0 gg c96.	 CM	 V)	 VI
0 0
.07)
-0 .C)
2 E
-0 "0 -0 "0
ggg ''co
c.I)	 CI1	 CA	 CA
-0 "0 -0
co
(I)	 CA	 CA
*0 "0 '0 .0
c9gc,9
En	 CA	 (I)	 CA
0 0 0 0
..0 JD .0 .0
.0 .0 .0 .0
E E E 2
'0 "0 -0 "0
'''gco.:
(I)	 C/1	 CA	 CA
Q
o
L.
"0 "0 -0 -0
co	 co	 co
CII	 CI)	 CA	 CA
-0 "0 "0 -0
'co	 to	 co
CI)	 CI)	 C4	 CI)
4.)5p.
in
ri ^
	 -	 -(4-)
0
.Fr. ,.	 -	 -
en
.-,
in
71. “	 ••
en
.-n
in
'CI	 -	 .-
en
,..-.
0
9. -
,-.
0
'-': -
,--,
0
C.1 "	 ^	 ^
,--.
0
M - -
,-.
Mel
s
cu
i
..CENNNNN
in kr) In kr)
•	 •	 •	 •
kr)tn In(.4 c,i r...i	 N
kr)	 kel
. en	 • enN
tr) tr) In inrsi
 csi	csi	 c‘i
kr)	 kr)cn N	 •	 •
,-,.-.
in inrn (--,1  
.1-	 .:1-	 •zr
-1- en en
kr) kr)
	 kr)
•	 • N	 •N N
	 .•-n
in in Li icsi	 eNi	 ,
kr) kr)
•	 • N si
--. •-n
in in in in
ct	 .:1-	 •cl-	 •ze
.:1-
	 ..4.	 •1-	 .:1-
Lel	 v-)	 kr)N	 •	 •	 •
N -. -•
in in Licsi_ :
, N	 ,-..
Ti03
41
o..4 Z"'	 0 Z C4	 En Z 44 C4 V)
3ww33ww333w3L4 v,3 w 3w3w3w3w
Z 44 Z Z CID CI) Z Z Cip Cn .— C/) L4Z 4-4
3w, 0 cla
Z f".
-ficD
g
-. N en •ct --. N en 'et ,-. N en •cl- )--. N en --, N en •ct- -. N en •ct -. N en .1- -. N en 'zl-
4412
.C.z. ,-.	 '-'	 ,--..	 ••-. N N N N rn en en en Tr •ct '1- tn in In in n0 1/40 1/40 1/40 N h 5 5 00 00 00 00
15
C.)
o
W
E
5
0
73
..,,
n!'a
,..,
ts
.,...
,1Z
t''''
7
o
ao
Z
L
u)
CS
-ts
4:
ET.
Z SF
0 0
Z ...2	
'Iz
cx)	 ,,,,.)
'13	 '13
00
4)	 ul
CS	 q•
•-•
ET.	
-
13
W
E
SF SF
0 0
.1:3
Z Z
tx)73
00
4)	 c,)
Ci	 CS
Tr
0 0 0
Cq ,-. rn
CD CD CDUD u, vn
CD CD vn
-. CA ".
CD CD Lin
,-.	 ...
IA
ci)
MtL.6o
g
GA
'17
=	 kri
m	 141
CA
4.1.6 6
7 7
> ..,0C) 0
IDID
e <4
w
m
tik
m
u7
60
U
CDC4
In
CD
cq
n00 0	 co CDCA	 CA
c) c> xr)
--. rn on
41 CD CD CD01 LCD 1/40 Tr
vn vn
VI V/ V/ V/
c) c)	 c)
rsi	 g 
..a
c:. c>
oo C) n
141
vn 
a.
c) c
v-.
' co
C'  ON 	 CT
WI
c> vn vn coCT Ch C.-
C› 
-.
4n	 CD
vn vn
CD C) CD
cr 1/40 r" 14--
CD	 C,
-.	 CA
CD 4n wn
vn c>
.--.
ken	 4n CD41
77 77C = =
as	 as	 es
CA	 CA	 V)
4)	 0.)	 0
az :5 715
-0 an az
E E E.tu E
...	 ...	 ...000000
t'
'4:
L
w
Em.
Im
La
0
4.) >1
E 60 co
1- v
c
CCI (/61	 )
....414D
7
Cl) P.,
imr
M
 E
(:10
-co
tn
u
4D
az
a
.. .00
r...
TS 77
u	 a>77 77
o	 o ..NeI.	 1.	 u
4)	 4)	 0
,..4	 -se	 i-.
00
006	 la
co	 0	 to	 to
715 az az az
az az az JD
E a a E
17 ID 77 17
a q c =
ct	 co	 cd	 cdEn	 En	 En	 En
00
...,
77 I= "0 17q = c
co	 cct	 01	 cocn	 En	 En	 En
17 17 77 77
= q q a
cd	 co	 co	 cdEn	 En	 rn	 En
__
o0
la
777
-0	 4)4?
1..	 u 4D
a)	 0-0
..,4...,	 a
0
06..
17 77 77 17q = z c
ca	 cd	 cO	 etEn	 En	 En	 En
77q7
V)
.12)	 =	 o	 0
-c m o 0a	 cn	 L.	 F.
77
co
"0
0	 77 77ti 0 = C0	 es	 at
.y4	 1-.	 En	 En
0
o6.
c>
'n-:
4 - 
w
E
n
0
v.-,
0
vl
0
wl
0
tr)
0
vl
kin(„i CA CA
unN	 • N
,--n
i•I
e g
CLW
GI .0
;
=
(NI
N
41 41
csi csi on on
4n kin kin
•	 •	 •	 cnN	 ,--.	 ,•—.
In
•	 on Tr 01N
vn
•	 en en enNNN
41 VnC4 N
	 •	 •
In In
•	 • NN
41 vnCA CA	 •	 •
". ..
tr)	 kr)
•	 •
vn vn
•	 • In 0101 01
tr)
• NN en
LLI
Z Z W
Til7
"9
wo
(4 zZ"I `n zZ
4)
.	 .
W LQ vp 14
.-.	
14 GOzZ
14
.	 .	
14	 Upzz
14 ril
--	
-- ripzZ
^. N en
•
CI.
,
o4
Tr T. cA 01 Tr T. rq 01 Tr -. cl on Tr T. (.4 on ,r 6. cl on ,r
CT CT CT 4?
cii
....
S..
CZ c) c) cm
'	 •n•1	 vnI	 1n1	 vnI
...	 ,—.	 .—.	 .--1
••n1	 1... 	 VnI	 vn•I
ty esi CN CSI
•••n1	 II	 vnI	 1n1
C',.)	 rn	 C..)	 Cn
1••••1	 ,..I	 1n1	 1n1
'Cr M. 	 .71. 	 .1-
•n1	 vl	 1n1	 1n1

Demersal
Rabbit fish
Scavenger
Snapper
Parrot fish
Surgeon fish
Unicorn fish
Grunter
Pouter
Black skin (spot)
Goat fish
Streaker
Rock cod
Cat fish
Mixed demersal
Appendix II List of species (common and Swahili names) on which catch data
should be collected by Fisheries Department personnel.
Oyster shell/grint	 Koa
Sea cucumber	 Jongoo
Squid	 Ngisi
Octopus
	
Pweza
Taft	 Shells	 Madondo
Changu
Tembo
Pono
Kangaja
Puju
Pamamba
Chaa
Fute
Mukundaji
Pali
Tewa
Fume
Pelagic
Cavala Jacks	 Kole kole
Mullets	 Mkizi
Little Mackerel
	
Kiboma
Baracouda	 Tengesi
Milkfish
	
Mwatiko
Kingfish
	
Nguru
Queenfish	 Pandu
Sailfish
	
Sulisuli
Bonito, Skipjack Tuna Kiboma
Dorado	 Filusi
Mixed pelagic
Sharks/Rays	 Papa
Sardines	 Simu
Mixed fish/others
Crustacea
Lobster
Prawns
Crabs
Miscellenious
Game fish
Oysters
Kamba mawe
Kamba ndogo
Kaa
Shaza
239
Appendix III Illustration of informal organisation with Biga community - the
fishermen's interest group
Dear Sir	 22nd June 1996
REQUEST FOR SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
The Galu Fishermen's Committee is asking for support from a number of
Government authorities to ensure that the livelihoods of the indigenous fishing
communities are safeguarded. The livelihoods of the fishing communities are
currently under serious threat.
The Galu Fishermen's Committee was created on Sunday 28th of April 1996 under
the supervision of the Area Chief of Kinondo location and with the assistance of the
KANU Secretary of the location. The following are the committee members:
MWANYZA:
1. Omari B. CHICHO - Chairman
2. Hassan J. MWALIPHUNZO - Assistant Chairman
3. Ayyub R. MWAVYAUSA - Committee Member
4. Ali Khalfan MWAHAGA - Committee Member
MVURENI:
5. Rashid Masoud MWABANDA - Committee Member
6. Sid Omar MWATUNDE - Committee Member
7. Mohamed Ali TINGA - Committee Member
8. Hassan MWINYI - Committee Member
MWAEPE:
9. Ismail FAKI - Committee Member
10. Isaack S. MWACHALA - Secretary
11. Balcari H. MWIYAKA - Committee Member
12. Omani SIMBA - Committee Member
13. Mfaki SULEIMAN - Committee Member
14. Hatib S. HAMAD - Committee Member
On Tuesday the 18th of June the Committee met to discuss an on going problem
which is having a detrimental effect on the lives of the fishermen and their families.
The problem is the lack of fish in the Galu - Kinondo area. The reason for the lack of
fish is the use of seine nets with very small meshes. In addition to the problem of
very fine meshes, the Committee considers the way in which the nets are used, by
dragging over the seabed, also has a detrimental impact on the marine environment
(NYAVU YA KUVUTA).
Thus, there are two factors which have dramatically reduced the number of fish in
the area:
i) Small meshed nets catch juvenile fish of all species, these fish are killed and
therefore do not reach maturity to reproduce and therefore there are no fish for
the future. Many of the fish that are caught are too small to eat and are thrown
away dead, other species are no good for food and are also thrown away dead.
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ii) The system of dragging the nets is also considered to be very damaging. By
dragging the nets many important habitats for young fish and eggs are destroyed
or disturbed. The particularly important habitats are the corals and the seagrass
areas. This method of fishing also damages the fish traps belonging to other
fishermen because the traps are turned over or broken as the net passes.
The Committee understands that under the law of the country, as stated in the
Fisheries Act (chapter 378 - Laws of Kenya), it is illegal to use any seine net with a
stretched mesh size of less than 50mm. The nets currently being used in the Galu
area are much less than 50mm.
In order to stop this destruction of the sea the Committee and the fishermen of Galu
have made the following decisions if the destructive fishing continues:
i) The fishing equipment and boats should be taken out of work.
ii) The fishermen should be suspended from fishing for a period of three months.
iii) If these are groups, then their Captains will be handed over to the police.
iii)	 Further steps to be taken under Goverment supervision.
The Galu Fishermen's Committee needs the full support of the law and the maximum
assistance from the under mentioned officers.
cc D.C. - Kwale District; 0.C.P.D. - Kwale; D.F.O. - Shimoni; D.O. -
Msambweni; Fisheries Officer - Msambweni; Chief - Kinondo location; Ass. Chief -
Kinondo & Gazi sub-location; O.C.S. - Diani Police; O.C.S. - Msambweni Police;
Hon. K.B. Mwamzandi (area M.P.); Councillor Kinondo Location - H.M.
Mwabwagizo.
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Appendix IV Questions used as the basis for household surveys (Source: IvIalleret-King,
1996; this study)
Family and dependants:
How many people eat in this house?
How many people depend on you?
How many wives do you have, and children?
Does your family originate from Biga?
Was your father a fisherman?
Land:
Is this your land? Is this Madvani (Kenya Sugar Estate) land? Do you have a
title deed, in whose name?
How long has your home been here? Were your parents and grandparents at
this site/plot?
How many acres of land is the plot?
How many families live on this plot?
Work:
Who works in the fields (shamba)?
When you settled here who worked in the shamba?
Have you employed temporary workers to help this year? And other years?
Describe the different tasks in the shamba for each month of the year and the
tools or implements required.
Agricultural production:
Do you sell any produce from your shamba? Which products?
How much do you earn from the sales each season/month?
Do you sell the same products every year?
If there are variations, why?
How many times do you cultivate on the same piece of land? After
harvesting the maize, do you plant other things?
How long do you leave land fallow?
How many kilos of maize seeds do you plant each season?
Do you use chemicals on your crops? Do you use fertilizer/manure/compost?
How long does your produce last (maize, beans, pigeon peas, sesame, millet
etc.)? How many times a week do you eat your own produce? Do you have
any of last years produce remaining?
Are there particular work problems, (such as lack of labour)? During which
period?
What are your main problems?
Fisheries production:
Do you fish every day? All year?
Which method of fishing do you use? Do you change method according to
season?
Do you have a dugout canoe (dau)? How old is the dau? How much did you
pay for it?
How long do you expect the dau to last?
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How many traps do you set? According to season?
How much did your spear gun (bunduki) cost? How long does it last?
During the low/bad season (kuzi — SE monsoon) how much money do you
bring home on average (daily)? How many/much fish do you bring home? Do
you bring home fish every day? Is it sufficient (for food or income)?
And during the high/good season (kaskazi, shwari)
What are the main problems?
Over the last thirty years, what changes have you seen in what you bring
home?
Do you encourage your children to become fishers?
Socio-economic situation:
What is your situation (general economic, activity,....) now? What was your
situation when you were twenty?
When you don't have enough to eat what do you do?
When you are ill what do you do?
Do you have financial savings (e.g. post office account)?
Do you borrow money? If so, from whom? What do you do spend borrowed
money on?
Did you choose your occupation? Would you rather do something else?
Have you been to school?
How do you see the future of Biga?
According to you what is the main thing you wish changed?
243
Appendix V Group interview - Questions posed to the Galu fishermen's
committee, 8 members were present, and responses. (26/6/96) (Source: Rubens, 1996;
this study)
1. How many fishermen are there at each of the landing points, by fishing
method?
Mwaepe Mwanyaza Mvureni
Lema 10 16 15
Bunduki 25-30 40-45 20-30
Jarife/kutega 6 5 8
Mshipi 8 13 14
2. How many days per month do you fish? On average 25 days in
the good season, 2 days per month rest days. During the low season days lost due
to bad weather, illness, and some people don't fish but concentrate on the crops
(Hassan Juma Mwaliphunzo), some fishermen don't fish on fridays, but most of the
Digos do.
3. Are there many more fishermen today than in the past, 30 years ago.
Three to Four times as many.
4. Have catches changed over the last 20 -30 years. (Effort) 20-30 years ago
used to only have three traps and get 100 fish per trap, and would catch fish having
reset the the trap and gone back to it a few hours later. Now have 9-11 traps, leave
them out all night and get very few fish. (Method/bait) Wouldn't catch anything if
you didn't use urchins as bait. In the past would only used seaweed because you
would get too many fish if urchins were used, would fill 4 big baskets with uchins.
(Effort) In the past didn't fish every day, sometimes only every three days, because
there was enough fish.
5. Has the sea and the lagoon changed. Yes, at mwanyaza tbe
sea used to be deep, used to have to paddle the canoes, now can pole everywhere
and even walk to the reef. The sea has also receded 50m.
6. Has the area of seagrass changed. It has reduced because of the pull nets
(beach seines), and because areas are exposed at low tide.
7. Has the beach changed. The sand at Mwaepe comes and goes
with the season, during the kuzi there is no sand, in the kaskazi the sand comes
back.
8. When were the Wapemba baned from fishing at mvureni.
	 They
were asked to stop fishing/landing at mvureni, they moved to mwaepe in 1980, now
they won't go, they are giving money to the leaders, to the chairman, some bribe the
police...
9. Do the other areas want the wapemba to leave (chale, kinondo,
mgwani).
	 At kinondo pull seine nets are used by the digo, they have joined the
pembas and don't care about the desruction.
244
10. The wapemba were chased away from Golden,will they come back?
The local leaders there were not bribed, so the local fishermen could stop
the beach seine crews.
11. How does their system of sharing/ownership work. One man owns
the net, he owns the boats and nets, every day the catch is divided into three: shares
for the boat and gear; the crew; and the bribe fund. The younger crew periodically
go back to Pemba with money for families. This system of fishing is banned in
Tanzania.
12. Does the DC care about this situation. Unless the problem is
explained to him, he won't know what is going on. There is no-one here with the
authority to go and explain.
Bunduki is hard work, so no energy to work in the shambas as well.
Bunduki get good fish, but hard work and a short life, gill nets good but the
fish can go bad, traps best they think.
none of the members of their families sell curios, very few have work in
hotels, and then only as shamba boys
- if it was available they would like their children to work in hotels, but if
there were no Wapemba and the se was as it used to be, then there would be no
need to work in the hotels.
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Appendix VI Disclaimer to reassure the fishermen's committee
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
19/6/96
At the request of the Biga Fishermen's Committee we would like to outline the
purpose and subjects of our studies:
Anthony King - To study the artisanal fisheries in Kenya, starting in Diani and
Galu/Kinondo, with particular interest in the traditional and
indigenous methods of resource use and resource management
and the effect of tourism on the fisheries. This work is for a
PhD at the University of Warwick in England.
Delphine King - To study the production systems of the fishing communities in
Kenya, to understand the division of time and labour between
fishing and agriculture and to understand the costs and
benefits of this division. This work is for a PhD at the
University of Warwick in England.
Jason Rubens - To study the economics and ecology of coral reef fisheries in
Kenya. This work is for a Masters of Science at the
University of Newcastle in England.
All our work is purely for our academic studies at our universities in England. It has
no link to any KWS project or any other project. We would hope that the results of
our studies would identify the problems fishermen face and suggest some solutions
to these problems.
Anthony King	 Delphine King	 Jason Rubens
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Appendix VII Hierarchy scores applied to all the actors in all the networks for the
valued graphs.
Basic administration hierarchy (AdHi) includes organisations such as formal
committees, it reflects an individual's position in the hierarchy.
Political hierarchy (PoHi) includes the politicians and the administration, and any
overtly politicised bodies or people.
Note that an actor in the network, ie. has a tie, starts with 1. So if the Att. Gen has a
tie it is 7 (+ 1) = 8 as shown in italics. The Combined hierarchy (ComHi) includes
the + 1.
Actor Code AdHi (+1) PoHi (+1) ComHi
Assistant Director Fisheries ADF 6 7 0 I 7
Attorney General Att. Gen. 7 8 5 6 13
Coast Development Authority CDA 6 7 0 1 7
Chief 3 4 1 2 5
Construction Company Constr. Co. 0 1 0 I 1
Councillors 2 3 2 3 5
District Commissioner DC 5 6 3 4 9
District Development Council DDC 5 6 0 I 6
District Development Officer DDO 5 6 0 I 6
District Environment Committee DEC 5 6 0 I 6
District Executive Council DEC 5 6 0 1 6
Diani Fishermen's Coop. Soc. DFCS 0 I 0 1 1
Digo Fishers 0 1 0 1 1
District Accountant Dis. Acc. 5 6 0 I 6
District Cooperative Officer Dis. Coop. 5 6 0 I 6
District Land Officer Dis. Land. 5 6 0 I 6
District Works Officer Dis. Wks. 5 6 0 1 6
District Surveyor Dis. Surv. 5 6 0 1 6
District Officer DO 4 5 2 3 7
Elders 0 I 0 I 1
Expatriate residents Expats. 0 1 0 1 1
Fisheries Officer FO 3 4 0 I 4
Hoteliers 0 1 0 I 1
Independent Fishers &Traders Inde. Fishers/Traders 0 1 0 I 1
KANU reps. 0 I 2 3 3
Kwale County Council KCC 5 6 2 3 8
Kenya Power & Lighting KP&L 5 6 0 1 6
Kenya Wildlife Service (district) KWS dis. 5 6 0 1 6
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Kenya Wildlife Service (provincial) KWS prov 6 7 0 1 7
Kenya Wildlife Service (state) KWS state 7 8 0 I 8
Ministry of Land MoLand state 7 8 5 6 13
Ministry of Public Works MoPW state 7 8 0 1 8
Ministry of Regional Development MoRegDev state 7 8 0 1 8
Member of Parliament MP Matug 5 6 3 4 9
Member of Parliament MP Msam 5 6 3 4 9
Police (distict) OCPD dis 5 6 0 1 6
Police (location) OCS 3 4 0 1 4
Provincial Commissioner PC 6 7 4 5 11
Private Developer Priv. Deve. 0 1 0 I 1
Private Investor Priv. Inves. 0 I 0 I 1
Provincial State Council PSC 6 7 0 1 7
Senior Fisheries Officer SFO 5 6 0 I 6
Sub Chief 2 3 0 1 3
Tanzanian Consul TZ Consul 0 1 4 5 5
Village Chairman Vill. Chairman 1 2 0 1 2
Wapemba 0 1 0 1 1
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Appendix VIII Actor codes to reflect institutional levels and types in the networks
Scale level Code Sub-type Code Type Code
Local 1 Administrative 1 Formal 1
District 2 Political 2 Informal 2
Provincial 3 Natural resource management/exploitation 3
National 4 Non natural resource management/exploitation 4
Actor Scale level Sub-type Type
ADF 3 3 1
AttnGenOf 4 4 1
BigaFishers 1 3 2
CDA 3 4 1
Chief 1 1 1
Councillors 1 2 1
DC 2 1 1
DDC 2 4 1
DDO 2 4 1
DFCS 1 3 1
DisCoopOf 2 4 1
DisEnvCom 2 3 1
DisExecCoun 2 4 1
DisLandOf 2 4 1
DO 1 1 1
Elders 1 1 2
Expats 1 3 2
FO 1 3 1
KANUreps 1 2 1
KCC 2 2 1
KWSdis 2 3 1
KWSprov 3 3 1
KWSstate 4 3 1
MinLand 4 4 1
MP 2 2 1
MPMatuga 2 2 1
MPMsambweni 2 2 1
OCPD 2 4 1
OCS 1 4 1
PC 3 1 1
PrivDev 1 4 2
PSC 3 2 1
SFO 2 3 1
SubChief 1 1 1
TanzConsul 4 4 1
VillChair 1 1 1
Wapemba 1 3 2
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Appendix IX Values of actor importance according to Eigenvector Centrality (CE),
used to identify which model (hierarchy scores) to adopt for the social network
analysis of all the phases of the three issues. Actor hierarchy scores are presented in
Appendix VII.
Marine Reserve
Binary (CE) Administrative (CE) Political (CE) Combined (CE)
KWSprov 0.350 KWSprov 0.427 DC 0.445 DC 0.416
DC 0.330 DC 0.358 Councillors 0.352 KWSprov 0.367
DO 0.305 SFO 0.293 DO 0.324 DO 0.300
BigaFishers 0.305 DO 0.287 KANUreps 0.322 BigaFishers 0.282
Councillors 0.302 BigaFishers 0.279 Chief 0.278 Councillors 0.280
Chief 0.285 CDA 0.267 BigaFishers 0.269 SFO 0.269
KANUreps 0.285 KWSdis 0.262 KWSprov 0.261 FO 0.257
SFO 0.285 Chief 0.256 FO 0.259 Chief 0.255
KWSdis 0.280 Councillors 0.250 SFO 0.242 KWSdis 0.253
FO 0.266 FO 0.248 KWSdis 0.235 MPmsambwen i 0.225
CDA 0.212 MPmsambweni 0.197 MPmsambweni 0.222 PC 0.218
MPmsambweni 0.173 KANUreps 0.181 PC 0.107 CDA 0.216
DFCS 0.091 KCC 0.128 CDA 0.072 KANUreps 0.212
KCC 0.086 PC 0.119 KCC 0.067 KCC 0.115
PC 0.081 DFCS 0.096 DFCS 0.023 DFCS 0.067
KWSstate 0.037 KWSstate 0.056 KWSstate 0.010 KWSstate 0.039
Wapemba Beach Seine
Binary Administrative Political Combined
BigaFishers 0.393 DO 0.450 SFO 0274 DO 0.472
DO 0.369 SFO 0.422 DO 0.493 DC 0.403
Wapemba 0.338 DC 0.365 DC 0.381 SFO 0.380
DC 0.327 FO 0.309 MP 0.296 MP 0.335
FO 0.321 MP 0.299 KANUreps 0.291 FO 0.257
Chief 0.270 BigaFishers 0.274 PC 0.279 PC 0.245
SFO 0.263 ADF 0.234 BigaFishers 0.269 BigaFishers 0.234
KANUreps 0.243 Chief 0.209 Chief 0.241 ADF 0.233
MP 0.203 PC 0.194 FO 0.224 Chief 0.198
OCS 0.184 Wapemba 0.190 Wapemba 0.197 Wapemba 0.167
VillChair 0.178 OCS 0.172 Councillor 0.134 OCS 0.147
ADF r 0.152 VillChair 0.098 OCS 0.124 KANUreps 0.130
PC 0.148 KANUreps 0.075 ADF 0.114 KWS 0.081
Councillor 0.122 KWS 0.074 TanzConsul 0.089 VillChair 0.069
OCPD 0.098 Councillor 0.057 KWS 0.082 Councillor 0.063
TanzConsul 0.066 SubChief 0.027 VillChair 0.065 TanzConsul 0.034
KWS 0.050 OCPD 0.015 SubChief 0.027 SubChief 0.024
SubChief 0.036 TanzConsul 0.013 OCPD 0.026 OCPD 0.010
Land
Binary Administrative Political Combined
BigaFishers 0.447 SFO 0.517 DC 0.652 DC 0.597
DC 0.436 DC 0.494 BigaFishers 0.373 SFO 0.433
DFCS 0.379 DisCoopOf 0.406 DisCoopOf 0.350 DisCoopOf 0.405 .
SFO 0.336 DDO 0.285 DDO 0.323 DDO 0.321
DisCoopOf 0.331 DFCS 0.247 SFO 0.311 BigaFishers 0.260
DDO 0.270 FO 0.232 MinLand 0.289 MinLand 0.225
FO 0.218 BigaFishers 0.209 DFCS 0.138 DFCS 0.163
MinLand 0.196 MinLand 0.161 FO 0.050 FO 0.141
Chief 0.133 AttnGenOf 0.158 DisLandOf 0.036 AttnGenOf 0.104
OCS 0.133 PSC 0.158 PrivDev 0.036 PSC 0.104
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DisLandOf 0.099 Chief 0.060 Expats 0.036 Chief 0.035
PrivDev 0.099 OCS 0.060 ADF 0.036 OCS 0.029
Expats 0.099 DisLandOf 0.011 AttnGenOf 0.030 DisLandOf 0.010
ADF 0.099 PrivDev 0.011 PSC 0.030 PrivDev 0.010
AttnGenOf 0.075 Expats 0.011 Chief 0.023 Expats 0.010
PSC 0.075 ADF 0.011 OCS 0.018 ADF 0.010
251
